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Abstract

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) is a network-based attack where the aim of
the attacker is to overwhelm the victim server. The attacker floods the server by
sending enormous amount of network packets in a distributed manner beyond the
server’s capacity and thus causing the disruption of its normal service. In this
dissertation, we focus to build intelligent detectors that can learn by themselves with
less human interactions and detect DDoS attacks accurately. Machine learning (ML)
has promising outcomes throughout the technologies including cybersecurity and
provides us with intelligence when applied on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
In addition, from the state-of-the-art ML-based IDSs, the Ensemble classifier
(combination of classifiers) outperforms single classifier. Therefore, we have
implemented both supervised and unsupervised ensemble frameworks to build IDSs
for better DDoS detection accuracy with lower false alarms compared to the existing
ones. Our experimentation, done with the most popular and benchmark datasets
such as NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017, have achieved at most detection
accuracy of 99.1% with the lowest false positive rate of 0.01%. As feature selection is
one of the mandatory preprocessing phases in ML classification, we have designed
several feature selection techniques for better performances in terms of DDoS
detection accuracy, false positive alarms, and training times. Initially, we have
implemented an ensemble framework for feature selection (FS) methods which
combines almost all well-known FS methods and yields better outcomes compared
to any single FS method.
The goal of my dissertation is not only to detect DDoS attacks precisely but also
to demonstrate explanations for these detections. Interpretable machine learning
(IML) technique is used to explain a detected DDoS attack with the help of the
effectiveness of the corresponding features. We also have implemented a novel
feature selection approach based on IML which helps to find optimum features that
vi

are used further to retrain our models. The retrained model gives better
performances than general feature selection process. Moreover, we have developed
an explainer model using IML that identifies detected DDoS attacks with proper
explanations based on effectiveness of the features.
The contribution of this dissertation is five-folded with the ultimate goal of
detecting the most frequent DDoS attacks in cyber security. In order to detect DDoS
attacks, we first used ensemble machine learning classification with both supervised
and unsupervised classifiers. For better performance, we then implemented and
applied two feature selection approaches, such as ensemble feature selection
framework and IML based feature selection approach, both individually and in a
combination with supervised ensemble framework. Furthermore, we exclusively
added explanations for the detected DDoS attacks with the help of explainer models
that are built using LIME and SHAP IML methods. To build trustworthy explainer
models, a detailed survey has been conducted on interpretable machine learning
methods and on their associated tools. We applied the designed framework in
various domains, like smart grid and NLP-based IDS to verify its efficacy and ability
of performing as a generic model.
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c h a p t er 1

Introduction

Cybersecurity has been a very serious issue and therefore, ensuring a secure
cyberspace/cyber world is crucial for the national security, the organization as well
as for the general public who depend upon the current networking technology and
the Internet. Each year, the usage of these technologies has been increasing steeply
along with an exponential increase in the attack surface available to the criminal
elements. For example, Cybersecurity Ventures estimates that the economic loss due
to cybercrime will soon reach $6 trillion annually by 2021 [1]. Developing new
countermeasures will certainly aid in curtailing the tide of cybercrime. From the
beginning of the evolution of the Internet, the proper way of packet transmission
and process-overhead cost reduction were the major concerns. Cyber-attackers can
easily exploit the existing limitations of Internet protocols (TCP, UDP, etc.) with the
help of readily available attack tools.
A distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is mostly a network attack that
causes the network resources unavailable to the intended users or overloads the
bandwidth due to the use of immense inbound or outbound traffic over the network,
or both; therefore, resulting in disruption of the normal operation. A
well-documented DDoS attack was first reported in August 1999 which was used to
flood a computer of the University of Minnesota by deploying a DDoS tool named
’Trinno’ in at least 227 systems and the target was knocked down for more than two
days. Nowadays, attackers use multiple compromised machines (botnet) that can be
located in geographically different places of the world in a distributed way to attack
a single target system. In recent years, attacks on financial systems, broadcast
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systems, and Internet-based services have grown exponentially [2]. Moreover, these
attacks are wide-ranging, devastating, easy to implement, and hard to detect and
defend, and constitute a major threat to Internet privacy and security. Today’s
Internet is badly plagued by DDoS attack and this phenomenon has drastically
escalated over the last decade. For the last couple of years, Tech Giants such as
GitHub, Amazon, Cloudflare, Facebook, Instagram, etc. have been facing serious
service disruption [3] caused by DDoS. According to the Amazon Web Services
(AWS) Shield Threat Landscape report [4], the largest DDoS attack in history has
been recorded in February 2020 which reached 2.3 terabyte per second (Tbps), and
now it is ruling the cyber-attack arena.
In the competitive combat against cyber-attacks (e.g., DDoS), defenders are
incessantly implementing newest technologies, mechanisms, countermeasures, etc.
to defeat the attackers. Throughout the scrutinization of existing DDoS attacks, it is
found that the attacks can be mitigated by one of the three approaches or defense
mechanisms, namely attacker-end, victim-end, and in-network approach, depending
on their locality of deployment. Though the attacker-end detection approach is much
more challenging than the victim-end detection approach, solutions do exist. On the
other hand, victim-end detection is easier to implement compared to the other two
types of detection approaches. The existing detection approaches can be categorized
into statistical, soft computing, clustering, knowledge-based, and hybrid approaches.
Based on the type of dataset [5], these approaches can also be classified as
supervised or unsupervised.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software or hardware implementation
which monitors the network traffic to look for suspicious or abnormal network
activity, which could represent an attack or unauthorized access or security violation.
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In the evolution of IDSs, anomaly-based detection is more popular than
signature-based detection. Traditional IDSs are designed to detect known threats but
can hardly identify unknown attacks. Behavioral analysis through network
baselining or defined rules are the basis of most common detection mechanisms. A
sophisticated attacker can bypass these common techniques, so the necessity of a
smart intrusion detection system is being felt badly day by day.
Machine learning (ML) is a subset of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that has
promising outcomes in detecting cyber-attacks including DDoS when applied on
IDSs. In ML, supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised are three basic ways to
classify anomalous packets from normal packets. Supervised methods have the
privilege of differentiating anomalous and normal data from a tagged dataset.
Unsupervised methods, on the other hand, batch the dataset into several clusters
where the strength of the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among these,
novelty and outlier detection strategies are the unsupervised methods that have
significant outcomes in detecting unseen anomalies. One-class SVM (Support Vector
Machine), Local Outlier Factor (LOF), Elliptic Envelope, Isolation Forest, etc. are the
most well-known novelty and outlier detection classifiers. Accuracy of the ML
models mostly depends on selecting appropriate features. Therefore,
explanation-based learning using Interpretable Machine Learning (IML) leverages to
find relevant features while predicting a data instance as either anomalous or normal
by using the ranking of all features. In addition, ensemble feature selection (FS)
method (combining well-known FS methods) provides an optimal set of features that
can produce better performances in terms of detecting DDoS attacks precisely and
lowering false alarms. Traditional ML models use black-box classifiers which lack
transparency. As a result, users do not rely on the predictions provided by these ML
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models in high-stakes decision making system. Adding explanation on how a
decision is made by the ML models can establish faith to the users. Therefore, an
explainer model generated by interpretable machine learning technique can provide
a detailed explanation to the user on how the decision is made by the ML models.
Using various ensemble frameworks including novel feature selection approach with
IML, DDoS (exiting and zero-day) attacks can be detected precisely with lesser false
alarms. Adding explanation with the precise detection can restore the faith to the
security experts as well as network admins that helps them to move forward in
mitigating these attacks.

1 .1

overview
Due to immense DDoS attack occurrences, it is nearly impossible to detect these

attacks with traditional approaches. Though they have good detection accuracy, the
problem arises while detecting an unseen or new attack. The traditional
signature-based detection techniques work with pre-stored knowledge (signature) of
an attempted attack, i.e., IDSs can detect an observation as an attack only if it
matches a pre-stored signature. As a result, an unseen DDoS attack remains unveiled
due to this limitation. In contrast, anomaly-based detection techniques check the
abnormality of the system behavior compared to predefined normal behavior. It has
the privilege of detecting unseen attacks, but at the cost of falsely detecting lots of
unusual activities as anomalies. Therefore, due to the existing limitations of both
detection techniques, a significant number of DDoS attacks remain undetected,
resulting in the misuse of the organization’s valuable information including
intellectual property, assets, sensitive data, government information, financial data,
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etc. Even if a DDoS attack is detected by an IDS, network admin or DDoS mitigator
cannot rely on the detection blindly.
Initially, the problem can be solved by applying various ML techniques on
Intrusion Detection System which can detect DDoS attacks precisely with
maintaining a lower false positive rate compared to traditional IDSs. An IDS can be
implemented inside or outside of a secure network perimeter to observe the network
flow, and the machine-learned pretrained model distinguishes the traffic as a DDoS
or a benign. ML classification works with data and feature values where a set of
data, known as training dataset, is used to train a classifier and another set of data,
known as testing dataset, is used to evaluate that trained model for outcome
prediction or approximation purposes. In a network infrastructure, data can be
obtained from the traffic flow and then different features can be extracted from it.
Sometimes ground truths (whether a DDoS or a benign data) are combined with the
traffic data to help create a labeled dataset for supervised training purposes.
Since all the features in a dataset are not relevant or important while training a
classifier, feature engineering is required. In an anomaly detection problem, feature
engineering is an ad-hoc process that uses trial and error to find the most relevant
features for the specific attack. Relevant feature selection is an important task in the
DDoS detection problem which can be accomplished by prior domain knowledge
and feature reduction techniques. In addition, explanation-based learning is a recent
technique to explain a predicted outcome based on the effectiveness of the features
of the corresponding data instance. Therefore, relevant features to identify DDoS
attacks can also be found from this approach. Hundreds of techniques, methods,
models, etc. have already been built by the ML community to classify data.
Choosing the right technique or method is another crucial task for data classification.
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By using different ML classifiers or techniques, one can generate multiple outcomes
from a single dataset. To get the best DDoS detection accuracy, the next important
task is to choose the specific classifiers or techniques which can be done by
experimenting with multiple techniques and/or methods and by tuning their
hyperparameters. Ensemble based machine learning uses various ML classifiers to
model the dataset and predicts more accurate outcomes which solves the
dependability problem of using certain classifier. In addition, reduced number of
features obtained from the feature selection process converges the dataset earlier
with a better outcome. Though ML models provide a greater outcome, the users
cannot rely on this prediction in high-stake decision-making system completely due
to the lack of transparency. To establish the faith on predictions, interpretable
machine learning provides explanations along with the outcomes. The explanation,
which is based on the effectiveness of the critical features, not only guarantees users
accurate prediction but also helps retrain the model with a feedback trigger by using
these features as a feature selection process.

1 .2

motivation and scope
Researchers have experimented with a wide range of techniques, methods,

approaches, etc. to detect DDoS attacks. However, due to the rapid growth of
strategies and immense attacks, most of the approaches are found obsolete within a
very short time of their establishment. An IDS always guards systems against
different cyber-attacks with its monitoring techniques. These techniques are
upgraded every now and then to cope up with the recent days’ threats. Therefore,
the traditional design for signature based IDSs fails to detect unseen attacks.
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Similarly, anomaly based IDSs detect a large number of false attacks. Moreover,
detecting DDoS attacks in real-time is much more challenging than detecting other
types of attacks but adding intelligence with IDSs increases the chance of DDoS
detection precisely. In the past few years, severe disruptions occurred in several tech
giants like GitHub, Amazon, Cloudflare, Facebook, Instagram, etc. [3], [4], making
the security experts struggle to detect DDoS attacks and find countermeasures. All
of these motivated us to work on this research field.
A large number of ML based IDSs are studied in the literature review in
Chapter 2. There, most of the researchers focused on single ML classification in
anomaly detection. A comparative analysis of applying well-known ML models is
missing. In addition, a very of them only mentioned ensemble classification,
however, didn’t use stacking or combining unsupervised methods. This research
scope motivated us to focus on applying ensemble learning in anomaly detection
problem. Moreover, in improving the models’ accuracy by using feature selection
approaches guided us to work on this research area. Based on the literature review,
we found that security researchers are struggling and not so successful in solving
this research problem to detect DDoS attacks precisely. We were confident and
proved that our ensemble frameworks along with two feature selection approaches
generated better results compared to the existing solutions listed in literature review.
Due to the drawbacks inherent in traditional IDS approaches in detecting
unseen attacks, it is necessary to incorporate intelligence with detection mechanisms.
As mentioned earlier, ML methods use intelligence to learn in predicting certain
behavior precisely. A wide variety of classifiers from different classifier families have
already been used in anomaly detection problem and still being used. In addition,
combining these classifiers is not a new idea but fruitful. The benefits of ensemble
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learning, i.e., combining multiple classifiers to form a more powerful classifier have
been well-studied in the ML community. Ensembles can perform better than a single
classifier [6], and many classification problems can be solved using the idea of
combining multiple classifiers. ML approaches (e.g., single classifier, ensemble,
interpretable machine learning, etc.) have outstanding outcomes over traditional
signature-based and anomaly-based techniques.
Several standalone machine learning classifiers have been used in detecting
intrusions [7]. However, not all the classifiers perform in the same way on the same
data. It has been shown that ML ensemble provides better accuracy and decisive
results compared to individual data classifications. Supervised methods learn to
differentiate the different classes in the data from a tagged or labeled dataset. They
require large amounts of curated data. Unsupervised methods, on the other hand
work on unlabeled data and group the different classes into clusters where the
strength of the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among unsupervised
methods, novelty and outlier detection strategies have shown significant promises in
detecting otherwise hidden anomalies. Unsupervised methods are better equipped
to discover zero-day attacks which are never before encountered. As such, a scheme
that utilizes both supervised and unsupervised classifiers can address and
counterbalance the drawbacks inherent to each other. Here we develop a DDoS
intrusion detection mechanism that employs machine learning ensembles of both
supervised and unsupervised classifiers that are complementary in reaching a
corroborated classification decision and provides higher performance with respect to
lower processing time. In addition, due to the black-box nature of traditional ML
approaches, security experts and system admins do not rely on ML predictions
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completely. Therefore, to establish the faith in ML predictions, we include
explanations to each prediction of ML models.

1 .3

threat model
With DDoS attacks the goal of the attacker is to overwhelm the capacity of the

target server with barrages of service requests. This causes the server to not able to
respond to the legitimate service requests at all or respond after significant delay
thereby effectively denying the service. In the threat model, we assumed that:
In the threat model used in this dissertation, we assume that:
• The attack traffic comes from many different compromised hosts or botnets
• The attacker can utilize IP spoofing or flooding requests to cause DDoS attacks
• The attacker can attack at the different OSI layers of the network
• A DDoS attack can be constituted with high-volume traffic or low-volume
traffic
We have considered the following DDoS attack scenarios:
• Back Attack: A victim web server gets a large number of requests containing
many front-slashes (“///////. . ..///”) that causes more processing time
resulting in slow down the server.
• Land Attack: A local area network denial (LAND) attack consists of sending a
special poison spoofed packet to a victim, causing it to lock up.

9

• Neptune Attack: A victim TCP server can be crashed for rejecting new
connections due to a large number of successive spoofed SYN packets are sent
to it.
• Ping of Death: Sending a ping packet with more than 64k data size and crash
the server.
• HTTP Flood: Without using malformed packets, spoofing or reflection
techniques, and much more bandwidth, the attacker exploits seemingly
legitimate HTTP, GET or POST requests to overwhelm a target web server or
application.
• Smurf Attack: By exploiting Internet Protocol (IP) and Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP), a malware program called smurf spoofs IP addresses and
pings them alike ping flood but amplify the attack vector.
• Heartbleed: Attackers can gain the access or steal information protected by
SSL/TLS encryption by leveraging vulnerabilities in the popular OpenSSL
cryptographic software library.
• Teardrop: The attacker sends malformed fragmented TCP/IP packets with their
fragment offset fields overloaded using IP protocol to the victim. When the
victim tries to reassemble those fragment TCP/IP packet, they get crashed or
rebooted due to the discrepancy of these fragments.
• Mail Bomb: A victim’s mailbox can be crashed or slow downed due to getting
enormous amount of successive e-mails from the attackers or urged by
zombies.
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• Process Table: Attackers completely fill up a target server’s (Linux OS run as
root) process table with multiple instantiations of incoming TCP/IP connection
and overwhelm the target for not executing any other commands.
• UDP Storm: In an UDP storm attack, attackers establish a connection between
two UDP services where each of them produces a huge number of packets to
congest or slow down the network.
• Slow Send: Attackers slowly send legitimate incomplete HTTP requests causing
a victim server to reserve resources for open connections waiting for their
completion.
• Slow Read: In slow read, attackers establish a number of active concurrent
connection with a victim server and send legitimate HTTP request to that
server followed by a slow consumption of the HTTP response sent the victim
causing it unavailable to serve other clients.

1 .4

goal, contribution, and novelty
We aim to improve the DDoS detection accuracy and provide a valid

justification (e.g. explanation) for a detected DDoS attack. Here is the detail of this
dissertation goal:
• Detecting DDoS attack precisely with negligible false alarms
• Reducing ML training time by minimizing dimensionality with maintaining
greater DDoS detection accuracy
• Comparative analysis of both supervised and unsupervised ML models in
terms of obtaining best detection accuracy
11

• Identifying DDoS attacks with proper explanation
• Providing accurate explanation with a comparative analysis of two explainer
models
• Providing generic intrusion detection mechanism that can be applied in other
attack types
To fulfill these goals, we focus on developing various ML-based IDSs to detect
DDoS attacks and explainer models for explanation purposes. We have applied our
designed ML-based IDSs on various domains like smart grid, NLP based IDS, etc. In
experimentation, three benchmark intrusion datasets namely, NSL-KDD [8],
UNSW-NB15 [9], and CICIDS2017 [10] are used. To build IDSs, we have
implemented two ensemble machine learning frameworks, two feature selection
mechanisms, and two interpretable machine learning based explainer models for
explaining predicted DDoS attacks. A list of our contributions is shown here:
• Machine learning classification for DDoS detection:
– Implemented a supervised ensemble framework [Chapter 4]
– Designed an unsupervised ensemble framework with novelty and outlier
detection type classifiers [Chapter 5 ]
• Feature selection approaches to improve DDoS detection accuracy:
– Designed an ensemble-based feature selection framework using various
well-known selection methods [Chapter 7]
– Implemented a novel feature selection process using interpretable machine
learning technique [Chapter 9]
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– Combined the above two feature selection processes using an OR logic
and compared with traditional FS methods [Chapter 7, 9]
• DDoS attack detection with verification dataset:
– Combined supervised and unsupervised ensemble ML frameworks with
an OR logic as the core detection mechanism of an IDS to obtain a better
prediction in detecting DDoS attacks [Chapter 6]
– The pretrained detection mechanism is installed within an IDS and with a
verification dataset, it can detect DDoS attacks more precisely with
negligible false alarms [Chapter 6]
• Taxonomy of Interpretable Machine Learning methods and tools:
– Provided a taxonomy of IML methods with their building blocks to know
the current state of the art [Chapter 8]
– Identified requirements in order to build transparent ML models [Chapter
8]
– In addition to IML model taxonomy, we classified the IML tools that helps
users to find the best IML tool according to their needs [Chapter 8]
• Explanation of detected DDoS attacks:
– Provided the explanation of predicted DDoS data with corresponding
features [Chapter 10]
– In building robust and consistent explanation, we generated the consistent
explanations for overall dataset [Chapter 10]
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– We experimented with two well-known IML methods namely, LIME and
SHAP and provided a comparison based on consistency and likelihood
scores to find the best explainer model [Chapter 10]
– In addition to generating the explanation for the detected DDoS attacks,
we provided a confidence score (similar types of attacks will provide
similar features) that guarantees the more accurate explanation [Chapter
10]
• Application of the frameworks in various domains:
– We applied our supervised ensemble framework for detecting network
anomaly using NLP with HTTP DATASET CSIC 2010 dataset [Chapter 11]
– We also applied our supervised and unsupervised ensemble frameworks
in smart grid to detect Stealthy False Data Injection attacks to demonstrate
that our ensemble ML approach is robust and generic [Chapter 12]
Though DDoS attack detection is not new, improvement of the attack detection
with minimal overhead is always cherished by the security experts in order to
mitigate further losses. The novelty of our research lies in many sectors of anomaly
detection using ML techniques, including ensemble technique, explainability, feature
selection approaches, etc. Details of the novelty of our research are listed below:
• Feature selection using interpretable machine learning [Chapter 9]
• Unsupervised ensemble framework with novelty and outlier detection type
classifiers [Chapter 5]
• Comparing and contrasting DDoS detection model using both supervised and
unsupervised ensembles [Chapter 6]
14

F igure 1 . 1: Cybersecurity analytics processflow
• Finding the consistency of the explanations for overall dataset [Chapter 10]
• Explaining DDoS prediction with adding confidence in it [Chapter 10]

1 .5

processflow of the dissertation
From a cyber security analytics perspective, several step by step processes are

needed to be accomplished to provide a complete security solution. Figure 1.1 shows
an overview of a cyber security analytics incorporating machine learning technique
on it. Here in this dissertation, we only focus three steps: data generation, data
preprocessing and model classification highlighted with a blue box in the figure,
considering other steps have been taken care of. The three highlighted steps can be
combined and replaced by an intrusion detection system.
In real world scenario, a system can be defended by an IDS that is deployed on
the perimeter of the secured network. The core component (i.e., detection
mechanism) of our IDS contains the combination of best performing supervised and
unsupervised pre-trained models. Figure 1.2 depicts the process flow of the DDoS
detection and explanation mechanism within the IDS. The detection mechanism
15

collects the network traffic as it comes into the secured network. The traffic data goes
through data preprocessing steps where it is sanitized, and feature reduced with
various approaches. Then it goes through the best performing supervised and
unsupervised models. If any one of the models identify the presence of a potential
DDoS intrusion, then the mechanism raises an alert for the network administrator to
take necessary action. In addition, a justifiable explanation is provided for the
potential DDoS attack with a confidence value which denotes the correctness of the
explanation. Figure 1.3 shows the deployment of our dissertation within an IDS.

F igure 1 .2: Process flow of the Dissertation

16

F igure 1 .3: Deployment of the dissertation within an IDS
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1 .7

dissertation roadmap
Chapter 2 gives a brief discussion of background and related work on IDS,

DDoS detection, and existing ML approaches in anomaly detection, feature selection
and explanation. It also summarizes the existing ML based IDS and highlights some
of their shortcomings. The datasets that we have used in our research are briefly
mentioned in Chapter 3. In addition, the performance evaluation metrics that we
have used throughout all our experiments is shown here. Ensemble frameworks
using supervised classifiers and unsupervised classifiers are shown in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 respectively with their detailed experimentation. Supervised and
unsupervised ensemble frameworks are combined in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 and
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Chapter 9 show the details of two feature selection approaches, namely ensemble
feature selection methods and IML based feature selection approach respectively. In
these two chapters, we verified our proposed two feature selection approaches with
various experiments and compered with existing feature selection methods. To know
the state-of-the-art of interpretable machine learning (IML) method, we provide a
taxonomy of IML methods with their corresponding building blocks in Chapter 8.
Chapter 10 presents the explanation of predicted DDoS attack by using an explainer
model built with IML techniques. To address the robustness of our two ensemble
ML frameworks, we implied these models in various domains like Smart grid and
NLP based IDS which are shown in Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 respectively. Finally,
in Chapter 13, we conclude our dissertation and show future directions in order to
extend this dissertation. Appendix a, b, c and d show the detailed experimental
results with figures, graphs and table for the Chapter 4, 5, 7 and 9 respectively.
Finally, a details of the implementation for these frameworks are shown in Appendix
e.
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c h a p t er 2

Background and Related Work

Before going deeper, we need to know the background and corresponding
works. Each of the subsections is organized as to provide a detailed background
along with its related work.

2 .1

intrusion detection system ( ids )

2.1.1 What is an IDS?
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software or hardware implementation
that monitors a system (software, hardware, OS, network, etc.) for malicious
activities and policy violations. Based on different detection mechanisms, a variety
of IDSs now exists. It can be placed in different locations such as inside a network,
outside a network, or inside an offline host to monitor the system’s activity. IDSs can
be classified according to their detection technique, functionality, deployment
approach, working mode (active/passive), placement, etc. Most IDSs have an
administrator with a Security Information database and Event Management system
(SIEM) which uses an alarm filtering technique that distinguishes a malicious
activity or policy violation and reports that to the administrator. The administrator,
on receiving the alarm, activates its built-in action plan to prevent malicious activity
and corresponding damages. However, detecting system abnormality in real-time is
a challenging task due to unexpected system behavior [11].
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2.1.2 Requirements of IDSs
While building an IDS, some building blocks are required that need to be taken
into account. Here are some requirements [12] for IDSs:
Accuracy: Accuracy for IDSs is determined by the percentage of successfully
detected attacks and the corresponding percentage of undetected attacks (false
negatives). In addition, falsely triggered alarms (false positives) are needed to
consider for getting better accuracy.
Minimal overhead: IDSs can experience overhead due to computation and
communication efforts as well as signaling inside the IDS (e.g., between monitors, or
between monitor and analysis unit). Therefore, the lesser the overhead of an IDS, the
better the performance.
Scalability: Scalability is the property of a system where performance should
increase linearly with the size of the resources added. IDSs require scalability that
protects adding networks of arbitrary size. As a result, it overcomes the bottleneck
problem or Single Point of Failure.
Resilience: An IDS should maintain its availability and ensure an acceptable
accuracy in case of failures in internal components and/or during attacks. Through
resiliency, it prevents Single Point of Failures (SPoFs) and provides graceful
degradation and fast restoration mechanisms to counter failures and attacks.
Privacy: Privacy is the key requirement in every aspect of network security and
devices. Since IDS exchanges information, data, resources, etc. among its
components, it is particularly important to maintain privacy for the shared data
across domains which involve users, companies, and network providers.
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Self-configuration: Without the intervention of an administrator, an IDS should
have the ability to adjust itself automatically and construct a less error-prone system.
Interoperability: It is the ability of a system to inter-operate with instances of the
same system deployed (e.g. IDS) in other networks and also across different IDSs.

2.1.3 Types of IDSs
Intrusion Detection System can be classified based on their detection techniques,
functionality, deployment approach, working mode (active/passive), placement,
etc. [12], [13], [14].
• Based on Working Mode: IDS can be categorized as active and passive based on
its working mode.
a. Active: An active IDS is also known as Intrusion Detection and Prevention
System (IDPS) which is configured to automatically block suspected
attacks without any intervention required by an operator.
b. Passive: On the other hand, a passive IDS is configured to only monitor
and analyze network traffic activity and alert an operator to potential
vulnerabilities and attacks. It is not capable of performing any protective
or corrective functions on its own.
• Based on Placement: IDS can be categorized as NIDS and HIDS.
a. Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): Usually, it consists of network
appliances (or sensors) with a Network Interface Card (NIC) operating in
promiscuous mode and a separate management interface to monitor all
incoming and outgoing traffic from network segment or boundary.
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b. Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS): Along with software applications
(agents) a HIDS can be installed on workstations to monitor operating
system, another application, and write data to log files and/or trigger
alarms.
The difference between these two IDSs is, one is installed on the workstation
(offline or online) while the other is on the network. During host compromising,
a HIDS can be disabled by attackers whereas a NIDS is not a part of hosts.
• Based on functionality: IDS can be IDS, IPS, and IDPS.
a. Intrusion Detection System: IDS can only monitor applications or systems or
network activity and trigger alarms, but it doesn’t have any capability for
countermeasure.
b. Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): IPS, on the other hand, has the proactive
technique which prevents an attack before entering a network by
examining packets and their patterns, and finally blocks them.
c. Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS): IDPS has the capability to
detect and prevent any attack against the system. It has three main parts,
namely preprocessing, classification, and protection. A packet sniffer is
used to capture information from packets in the preprocessing part. Then
the preprocessed data is classified into two types: attack and normal
packets. Finally, for prevention, it takes appropriate action based on the
type of packet.
• Based on Deployment Approaches: IDS can be categorized into centralized,
decentralized, and distributed IDS based on its deployment approaches.
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a. Centralized IDS: It consists of several monitors which monitor the behavior
of their respective host connected to them or the passing network traffic
through which they share their data with a central analysis unit. However,
the central analysis unit represents a performance bottleneck or a Single
Point of Failure (SPoF).
b. Decentralized IDS: Usually, it employs a hierarchical structure of
monitoring points or multiple self-contained IDS deployments and thus
overcomes the performance bottleneck of centralized IDS.
c. Distributed IDS: The distributed IDS employs a Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
architecture to share the tasks of the central analysis unit equally among
all monitors where each monitor acts as an analysis unit that facilitates the
monitored data to be correlated, aggregated, and analyzed in a completely
distributed manner.
• Based on Detection Techniques: There are two basic techniques to detect a
malicious event through IDS. They are:
a. Signature-based IDS: A database of previous attack signatures and known
system vulnerabilities is referenced in a signature-based or
knowledge-based IDS. An IDS records the evidence of an intrusion or
attack. Each intrusion leaves a footprint behind (e.g., nature of data
packets, failed attempt to run an application, failed logins, failed file and
folder access, etc.). These footprints are called signatures and can be used
to identify and prevent the same attacks in the future. Based on these
signatures, a signature-based IDS identifies intrusion attempts. This
signature database must be continually updated and maintained for better
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accuracy. However, a signature-based IDS often fails to identify a unique
attack due to the lack of information stored in the database.
b. Anomaly-based IDS: It is also known as Behavior-based IDS. It references a
baseline or learned pattern of normal system activity to identify active
intrusion attempts. Deviations from this baseline or pattern cause an
alarm to be triggered. Moreover, it can detect unseen attacks but at a cost
of high false alarms.
Anomaly-based IDS learns patterns through either rule engine or Artificial
Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence sometimes extends to Neural network,
Machine Learning, or Genetic Algorithm.
(a) Rule Engine: Here, an IDS detects anomalous behavior by comparing
the features of the packets to some predefined rules that are defined
by the administrator or by some algorithm through learning.
(b) AI/ NN/ GA based: Artificial Intelligence facilitates the IDS to define a
new set of rules for attack detection. Machine Learning helps to
predict a new attack that can be obtained by training a model using
real datasets (e.g.; normal or attack dataset). On the other hand,
Neural Network creates a set of cells that have a weighted connection
to other cells. Through training, the weights of connections are altered,
and the output is compared to the desired output. In Genetic
Algorithm, rules are defined where each rule consists of features that
can distinctly identify a class of attack. The rules are tested and
selected at the end of each iteration after comparing them with higher
fitness factors and modified to create new rules until the desired
detection rate is not achieved.
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2.1.4 Related Work on IDSs
Tremendous works have been done to improve the Intrusion Detection Systems’
detection accuracy over time. An IDS helps to protect the network from both inside
and outside attacks. Several techniques have been improvised to build a successful
IDS such as verifying system properties [15], monitoring web services [16], etc.
Anomaly-based IDS is most popular in detecting several attacks. Ahmed, et al. [17]
provided a survey of network anomaly detection techniques which are based on
classification, clustering, statistical and information theory, etc. Collaborative IDS
(CIDS) over traditional single IDS is benefited by overcoming the single point of
failure. Vasilomanolakis, et al. [12] provided a taxonomy and survey of existing
CIDSs. CIDSs can be classified as centralized, decentralized, and distributed CIDSs.
In addition, requirements and basic building blocks of traditional CIDS, comparison
of various approaches, and relationships among different attacks were discussed in
their paper. Recently, different machine learning [18], [19] techniques, deep
learning [20], etc. are being applied with IDS to detect the anomaly more accurately.

2 .2

distributed denial of service ( ddos)

2.2.1 What is a DDoS Attack?
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a cyber-attack in which the
perpetrator seeks to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended
users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the
Internet. This type of attack is originated by multiple sources aiming to make a
single target system unavailable. Nowadays, attackers create a botnet that can be
located geographically in various places of the world to penetrate a single target
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system during a certain time period. A very common type of DDoS attack is,
requesting many services from a server beyond its capability, resulting in the failure
of server responses back to the requesters. A large traffic load jams the network and
causes a denial of service. The simplest DDoS is ‘Smurf’ attack. Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) works on ‘echo’ and corresponding ‘reply’ packets. In
Smurf attack, the attacker compromises and spoofs a large number of hosts’ IP
addresses and sends an echo request to them which specifies the forged sender IP
address of target. Then all the compromised hosts reply back to the target system in
response to the echo request, resulting in ICMP packets flooding on target system.
Though security experts are experimenting and scrutinizing DDoS attacks for
prevention, there is no straightforward standard solution to defend against DDoS
attacks. It is being the top occurrence attack every year and increasing its traffic size
over time. Some of the world’s largest DDoS attacks of the last decade are shown in
Table 2.1 along with their rate of attack.
Table 2 .1: Largest DDoS attacks in terms of peak traffic rates [21]
Organization Details

Time

Rate of attack

Amazon

February,
2020
28-Feb-18
21-Oct-16
31-Dec-15
11-Feb-14

2.3 Tbps

19-Mar-13

∼300 Gbps

GitHub
Dyn
BBC
CloudFlare
Spamhaus

A known UDP reflection vector, CLDAP reflection
Web-based version control hosting service
A major DNS provider
News channel
A US based company providing network
security services including DDoS mitigation
A non-profit organization to track email spammers and spam related activity
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1.35 Tbps
1.2 Tbps
602 Gbps
∼400 Gbps

Figure 2 .1 : DDoS architecture [22]

2.2.2 Architecture of DDoS Attack
A DDoS attack has four basic components: Attacker, Handlers/ Controllers,
Bots/ Agents/ Zombies, and a Target. The attacker and the target are a single
system whereas in between these two, handlers and bots accelerate the attack into a
distributed way. The goal of the attacker is to disrupt the services of a target through
controllers and bots. From Figure 2.1 [22], the attacker compromises a network and
creates as many as possible controllers/ handlers in which attacker conveys the
attack instruction to them. The attacker uses controllers to infect many computers
(Botnets) and this benefits him to carry out a DDoS attack. Controllers are computers
that install threats or instructions to the bots about how or when to attack the
victim’s server/ machine to cripple it. Botnets can be voluntary but, in most cases,
botnets have no idea that they are being used to accelerate a DDoS attack. As soon as
the instruction from attacker is conveyed through the controller, botnets start sending
trashy requests to the target. In most of the cases, the attacker programs malware in
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a way that upon reaching the botnets, it not only sends high-rate traffic to the target
but also infects other systems to make more bots for the attack. As a result, it
increases the power of a DDoS attack exponentially which can make any target down
within a very short time. After the attack occurs, it is hardly possible to detect the
original source as the immediately before attack traffic coming from unsuspected
botnets who use spoofed IP address, has no trace to the original attacker.

2.2.3 Types of DDoS Attack
There are different types of DDoS attack in different layers of ‘Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI)’ model. In general, DDoS attacks can be segregated based on
the layer of the OSI model they attack. They are mostly available at Network (layer
3), Transport (Layer 4), Presentation (Layer 6), and Application (Layer 7) Layers.
Most common DDoS attacks in different layers are:
• Application (Layer 7)- HTTP floods, DNS query floods,
• Presentation (Layer 6)- SSL abuse,
• Transport (Layer 4)- SYN floods and
• Network (layer 3)- UDP reflection attacks
A DDoS attack has its common way of flooding the target system, and it can be
done by one of the following ways [22], [23]:
SYN Flood: Three-way handshaking is the foundation for every connection
establishment using the TCP protocol. A SYN Flood attack exploits this three-way
handshaking. In a normal scenario, three-way handshaking works in following
sequences [24]:
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• The client requests a connection by sending a SYN (synchronize) message to
the server.
• The server acknowledges this request by sending SYN-ACK back to the client.
• The client responds with an ACK, and the connection is established.

Figure 2 . 2: Three way handshaking [24]
Figure 2.2 shows a normal scenario of three-way handshaking and incomplete
handshaking respectively. In SYN Flood, attackers continuously send SYN requests
without responding to the victim’s SYN-ACK or use spoofed IP addresses to send a
SYN request. Either way, the handshake remains incomplete and eventually exhausts
more and more resources from the victim. This creates a flooding on target end and
results in a DDoS attack.
Ping Flood (ICMP flood): It is a simple denial-of-service attack where the attacker
overwhelms the victim with ICMP “echo request” (ping) packets. This is most
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effective by using the flood option of ping which sends ICMP packets as fast as
possible without waiting for replies.
UDP Flood: A DDoS attack that floods a target with User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) packets at random ports on a remote host. This causes the victim to
repeatedly check for the application listening at that port, and when no application
is found, reply with an ICMP ‘Destination Unreachable’ packet causing exhaustion
of resources.
HTTP Flood: In an HTTP flood DDoS attack, the attacker exploits seemingly
legitimate HTTP GET or POST requests to attack a target web server or application.
The bonus points on the attacker side to generate this type of attack is, HTTP floods
do not use malformed packets, spoofing or reflection techniques, and require less
bandwidth than other attacks to bring down the targeted site or server.
DNS Amplification: Here in the DNS Amplification DDoS attack, an open DNS
server is asked too many requests from a spoofed IP address of the target and then
DNS server responds to the target with a large amount of data. As a result, the
target receives an amplification of the attacker’s initial query.
Ping of Death: A ping of death is a type of attack on a computer system that
involves sending a malformed or otherwise malicious ping to a computer by
violating the Internet Protocol documented in RFC 791 [25]. But nowadays, this
attack is not as effective as before.
Zero-day DDoS attack: The “Zero-day” definition encompasses all unknown or
new attacks, exploiting vulnerabilities for which no patch or defense mechanism has
yet been released.
These are not the full set of DDoS attacks that have ever been discovered. Smurf,
Slowloris, NTP Amplification, IP Null Attack, CharGEN Flood, SNMP Flood, NTP

32

Flood, SSDP Flood, Fragmented HTTP Flood, Single Session HTTP Flood, Single
Request HTTP Flood, Recursive HTTP GET Flood, Random Recursive GET Flood,
Multi-Vector Attacks, SYN-ACK Flood, ACK & PUSH ACK Flood, ACK
Fragmentation Flood, RST/FIN Flood, Synonymous IP Attack, Spoofed Session
Flood, Multiple SYN-ACK Spoofed Session Flood, Multiple ACK Spoofed Session
Flood, Session Attack, Misused Application Attack, UDP Fragmentation Flood, DNS
Flood, VoIP Flood, Media Data Flood, Direct UDP Flood, ICMP Fragmentation
Flood, etc. [23] are also very well-known DDoS attacks in recent days.

2.2.4 Related Work on DDoS
Various detection techniques are being improvised by researchers to defend
against DDoS attacks over the year. To evade the existing DDoS attack detection
solutions, the attack itself changes frequently. Based on the various techniques such
as cloud computing, software-defined networking (SDN), backbone web traffic, and
big data strategies, DDoS attacks detection can be categorized into filtering
mechanisms, routers function, network flow, statistical analysis, etc.
Ahmad Riza’ain, et al. [26] performed an in-depth analysis on DDoS attack
types as well as on existing DDoS detection and attack prediction techniques by
characterizing the attacks. Also, they identified the factors behind those attacks.
Moreover, they have classified and ranked at least 53 articles from different digital
libraries such as Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, Springer, and
Web of Science related to DDoS detection and prevention and found 30% of them
using ML techniques as their detection or prevention strategy. Recent DDoS attacks
such as application-level DDoS attacks [27], DDoS in IoT [28], DDoS in SDN
network [29], etc. have been successfully mitigated by several DDoS detection
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techniques, like entropy-based anomaly detection [30], neural network-based
detection mechanism [31], cluster analysis [32], statistical approaches [33], deep
learning [34], etc. Osanaiye, et al. [35] used ensemble-based multi-filter feature
selection method to find the most relevant features of the NSL-KDD dataset in
detecting DDoS attack.

2 .3

machine learning classifiers
Machine learning (ML) has become one of the mainstays of information

technology in solving real-life problems. In our day-to-day life, most of the
applications, gadgets, etc. are capturing data. With the increasing enormous
amounts of data becoming available, there is a good reason to believe that smart data
analysis will become even more pervasive as a necessary ingredient for technological
progress [36]. A lot of Machine Learning techniques have been seen in existing
research. Of them, regression, clustering, classification, anomaly detection, novelty
and outlier detection, etc. are very common. ML has a substantial impact in different
sectors of technologies including biomedical, financial, image processing, intrusion
detection, etc. Generally, the learning capability can be classified into four general
ways:

2.3.1 Supervised Learning
The data that works for training and testing requires a labeled dataset in
supervised learning. Given data in the form of examples with labels, a learning
algorithm is fed with these example-label pairs one by one, allowing the algorithm to
predict the label for each example, and giving it feedback as to whether it predicted
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the right answer or not [36]. Over time, the algorithm learns to approximate the
exact nature of the relationship between examples and their labels. When fully
trained, the supervised learning algorithm can observe a new, never-before-seen
example and predict a good label for it. Supervised learning problems can be
defined as either classification or regression problems. In a classification problem,
the output variable would indicate a category, for example, “good/bad”,
“anomalous/ non anomalous”, “detected/ not detected”, etc., where in the
regression problem, it would assume a real value, for example, “amount of stocks”,
“percentage of passing rate”, “average lifespan”, etc. Some of the popular supervised
learning algorithms are Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Trees (DT), Logistic Regression
(LR), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), K-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN), Random Forests (RF), etc. Here, some of the supervised models
that we have used are described below:
Logistic Regression: Logistic regression is a classification algorithm that performs
very well on linearly separable classes and is the go-to method for binary
classification problems [37]. This machine learning algorithm builds on ideas from
the field of statistics. In statistics, the logistic model is used to model the probability
of an existing class or event such as normal/abnormal, pass/fail, win/lose, hot/cold,
etc. This can be extended to classify with more than two classes of events, and each
of the events would be assigned a probability value between 0 to 1, where the sum of
all probabilities will be a complete 1. The coefficients (Beta values, b) of the logistic
regression algorithm must be estimated from the training data which is done by
using maximum-likelihood estimation. The best coefficients would result in a model
that would predict a value very close to 1 (e.g. anomalous) for the default class and
value very close to 0 (e.g. normal) for the other class. The intuition for
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maximum-likelihood for logistic regression is that a search procedure seeks values
for the coefficients (Beta values) that minimize the error in the probabilities predicted
by the model to those in the data.
Support Vector Machine: SVM is a group of supervised learning methods which
have learning algorithms that analyze data and identify the patterns for data
classification or regression analysis based on finding a separating hyperplane in the
feature space between two classes in such a way that the distance between the
hyperplane and the closest data points of each class is maximized [38]. The SVM
algorithm is based on probabilistic statistical learning theory [39] whereby the
approach favors a minimized classification risk rather than optimal classification.
Various types of dividing classification surfaces can be realized by applying a kernel,
such as linear, polynomial, Gaussian Radial Basis Function (RBF), or hyperbolic
tangent [40]. SVMs are primarily binary classifiers and multi-class classification is
realized by developing an SVM for each pair of classes.
Naïve Bayes: Naïve Bayes is a simple and common classifier used in many
machine learning problems. Based on the Bayes theorem this probabilistic classifier
helps define the probability of an event based on some prior knowledge of certain
conditions associated with that event [41]. The name naïve Bayes originates from the
fact that the input features are assumed to be independent, whereas in practice this
is not always true.
Decision Tree: Decision Tree is a non-parametric supervised learning method and
is used both for classification and regression. The decision tree algorithms build a
tree in which each branch shows a probability between a number of possibilities and
each leaf shows a decision [42]. The paths from root of the tree to leaves represent
classification rules. The algorithms collect information and apply the rules for the
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purpose of decision to take a path. In decision trees, each level splits the data
according to different attributes and the goal is to achieve perfect classification with
a minimal number of decisions.
Neural Networks: The computational architecture of neural networks mimics the
neural structure and function of the brain forming the interconnected groups of
artificial neurons. Each of these artificial neurons is a set of input values and
associated weights that triggers the neurons beyond a threshold [43]. The neural
network is organized in layers of neurons. The first layer is the input layer and the
last one is the output layer. The layers in between these two are called hidden layers.
The neural networks attempt to hierarchically learn deep features and correlations in
input data by adjusting the weight associated with the neurons. Neural network
architectures have many variants with each finding success in specific domains of
applications. An extensive review of neural networks can be found in the paper by
Schmidhuber [44].
K-Nearest Neighbor: K-nearest neighbors(KNN) is mostly used in pattern
recognition. KNN is a non-parametric method that is used for both classification and
regression purposes. It is a lazy learning where the built-in function is only
approximated locally, and all computation is deferred until function evaluation. It
classifies data points which are most similar to it. Though it has the advantages of
easy use, fastest calculation, the accuracy from these models depend on the quality
of the data.

2.3.2 Unsupervised Learning
In unsupervised learning, models learn through unlabeled data without any
knowledge of output. Based on the similarities and differences of the dataset, the
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models group the unlabeled data. In another way, the unlabeled data are being fed
to the unsupervised algorithms and given the tools to understand the properties of
the data that helps the algorithms to create group, cluster, and/or organize the data.
Unsupervised learning problems can be defined as either association or clustering
problems [45]. In an association problem, a large portion of data is needed to be
described through a set of rules by an algorithm. A Market-basket analysis is one of
the most intuitive applications of association rules which strives to analyze customer
buying patterns by finding associations between items that customers put into their
baskets. On the other hand, in a clustering problem, a collection of data items finds
the similarity between them, and dissimilarity to data items in other clusters. Some
of the popular unsupervised learning algorithms are K-Means, Gaussian Mixture
Clustering, Self-Organizing Map, Autoencoder, Expectation–maximization algorithm,
Local Outlier Factor, etc. Here we briefly describe the five unsupervised learning
algorithms used in this research.
One-Class SVM: One-class classification, also known as unary classification or
class-modeling, tries to identify objects of a specific class among all objects by
primarily learning from an unlabeled training set containing only the objects of that
class. Trained this way the classifier then flags any object not recognized according to
the learned generalization as an outlier [46]. Therefore, in anomaly detection,
one-class SVM is trained with data that has only one class, which is the
“non-anomalous” or “normal” class. It infers the properties of normal classes and
using these properties, it can predict which examples are unlike the normal. This is
useful for anomaly detection because the scarcity of training examples is what
defines anomalies; typically, there are very few examples of the network intrusion,
fraud, or other anomalous behavior. One-class SVM [47] is a support vector
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machine-based anomaly detector. Like the supervised SVM models, unsupervised
one-class versions also work with different kernels. In our proposed framework we
use one-class SVMs with a linear kernel and a polynomial kernel.
Isolation Forests: Isolation Forest [48] is an ensemble regressor consisting of a
number of isolation trees with each tree trained on a random subset of the training
data. The parameters associated with this algorithm are: i) the number of trees or
estimators ii) the maximum number of observations representing the size of the data
subset used to train each tree, and iii) the maximum number of features representing
the subset of the data features used to train each tree. Isolation forest is used to
perform the outlier detection efficiently in high-dimensional datasets. The algorithm
isolates observations by randomly selecting a feature and then randomly selecting a
split value between the maximum and minimum values of the selected features
using recursive partitioning to split the values. The required number of splitting to
isolate a sample is equivalent to the path length from the root to the leaf. The path
length from the root to leaf, averaged over a forest of such random trees, is a measure
of normality and the decision function. Random partitioning produces noticeably
shorter paths for anomalies. Therefore, the random forest trees that collectively
produce shorter path lengths for particular samples are highly likely to be anomalies.
Elliptic Envelope: Elliptic Envelope assumes the data is normally distributed and
based on that assumption it ’draws’ an ellipse around most of the data, classifying
any observation inside the ellipse as an inlier or "normal" and any observation
outside the ellipse as an outlier or "anomalous". The Elliptical Envelope routine
models the data as a high dimensional Gaussian distribution with possible
covariances between feature dimensions. The Elliptical Envelope routine uses the
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FAST-Minimum Covariance Determinant [49] to estimate the size and shape of the
ellipse.
Local Outlier Factor:The local outlier factor [50] score is computed by the LOF
algorithm which reflects the degree of abnormality of the observations. With respect
to its neighbors, LOF measures the local density (obtained from k-nearest neighbors)
deviation of a given data point. As a result, it detects the samples that have a
substantially lower density than their neighbors. For an observation, the LOF score is
equal to the ratio of the average local density of its k-nearest neighbors and its own
local density. A "normal” data is expected to have a local density similar to that of its
neighbors, while an "abnormal” data is expected to have much smaller local density.

2.3.3 Semi-supervised Learning
By definition, semi-supervised learning is a combination of supervised and
unsupervised learning. In many practical situations, the cost of labeling is very high,
since it requires skilled human experts. In semi-supervised learning, the dataset
contains a small percentage of labeled data and the rest of the others are unlabeled.
So, the semi-supervised algorithms learn the structure of the data through both
labeled and unlabeled data. Some of the popular semi-supervised learning
algorithms are Label Propagation, Generative Methods (Mixture of Gaussian Mixture
Models), Hidden Markov Model (HMM), S3VM (Semi-supervised SVM),
Graph-based algorithms, etc.

40

2.3.4 Reinforcement Learning
Although reinforcement learning is different from supervised and unsupervised
learning, it is similar to supervised learning in using a time-dependent sequence of
labels and to unsupervised learning in terms of learning techniques. In order to
maximize the performance, this type of learning allows machines and software
agents to automatically determine and learn the ideal behavior within a specific
context with the help of a simple reward feedback signal. The algorithm which is
often called an agent continuously learns from its experiences of the environment
until it explores the full range of possible states through an iterative fashion [45].
Some of the popular reinforcement learning algorithms are Q-Learning, Temporal
Difference (TD), Deep Adversarial Networks, Generative Adversarial Network, etc.

2.3.5 Related Work in ML Classifiers
Traditionally, anomaly-based IDS is better than signature-based IDS in detecting
threats but at the cost of a higher false positive rate. ML applied IDSs are better than
any traditional IDSs in reducing false positive rate. The state-of-the-art ML
approaches for both IDS and DDoS can be found in a comprehensive survey of
Machine learning intrusion detection [51], systematic literature review and taxonomy
of DDoS attack [26]. To detect DDoS attacks, supervised [52], semi-supervised [53],
and unsupervised methods are being used to build the training model. A
combination of supervised and unsupervised ML models to detect anomaly can also
be found in [54]. Neural Network and SVM for supervised modeling, KNN for
unsupervised modeling, and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Gradual
Feature Reduction (GFR) for feature selection with NSL-KDD dataset are used there.
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However, the reason for using a combination of supervised and unsupervised
methods in their research is ambiguous.

2 .4

machine learning ensemble
Machine learning ensemble refers to combining multiple classifiers aiming to

get a more accurate outcome. The benefits of ensemble learning, i.e., combining
multiple classifiers to form a more powerful classifier have been well-studied in the
ML community. Dietterich, et al. [6] mentioned that ensembles can perform better
than a single classifier, and many classification problems have become benefited
from the idea of combining multiple classifiers.
In general, there are two ways to ensemble the classifiers: homogeneous and
heterogeneous. When similar types of classifiers are used to build a training model,
it is called homogeneous ensemble (e.g. bagging and boosting), whereas combining
different types of classifiers is called a heterogeneous ensemble (e.g. stacking). Both
homogeneous and heterogeneous ensembles have been used to build IDS.

2.4.1 Ensemble ML Classifiers
In this section, we discuss several ensemble ML classifiers that we have used in
our research, namely the majority voting and other supervised models.
Majority Voting: Majority voting scheme is the very common and basic technique
in ML ensemble. Generally, a majority means when the greater part or more than
half of the total accumulates. In Machine learning, an output prediction could be ‘1’
or ‘0’. A majority voting mechanism could be applied on any number of classifiers’
output. When the greater part or more than half of the total classifiers’ predictions

42

agree with a certain prediction value ‘1’ or ‘0’, that prediction value would be the
final output of this majority voting mechanism. For example, for five classifiers ‘A, B,
C, D, E’ that predict a certain data instance ‘1, 0, 1, 1, 0’ respectively, the final output
will be the ‘1’ decided by majority voting mechanism. When Majority Voting is used
in ML ensemble as a combination rule (which only works with nominal classes),
each of these classifiers will predict a nominal class label for a test sample. The label
which was predicted the most will then be selected as the output of the voting
classifier.

(a) Supervised Models.

(b) Unsupervised Models.

Fi g u r e 2. 3: Illustration of how the individual classifications are combined using
different ensemble models.

Supervised Classifiers as Ensemble Classifier: To ensemble various ML classifiers a
lot of techniques are used. In this dissertation, we improvised a different type of
ensemble technique which is nothing but a two-layer classification. Initially, we used
either supervised or unsupervised classification for a single dataset. The outcomes
(e.g. predictions) of each model are stored in a datafile and those outcomes are
considered as a training data features. For an example, we have used five
stand-alone classifiers individually to train our dataset. Using test dataset, we used
five pretrained model to predict and stored the outcomes in a csv file. For a single
data instance, five models generate their outcomes based on either benign or DDoS
detection. So, we have five values which are used as a feature vector including its
corresponding ground truth. Now, using these five outcomes as features and the
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level data, we trained several supervised classifiers. This top layer supervised
classification ensemble the bottom layer classifications’ outcomes. In this research, we
have used logistic regression, naïve bayes, neural networks, decision tree, and SVM
to ensemble bottom layer classifiers in both ensemble frameworks. Figure 2.3 shows
the ensemble classifiers in both supervised and unsupervised ensemble frameworks.

2.4.2 Related Work on ML Ensemble
There are two major ensemble types: Homogeneous, combination of similar
types of classifiers and heterogeneous, combination of different types of classifiers. A
detailed survey of ensemble and hybrid classifiers [7] helps in understanding the
usage and shortfalls of ensemble ML in network security. A wide range of ensemble
Machine Learning techniques and methods are used to detect network intrusion [7].
However, the key drawback of existing techniques is that they do not use enough
domain knowledge in conjunction with the ensemble methods, and unsupervised
ensemble models are not found. Specifically, several ML methods differ from the
so-called “curse of dimensionality”, i.e., as the number of irrelevant features
increases, the learned models fail to generalize well. In our context, this means that
for newer forms of intrusions (not seen in the training dataset), the models perform
poorly. Therefore, a deep analysis of several types of DDoS attacks is performed in
our research.
Outlier and Novelty Detection techniques are more efficient in detecting
unknown attacks as they use unsupervised ML models. An unsupervised ML model
is used to detect a high-volume DDoS attack using an in-memory distributed graph.
Jabez et al. [55] mentioned an outlier detection mechanism NOF (Neighborhood
Outlier Factor) to detect the anomaly. But there could be a high chance for a single
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classifier to predict incorrectly compared to multiple classifiers’ predictions.
Therefore, an ensemble classifier would be a perfect fit for predicting anomalous
behavior precisely. Smyth et al. [56] showed that stacked density estimation
outperforms a single best model which could be chosen based on cross-validation,
combining with uniform weights, or even through bias. A few hybrid supervised
learning models [57] are used to detect DDoS attack, but realistically for a zero-day
attack or unknown attacks, an unsupervised hybrid model has better detection
accuracy.

2 .5

feature selection methods
We consider a high dimensional dataset with n data instances and m columns

(e.g. features) i.e., the data matrix is X ∈ Rn×m , and a target variable (level) is y. A
target variable can be either continuous or discrete. A feature selection (FS)
algorithm selects a subset of p << m features i.e., Xs ∈ Rn× p where p features are
most relevant to the target variable y [58]. The subsequent sections discuss briefly
three major categories of FS methods and the corresponding FS methods that fall
under each category.

2.5.1

Filter-based Methods
Filter-based methods utilize the underlying statistical characteristics of the input

data during ML model training time. A correlation value between the feature and
the target variable is calculated for each feature. A general filter-based FS process
can be accomplished by selecting the features for which the correlation value exceeds
a threshold value [58].
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Anova: In statistics, Analysis of variance is used to check the means of two or
more different groups. The mean can be calculated by computing chi-square χ2
statistic between each input variable and the output variable, where the features are
categorical values. On the other hand, for quantitative features, Anova F-1 score is
calculated [59].
Pearson’s Correlation: Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is a statistical
measurement that calculates the linear correlation between two random variables x
and y using the formula in 2.1. The value of Pearson’s r can be +1, 0, or -1; where +1
denotes a positive linear correlation, 0 denotes no linear correlation, and -1 denotes a
negative linear correlation [60]

r= p

∑( x − x̄ )(y − ȳ)
∑( x − x̄ )2 + ∑(y − ȳ)2

(2.1)

Chi-Square: In a contingency table, Chi-Square test determines the relationship
between two or more random variables i.e., tells how much difference exists between
observed frequencies and expected frequencies, while assuming no relationship
among the data instances using the formula in 2.2. The test statistic is computed
from a χ2 distribution in order to make the null hypothesis true by evaluating how
close the observed and expected frequency values are [61].

χ2c =

(Oi − Ei )2
∑ Ei

(2.2)

where, χ2 is the chi-square distribution with c degrees of freedom, and O and E are
the observed and the expected values, respectively. If the chi square test statistic is
very small, it means that the observed data fit very well with the expected data i.e.,
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both data have a relationship. Otherwise, the observed data don’t fit well with the
expected data i.e., there is no relationship between these two datasets.
Mutual Information: The measurement of the mutual information between two
random variables X and Y can be obtained by doing the reduction in uncertainty for
one random variable, given that the other random variable’s value is already known
using the formula in 2.3.

I( X; Y ) =

Z Z
X

Y

p( x, y) log

p( x, y)
dxdy
p( x ) p(y)

(2.3)

where, p( x, y) denotes the joint probability density function of two random
variables X and Y. The marginal density functions of two random variables X and Y
are p( x ) and p(y), respectively. When two random variables X and Y are
independent, the joint probability density function is equal to the product of two
marginal density functions, i.e., p( x, y) = p( x ) p(y) which results in the value of the
integration (equation 2.3) to become zero. So, the stronger relationship between two
random variables is determined by the larger value of the integration.

2.5.2

Wrapper-based Methods
Wrapper-based methods exploit an ML algorithm to evaluate the goodness of

features, and the FS process is accomplished by the means of a search problem
where different combinations are exhaustively prepared, evaluated, and compared
with other combinations.
Recursive Feature Elimination: In Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE), the process
starts with initializing the predictors with a rank that comes from an initial measure
of importance. The very first model is built using the complete set of predictors.
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Then a smaller set of predictors is used to build the next model, where the smaller
set is obtained by removing the least important ones. This process (extracting a
smaller set of predictors and building a model) continues recursively to a defined
way until a minimum number of predictors are remained.

2.5.3 Embedded Methods
Several algorithms are used in embedded methods, and they have built-in
mechanisms for selecting certain features which are executed during model training
time i.e., the FS process can be completed within the construction of ML algorithms.
With its own variable, an ML model performs feature selection as well as
classification/regression at the same time.
LASSO Regression: Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) is
a regression analysis that is often used as a FS method. To accomplish the FS process,
LASSO method performs L1 regularization through which it assigns a constraint on
the sum of absolute values of the model parameters and penalizes the regression
variable’s coefficient by shrinking some of the variables towards zero. After the
regularization process, the features having zero values on their regression coefficient
are eliminated. Then, a new subset of features can be constructed with the features
having non-zero regression coefficients which have strong association with the target
variable[62].
Logistic Regression (LR) with L1 Penalty: From the statistical point of view, LR
models are used to model the probability of an existing class or event, such as
normal/abnormal, pass/fail, win/lose, hot/cold, etc. Using L1 regularization in LR,
each non-zero coefficient is added as a penalty that forces weak feature coefficients
to have a zero value. Here, FS is performed by producing sparse solutions.
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Random Forests: Random Forests are formed with four to twelve hundred
decision trees where each of the trees is built over a random extraction of the
observations from the dataset and a random extraction of the features. These trees
are uncorrelated since they can’t access all features or all observations and therefore
less prone to overfitting. Each of the trees is constructed by a sequence of simple
yes/no questions based on a single or combination of features. Based on the answers
(yes/no), the tree divides the dataset into two buckets; observations that are most
likely similar among themselves are put into one bucket, whereas the dissimilar ones
are put into another bucket. The importance of each feature is measured based on
the purity of each bucket [63].

2.5.4 Matrix Decomposition : PCA
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a method to decompose a high
dimensional matrix into lower dimensions including the principal component on it
by maximizing the variance of each dimension. PCA decomposition can be done
using either singular value decomposition of a design matrix or by calculating
covariance of the high dimensional matrix and then doing the eigenvalue
decomposition of the covariance matrix [64].

2.5.5 Ensemble Feature Selection
Like other ensemble mechanisms, here we have combined several feature
selection methods. We implemented an ensemble framework for feature selections
(EnFS) that combines seven FS methods using the majority voting (MV) technique
using two layers of experiments. Initially, seven selection methods are chosen from
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among fifteen selection methods based on accuracy, performance, and other metrics
using a manual grid search algorithm. The search algorithm selects all three types
(filter-based, wrapper-based and embedded methods) of selection methods. After
completing method selection, seven FS methods are used individually to extract the
features, where each of the methods selected a different subset of features.
Subsequently, the majority voting (MV) technique is used to ensemble all seven
methods. Finally, a combined subset of features is extracted that is further used in
model classification. The EnFS framework codifies a systematic and repeatable
method that provides better results (prediction accuracy) in less computational time
(more efficient), and maintains such benefits as reducing overfitting, reducing
classification and training time, etc. The performance of EnFS remains outstanding
for several different classification methods as compared to using a single FS criterion
or without using any FS method.

2.5.6 Related Work on Feature Selection
Machine learning (ML) algorithms focus on the development of computer
programs where they provide the systems with the ability to automatically learn and
improve from experience without the intervention of humans and without being
explicitly programmed. The feature selection (FS) process is one of the vital ML
pre-processing phases where it removes unwanted and irrelevant features with the
goal of improving prediction (i.e., detection) accuracy and reducing computational
complexity.
Dash and Liu [65] mentioned four basic procedures in a FS method. The
procedures are generation, evaluation, stopping, and validation. Various support
vector machine (SVM) models with NSL-KDD dataset [66], genetic-fuzzy rule
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mining approach [67], genetic algorithm approach [68], mutual
information-based [69] techniques, filter-based methods [70], etc. were used in
feature selection process for intrusion detection systems. Several FS methods are also
found in detecting DDoS attacks such as detecting DDoS in cloud computing,
detecting robust backscatter DDoS [71], chi-square and information gain FS
methods [72] in detecting general DDoS attacks, etc.
A significant number of surveys and taxonomies of FS methods are found from
the recent research. Chandrashekar and Sahin [73] conducted a detailed survey on
various FS methods using the DARPA dataset. A taxonomy and survey on
semi-supervised FS methods were accomplished by Sheikhpour, Razieh, et al. [74]
using several datasets. Khalid, Samina et al. [75] performed a brief survey on
well-known FS methods to check the suitability of different FS and feature extraction
techniques in certain situations based on experiments. A survey of various selection
algorithms that helps decide which algorithm to use in certain situation [76], a FS
survey for gaussian mixture models and hidden Markov models [77], taxonomy of
FS algorithms in intrusion detection systems [78], etc. are found to depict the
state-of-the-art of FS methods.
From the above studies, most of the researchers other than Osanaiye, Opeyemi,
et al. [35], provided either a detailed survey of FS methods in general and/ or
specific research areas, or implemented various FS methods with several types of
datasets. None of them mentioned combining several selection methods and
demonstrated their outcomes. Osanaiye, Opeyemi, et al. [35] used an ensemble
based multi-filter (only filter-based) selection method although, they did not
consider the other two types of selection methods (e.g. wrapper-based and
embedded). In this research, we propose an ensemble framework for feature
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selection methods (EnFS) where all three types of methods are used and combined
using a majority voting technique to extract a valid minimal subset of features that
improves the performance of DDoS detection problem.

2 .6

deep learning
Deep learning is an Artificial Intelligence (AI) function that helps in making a

decision by imitating the workings of the human brain in processing data and
creating patterns. It is a subset of Machine Learning in AI that has networks capable
of learning new things from data that is unstructured or unlabeled. Deep learning is
also known as deep neural learning or deep neural network [79]. It uses multiple
layers to progressively extract higher level features from the raw input. Several fields
of studies such as bioinformatics, medical image analysis, computer vision, speech
recognition, audio recognition, natural language processing, social network filtering,
machine translation, drug design, material inspection, etc. have been using deep
learning for past few years.

2.6.1 Auto-Encoder
Autoencoder is an artificial neural network that learns how to efficiently
compress and encode data in an unsupervised manner, then learns how to
reconstruct the data back from the reduced encoded representation to a
representation that is as close to the original input as possible [80]. By design, it
reduces data dimensions by learning how to ignore the noise in the data. In this
research, we used autoencoder to reduce the dimensionality for the purpose of
clustering dataset in building the explanation model. The lower dimensionality
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emphasized us to run the model in a shorter time to find the dataset’s consistency
measurement.

2.6.2 Related Work on Deep Learning
Deep learning (DL) is a branch of machine learning aiming to represent
high-level data abstractions by constructing a computational model based on a set of
algorithms. Due to the improvement of CPU and neural network algorithms, DL
overcomes the traditional ML systems difficulties. Its self-taught, compression,
high-level feature extraction, etc. capabilities facilitate in detecting intrusion more
accurately. Fadlullah, Zubair Md, et al. [81] provided the state-of-the-art Deep
Learning architectures and algorithms relevant to network traffic control systems. A
DL based new network routing approach was demonstrated there. DL has an
outstanding outcome in classifying and predicting network traffic [81] and is used in
implementing NIDS, detecting distributed attacks in Inter of Things (IoT), etc. Some
of the DL techniques like Non-symmetric deep auto-encoder (NDAE) [34] for
unsupervised feature learning, flow-based anomaly detection, recurrent deep neural
network, etc. are being used in detecting anomaly, especially DDoS attacks.

2 .7

summary
Though most of the researchers have chosen a single classifier to train their

model in detecting DDoS attacks, a combination of classifiers has better accuracy
compared to a stand-alone model. Moreover, none of them have focused on either
unsupervised ensemble or ensemble of Outlier and Novelty Detection type
classifiers. In addition, their works didn’t guide properly in detecting unseen attacks.
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Therefore, our motivation and the goal of this research is to build an IDS using
ensemble ML models with reduced feature set obtained from majority voting-based
ensemble feature selection framework and from feature selection approach using
interpretable machine learning which will eventually increase the capability to detect
both exiting and unseen DDoS attacks from different dimensions with lower false
alarms. In addition, we provide the explanations for these predicted DDoS attacks.

54

c h a p t er 3

Datasets, Preprocessing and Performance
Metrics

In this research, we have experimented with several well-known benchmark
datasets to detect DDoS attacks. This section describes these datasets in detail. The
step by step data preprocessing phases like data sanitization, transformation,
normalization, scaling and feature selection approaches are described here as well.
In addition, a standard performance metrics is provided here which we have used in
all of our experiments to evaluate the performances.

3 .1

datasets
Three datasets are used in our several experiments to conduct this research. This

section provides the details of these three datasets. Though the datasets consist of
several type of attacks, we have only extracted the DDoS data from them as the goal
of my dissertation is to detect only DDoS attacks.

3.1.1 NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD [8] dataset has been used for training and testing purposes through
the research. NSL-KDD is a dataset suggested to solve some of the inherent problems
of the KDD’99 dataset which are mentioned in [8], [82]. Although McHugh
discussed some problems that are suffered by this new version of the KDD dataset,
and may not be a perfect representative of existing real networks due to the lack of
public datasets for network-based IDSs, NSL-KDD dataset can be applied as an
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effective benchmark dataset to help researchers compare different intrusion detection
methods. It has some major improvements over the original KDD’99 dataset, such as:
• No redundant records in the train data, so classifiers will not be biased towards
more frequent records;
• No duplicate records in the test data, so the performance of the learners is not
biased by the methods which have better detection rates;
• The number of selected records from each difficulty group are inversely
proportional to the percentage of records in the original KDD’99 dataset;
• The number of records in the train and test sets are reasonable which makes
the dataset affordable to run the experiments, and so on.
Each record in the NSL-KDD dataset unfolds different features of the traffic
with 41 attributes plus an assigned label classifying each record as either normal or
attack. The features of the dataset are of three types: Nominal, Numeric, and Binary.
Feature no. #2, #3, and #4 have nominal values, while the feature no. #12, #14, #15,
#21, and #22 have binary values, and the rest of the features are numeric type.
Details of these attributes are the attributes’ names, description, and sample data.
Attack types in the dataset are grouped into four main classes, namely DoS,
U2R, Probe, and R2L [82]. TABLE 3.1 maps different attack types with its attack class
while Table 3.2 shows the number of occurrences for normal and different attack
classes.
Table 3.2 shows that the number of attack records associated with the R2L and
U2R attack classes in the dataset is deficient compared to the normal and other
attack classes, which leads to the imbalanced problem. The classification process for
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Table 3 .1: NSL-KDD attack types and classes
Attack
Class

Attack Type

Sample Relevant Feature

Example

DoS

Apache2, Back, Pod, Process table,
Worm, Neptune, Smurf, Land,
Udpstorm, Teardrop
Satan,
Ipsweep,
Nmap,
Portsweep, Mscan, Saint
Httptunnel, Snmpgetattack, Snmpguess, Guess_Password, Imap,
Warezclient, Ftp_write, Phf, Multihop, Warezmaster, Spy, Xsnoop,
Xlock, Sendmail
Buffer_overflow, Xterm, SQL attack, Perl, Loadmodule, Loadmodule, Ps, Rootkit

percentage of packets
with errors - source bytes

Syn flooding

source bytes - duration of
the connection
number of shell prompts
invoked - the number of
file creations

Port scanning

Probe
R2L

U2R

Buffer overflow

Service requested – con- password guessnection duration – num ing
of failed login attempts

any imbalanced dataset is always a challenging issue for researchers. Most standard
ML and data mining methods consider balanced datasets. When the methods are
used with an imbalanced dataset, they produce biased results toward the samples
from the majority classes. The classification accuracy for the majority classes is much
higher than for the minority classes [83]. The dataset contains eight data files of
different formats that are compatible with most experimental platforms.
Ta b l e 3 .2: Number of samples for normal and attack classes for NSL-KDD dataset
Class

Training Set

Occurrences Percentage

Testing Set

Occurrences Percentage

Normal
DoS
Probe
R2L
U2R
Total

67343
45927
11656
995
52
125973

53.46%
36.46%
9.25%
0.79%
0.04%
100.00%

9711
7460
2421
2885
67
22544

43.08%
33.08%
10.74%
12.22%
0.89%
100.00%
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3.1.2 UNSW-NB15
The raw network packets of the UNSW-NB15 dataset [9] are created by the IXIA
Perfect Storm tool in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber
Security (ACCS) for generating a hybrid of real modern normal activities and
synthetic contemporary attack behaviors. Tcpdump tool is utilized to capture 100 GB
of the raw traffic (e.g. Pcap files). This dataset has nine types of attacks, namely
Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode,
and Worms. The Argus, Bro-IDS tools are used, and twelve algorithms are
developed to generate a total of 49 features with the class label.

3.1.3 CICIDS2017
CICIDS2017 dataset [10] was created at the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity
at the University of New Brunswick. This dataset, containing both benign and the
most up-to-date common cyber-attacks, resembles the true real-world data. It also
includes the results of the network traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter with labeled
flows based on the timestamp, source and destination IPs, source and destination
ports, protocols and attacks. The attacks include brute-force FTP, brute-force SSH,
DoS, heartbleed, web attack, infiltration, botnet and DDoS.
We use these three well-known datasets from different research organizations to
train, test, and verify our developed framework. As mentioned earlier, we have only
extracted DDoS data from these datasets for our experiments. Intensive research is
conducted on these data sets to detect DDoS attacks using different machine learning
techniques which can perform better in detecting zero-day DDoS. Apart from
dividing the dataset into train and test data, we have a third dataset that we call the
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Ta ble 3 .3: Data instances with respect to datasets used in our dissertation
Dataset

Class

NSL-KDD

UNSW-NB15

CICIDS2017

Sup

Total
113268

Unsup

68014

Sup

25265

Unsup

23230

Sup

641974

Unsup

379861

Training
Benign
DDoS
67341
45927
(59.45%) (40.55%)
67341
673
(99%)
(1%)
13000
12265
(51.4%)
(48.6%)
23000
230
(99%)
(1%)
375101
265873
(58.59%) (41.41%)
376101
3760
(99%)
(1%)

Testing
Benign
9608
(59.44%)

DDoS
6556
(40.56%)

Total
1000

12090

8000
(66.17%)

4090
(33.83%)

1000

900

100

179549

125728
(70%)

53821
(30%)

1000

900

100

Total
16164

Verification
Benign DDoS
900
100

‘verification data’. This verification data mimics the real time data and is used to
verify our proposed model within the IDS in the real world. The numbers of benign
(normal) and DDoS (anomalous) data in the three training, testing and verification
datasets for both supervised and unsupervised methods are shown in Table 3.3.

3 .2

data preprocessing
Data preprocessing phase consists of data sanitization and feature reduction.

Initially, data are converted using various processing tools, scaling mechanism and
encoding technique. Then in feature reduction phase, dimensionality of data is
reduced so that it will take less time to build the model.

Data Sanitization

3.2.1

Supervised methods work better with balanced dataset, i.e., when the amount of
data pertaining to ‘non-attack’ and ‘attack’ are close to equal. On the other hand,
unsupervised methods require that the ‘attack’ data is a small fraction of ‘non-attack’
data.
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In the supervised classification, we separated normal and anomalous data
instances from the training dataset provided by the corresponding repository. As the
anomalous data not only contains DDoS data but also other types of attacks in
several datasets, we extracted data instances containing the DDoS. We combined this
DDoS data with normal data preparing the training dataset for supervised
classification. In order to preparing the datasets for the unsupervised classifiers,
normal and anomalous data were separated from the entire training dataset and a
new training dataset was created that contained 99% of normal data and 1% of
anomalous data.The numbers of benign (normal) and DDoS (anomalous) data for
both supervised and unsupervised methods are shown in Table 3.3
For all three datasets, text-based categorical variables, for example, protocol
type, service and flag data in NSL-KDD dataset, were label-encoded, i.e., converted
to integer-based categorical variables using OneHot encoding [84]. In OneHot
encoding, the input to this transformer should be an array-like of integers or strings,
denoting the values taken on by categorical (discrete) features. The features are
encoded using a one-hot (aka ‘one-of-K’ or ‘dummy’) encoding scheme. This creates
a binary column for each category and returns a sparse matrix or dense array. We
deleted the column ‘id’ in UNSW-NB15 dataset. For the CICIDS2017 dataset, the
single space before each of the feature names was stripped. Rows that contained
invalid values such as ‘.’ or ‘infinity’ in some columns were discarded. OneHot
encoding was also applied in the CICIDS2017 dataset to convert the categorical
values into numeric values. NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017 datasets are
tagged or labeled dataset. For unsupervised training, we stripped of the target
variable column. Since the data in each column varied within a different range, we
used a couple of scaling mechanisms to normalize the data. Standard scaling and
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MinMax scaling are two well-known scaling mechanisms that we used to scale the
data. The standard scaling standardizes features by removing the mean and scaling
to unit variance. On the other hand, MinMax scaling transforms features by scaling
each feature to a range between zero and one.

3.2.2 Feature Reduction
The feature reduction process has been done separately for three different
datasets. For the NSL-KDD dataset, a set of 12 experiments were done, each with a
particular set of (reduced) features. The feature sets were chosen according to what
were proposed in the literature by different researchers. Table 3.4 shows the list of 11
feature sets plus a set that contains all 41 features. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, We
experimented with seven feature selection algorithm [85] and best performed
features are obtained. Among seven algorithms, Chi-squared feature selection
method selected the optimized features for supervised and unsupervised
classification. It selected 14 features, namely proto, service, rate, sttl, sload, dload, swin,
stcpb, dtcpb, dwin, tcprtt, dmean, ct_state_ttl, ct_dst_sport_ltm for supervised
classification and 19 features, such as proto, service, state, rate, sttl, sload, dload, swin,
stcpb, dtcpb, dwin, tcprtt, synack, ackdat, dmean, ct_state_tt, ct_dst_ltm, ct_dst_sport_ltm,
ct_ftp_cmd for unsupervised classification. For the CICIDS2017 dataset, we removed
the following single valued features, namely, destination port, Bwd PSH flags, Fwd
URG flags, Bwd URG flags, CWE flag count, Fwd Avg bytes/bulk, Fwd Avg
packets/bulk, Fwd Avg bulk rate, Bwd Avg bytes/bulk, Bwd Avg packets/bulk, and
Bwd Avg bulk rate. These features were removed because they have no
discriminating value in the analysis.
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Table 3.4 shows all feature sets that have been used in the data classification
phase.
Ta ble 3 . 4: Reduced feature sets for NSL-KDD dataset (adopted from [86])
Feature
Set

Algorithm
Used

Feature
Count

FS-1

24

FS-2
FS-3
FS-4
FS-5
FS-6
FS-7
FS-8
FS-9

Degree of dependency
and dependency ratio
FS-3 ∩ FS-4 ∩ FS-5 ∩ FS-6
Information gain
Gain ratio
Chi-squared
ReliefF
Mutual information gain
Domain knowledge
Gain ratio

FS-10

Information gain

19

FS-11
FS-12

Genetic algorithm
Full set

15
41

Features
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41
3, 4, 29, 33, 34, 12, 39, 5, 30, 38, 25, 23, 6
5, 3, 6, 4, 30, 29, 33, 34, 35, 38, 12, 39, 25, 23
12, 26, 4, 25, 39, 6, 30, 38, 5, 29, 3, 37, 34, 33
5, 3, 6, 4, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 12, 23, 38, 25, 39
3, 29, 4, 32, 38, 33, 39, 12, 36, 23, 26, 34, 40, 31
23, 5, 3, 6, 32, 24, 12, 2, 37, 36, 8, 31
2, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 35, 39
9,26,25,4,12,39,30,38,6,29,5,37,11,3,22,35,34,14,33,
23,8,10,31,27,28,32,1,36,2,41,40,17,13,16,19
3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39
4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 17, 23, 26, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39
All features

13
14
14
14
14
12
16
35

In NSL-KDD dataset, data-instances that contain the class labels Back, Land,
Neptune, Smurf, and Teardrop, correspond to DDoS. In the supervised ensemble
model, we have used 24 reduced features [87]. Table 3.5 shows the relevant features
under each class label for DDoS attack that we have used in the supervised ensemble
model. After comprehending all class labels, the final DDoS feature set is
constructed by the feature number of #2, #3, #4, #5, #7, #8, #10, #13, #23, #24, #25, #26,
#27, #28, #29, #30, #33, #34, #35, #36, #38, #39, #40, and #41.
Table 3 . 5: Relevant features for DDoS attack [87]
Class Label

Most Relevant Features

Land
Smurf
Neptune
Teardrop
Back
Full Set

7
2, 3, 5, 23, 24, 27, 28, 36, 40, 41
4, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39
8
10,13
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39,
40, 41
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On the other hand, while working with the unsupervised ensemble model,
twelve different feature sets (listed in Table 3.4) from existing research are used for
experimentation and analyzing their accuracy. Based on our domain knowledge,
each of the features’ relevancy with DDoS attacks is verified.

3 .3

performance metrics
For all the experiments throughout this dissertation, we have used following

performance metrics to evaluate our results. In terms of performance evaluation,
Confusion Matrix, True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), True Negative
Rate (TNR), False Negative Rate (FNR), Precision, Recall, and F-Measure are used
very frequently. Confusion Matrix has three main terms: Sensitivity, Specificity, and
Accuracy which can be defined as follows:

Sensitivity =

TPR
TPR + FNR

(3.1)

Speci f icity =

TNR
TNR + FPR

(3.2)

Accuracy =

TPR + TNR
TPR + TNR + FPR + FNR

(3.3)

Also, Precision, Recall, and F-Measure are another three important performance
metrics that are used to evaluate a model. These terms can be defined in terms of TP,
TN, FP, FN from equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.

Precision( P) =
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TP
TP + FP

(3.4)

Recall ( R) =

TP
TP + FN

(3.5)

2PR
P+R

(3.6)

F − Score =

ROC curve is a well-known evaluation measure that visualizes the relation
between True Positive (TPR) and False Positive (FPR) rates.

3 .4

summary
This chapter showed the details of various datasets that we have used in our

experiment. Data preprocessing and feature reduction is the crucial part of any ML
classification which is shown in this chapter. In addition, a standard performance
metric is shown here that we have used in this research to evaluate the performance
of the proposed models.
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c h a p t er 4

Supervised Ensemble Framework

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been the prominent attacks
over the last decade. A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) should
seamlessly configure to fight against these attackers’ new approaches and patterns of
DDoS attack. In this chapter, we describe a NIDS which can detect existing as well as
new types of DDoS attacks. The key feature of our NIDS is that it combines different
classifiers using ensemble models, with the idea that each classifier can target
specific aspects/types of intrusions, and in doing so provides a more robust defense
mechanism against new intrusions. Further, we perform a detailed analysis of DDoS
attacks, and based on this domain-knowledge verify the reduced feature set listed in
Table 3.4 to significantly improve accuracy. We experiment with and analyze
NSL-KDD, UNSW-15, and CICIDS2017 dataset with reduced feature set and our
proposed NIDS can detect at most 99.1% of DDoS attacks successfully with a
minimum false positive rate of 0.01%. We compare our results with other existing
approaches. Our NIDS approach has the learning capability to keep up with new
and emerging DDoS attack patterns.

4 .1

introduction
In this research, we develop an IDS using ensemble machine learning, which has

arguably been the primary driver behind several recent successes in Artificial
Intelligence. It is been used in a wide variety of applications including computer
vision, natural language understanding, robotics, software engineering, etc. In the
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security arena, machine learning has been previously used in building IDSs [88]. In
general, majority of these approaches have focused on learning a single model for
intrusions. However, due to the varied nature of intrusions, it may be hard to learn a
single model that generalizes to all types. For example, some types of intrusions can
be modeled using a simple linear model (e.g. logistic regression) while others may
require more complex non-linear models (e.g. support vector machines with kernels).
Therefore, our main idea is to train several models that can identify intrusions, and
then combine these into a unified system.
The benefits of ensemble learning, i.e., combining multiple classifiers to form a
more powerful classifier has been well-studied in the machine learning community.
Dietterich et al. [6] showed that ensembles can perform better than single classifier,
and many classification problems have benefited from the idea of combining
multiple classifiers. In general, there are two ways to ensemble the classifiers:
homogeneous, and heterogeneous. When similar types of classifiers are used to
build a training model, it is called homogeneous ensemble (e.g. bagging, boosting),
whereas combining different types of classifiers is called a heterogeneous ensemble
(e.g. stacking). Both homogeneous and heterogeneous ensemble have been used to
build IDSs. Aburomman et al. [7] mentioned a wide range of ensemble machine
learning techniques and methods used to detect network intrusion. However, the key
drawback of existing techniques is that they do not use sufficient domain knowledge
in conjunction with the ensemble methods. Specifically, several ML methods duffer
from the so-called “curse of dimensionality”, i.e. as the number of irrelevant features
increase, the learned models fail to generalize well. In our context, this means that
for newer forms of intrusions (not seen in our training dataset), the models perform
poorly. Therefore, we perform a deep analysis of several types of DDoS attacks.
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Using this, we extract features relevant to these attacks and learn several models
using these features. Further, we combine the classifiers in our model using a
majority voting method. We empirically show that our proposed approach is much
more accurate than existing ML-based intrusion detection methods for the
NSL-KDD, UNSW-15 and CICIDS2017 dataset.
Yet, there resides an open research scope to ensemble the classifiers in a better
way that can detect the intrusion more accurately. Our contribution in this research
is to build an ensemble model with reduced feature sets listed in Table 3.4 in order to
increase the DDoS attack detection accuracy and reduce the false positive rate.

4 .2

methodology : supervised ensemble framework
The goal of this research is to build an accurate intrusion detection model with a

low false positive rate based on an ensemble. Here, we propose an ensemble
classifier of five ML classifiers from various classifier families. The selection of these
classifiers is based on a grid search comparing the performance of different ML
algorithms in intrusion detection system domain. The selected classifiers are,
Logistic Regression (LR), Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), Neural Network
(NN) and Support vector Machine (SVM) which are described details in Section 2.3.1.
In this framework, the five classifiers work in parallel and each classifier builds a
different model of the data. Initially, the outputs of the five predictors are combined
by majority voting method to obtain the final output of the majority voting-based
ensemble model (Ens_MV). Then, another set of classification (we call it meta
classifier) is performed using these five predictors which is known as ensemble
classification. Figure 4.1 shows the flow of the proposed model which has four main
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Fi g ure 4 . 1: Overview of the Ensemble Supervised ML Classifier Framework
parts: data collection, data preprocessing, model classification and DDoS detection
process.
Data collections and data preprocessing phases have been described in
Section 3.2 in details for three datasets that we have used in this experiment.
Data classification is the heart of our approach. This section comprises several
components. Two major components are individual and ensemble classification.
Initially, preprocessed data are classified by individual classifiers and then on top of
these classification results, another layer of classification is performed which is called
ensemble classification. Each of the ensemble frameworks consist of several
classifiers, models generated from individual classification, and ensemble models
generated by combining these individual models using various ensemble classifiers.
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Figure 4.1 depicts the ensemble mechanism using two layers of classification.
We first perform the individual classification and then the outcomes from these
individual models are fed into ensemble classifiers to combine them. To combine
these outcomes, we create a prediction matrix. A prediction matrix is a binary matrix
and contains the outputs from individual models with each row corresponding to
one record in the input dataset. The value of an element is ‘1’ if the corresponding
model identifies the record as “DDoS” and is ‘0’ if “Benign”. Since, five individual
models are used to generate prediction matrix, each column of the matrix is treated
as a feature for ensemble classification. Finally, the whole prediction matrix is fed as
input to the ensemble classifiers. The ensemble classifiers used in this framework are:
Majority Voting (Ens_MV), Logistic Regression (Ens_LR), Naïve Bayes (Ens_NB),
Neural Network (Ens_NN), Decision Tree (Ens_DT), and Support Vector Machine
(Ens_SVM). These classifiers are briefly described in Section 2.3.1.
At the end of the ensemble framework, the performance of all the individual
and ensemble models are measured and compared using standard model evaluation
metrics described in Section 3.3. After the comparison, the best performing
supervised model is identified from our proposed ensemble framework. In real
world scenario, a system can be defended by an IDS that is deployed on the
perimeter of the secured network. The core component (i.e., detection mechanism) of
this IDS contains the best performing supervised pre-trained model. The mechanism
collects the network traffic as it comes into the secured network. The traffic data goes
through data preprocessing steps where it is sanitized, and feature reduced. Then it
goes through the best performing supervised model. If the model identifies the
presence of a potential DDoS intrusion, then the mechanism raises an alert for the
network administrator to take necessary action. Here, we have used verification

69

Fi g u r e 4 . 2: IDS containing best performing model from supervised ensemble as
detection mechanism
dataset to mimic the real-time data that can go through the best performing
supervised pre-trained model and the model distinguishes the DDoS and Benign
traffic. Figure 4.2 shows an IDS containing the best performing model from the
supervised ensemble framework as the detection mechanism.

4 .3

experiments
The supervised ensemble model has been implemented using python machine

learning library scikit-learn [89] that was running on a PC with Intel®Core™i5-6600K
CPU @ 3.50GHz, 8 GB RAM installed with an ubuntu operating system.
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Three well-known datasets, namely NSL-KDD, UNSW-15 and CICIDS2017 are
used in our experiments. The details of the datasets are described in Section 3.1.
Data collection, preprocessing and feature selection steps are performed to create a
standard data formats that are acceptable for a machine learning classifier. The
details of these steps are shown in Section 3.2.
Among various ML classification family, we have chosen five supervised
classifiers based on their ability in binary classification, and anomaly detection. We
experimented with nine classifiers using a grid-search algorithm and retained the
best values of the hyper-parameters given by the grid-search for these classifiers in
the framework. The hyper-parameters used for different classifiers are given in
Table 4.1. In order to obtain robust models and to avoid over-fitting, we used 10-fold
cross-validation over randomly divided training data during training of the models.
In a k-fold cross-validation, the entire training set is divided into k parts with one
part used as test data and remaining k-1 parts used as training data. The selection of
the test data segment starts from the first part and slides towards k for each iteration.
After k iteration, k-fold cross-validation produces an average of the metrics values.
In the data classification phase, the experiments were conducted into two layers.
Initially, individual classifications with five supervised classifiers (one by one) were
performed using the prepossessed training data to build the models. Then the
outcomes (i.e., predictions) of each model was fed as input (i.e., training set) to each
of the six ensemble classifiers. The snippet of ensemble framework is shown in
Figure 2.3 to illustrate how the individual classifications are combined using
different ensemble classifiers. For NSL-KDD dataset, we have performed the same
experimentation for twelve times with different feature sets where eleven of them are
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Ta b l e 4 .1: Hyper-parameters for supervised individual and ensemble classifiers
Classification
Type

Classifier
Name

Abbreviated
Name

Hyper-parameters

Supervised

Logistic Regression

LR

Decision Tree
Naïve Bayes

DT
NB

Neural Network

NN

Support Vector
Machine

SVM

random_state=0, solver=‘lbfgs’,
multi_class=‘multinomial’, multi_class=‘multinomial’
default parameters
alpha=1.0, binarize=0.0,
fit_prior=True, class_prior=None
solver=‘lbfgs’, alpha=1e-5,
hidden_layer_sizes=(5, 2), random_state=1
C=1.0, kernel=‘rbf’, degree=3, gamma=‘scale’,
coef0=0.0, shrinking=True, probability=True

Majority Voting
Decision Tree
Naïve Bayes

Ens-MV
Ens-DT
Ens-NB

Logistic Regresion

Ens-LR

Neural Network

Ens-NN

Support Vector
Machine

Ens-SVM

Ensemble

none
default parameters
alpha=1.0, binarize=0.0,
fit_prior=True, class_prior=None
random_state=0, solver=‘lbfgs’,
multi_class=‘multinomial’
solver=‘lbfgs’, alpha=1e-5,
hidden_layer_sizes=(5, 2), random_state=1
contamination=0.22, novelty=True
C=1.0, kernel=‘rbf’, degree=3, gamma=‘scale’,
coef0=0.0, shrinking=True, probability=True

reduced feature-sets and another one is the full list of features. Details of these
feature sets are shown in Table 3.4.

4 .4

results and discussion
In this section, we analyze and discuss the results of the experiments running

the ensemble framework with three different datasets. We performed individual and
ensemble classifications with three datasets. However, for NSL-KDD dataset, we
experimented twelve times on each set with twelve different feature sets listed in
Table 3.4 Out of these experiments with the NSL-KDD dataset, the dataset with FS-7
feature set provided the best performance for supervised models.
We show the detailed results for the three datasets in Appendix a. Here we
discuss only the best models.
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Ta ble 4 . 2: Best performing results using supervised ensemble framework
Dataset

Category

Classifier

Individual SVM
Ensemble Ens_DT
Individual DT
UNSW-NB15
Ensemble Ens_LR
Individual DT
CICIDS2017
Ensemble Ens_LR
NSL-KDD

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

0.967
0.971
0.978
0.979
0.999
0.999

0.972
0.975
0.985
0.986
0.999
0.999

0.984
0.991
0.977
0.982
0.999
0.999

0.949
0.952
0.979
0.976
0.999
0.999

0.012 0.959
0.006 0.977
0.012 0.984
0.009 0.983
0.001 0.999
0.001 1

Elapsed Time
468.65
468.68
0.28
0.23
60.47
112599.96

Fi g u r e 4 .3: Performance comparison of individual (LHS) vs ensemble (RHS)
models for all datasets using Supervised Ensemble Framework
Table 4.2 and the corresponding bar-graph in Figure 4.3 shows the best
performing supervised individual and ensemble models for the three datasets. In
general, all the ensemble models perform better than the individual models for all
the categories. For supervised models, the improvements are not that substantial.
Referring to Tables a.1, a.2 and a.3 in Appendix a, we can see that for almost
all the cases the ensemble models perform better than the corresponding individual
models. Also, since supervised models are trained with labeled data, they learn the
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patterns associated with “DDoS” very well and can detect such patterns with
consistent accuracy. In other words, if the attack pattern is not one of the learned
patterns or the attack is a new one, then supervised models do not perform that well.
The last columns in Tables 4.2, a.1, a.2 and a.3 show the time taken to train
and test the models. They show that the ensemble models take more time. This is
because in an ensemble mechanism, all the constituent individual models run first,
then the ensemble classifier runs. Therefore, ensemble models include the times
taken by the individual models in addition to its own time. In these days of
high-performance computing, time is a critical and important factor. A real-time
deployment of these models may not seem feasible. However, in practice, the
training is seldom done in real-time. Instead, the training is used off-line to obtain a
robust model and then this “trained” model is deployed online to detect similar
attacks. Typically, high-performance computing platforms with graphical processing
units (GPU) are used to speed up the training process into many folds.
Table 4 . 3: Verifying supervised ensemble with the verification dataset
Dataset
NSL-KDD
UNSW-NB15
CICIDS2017

Best Model
Ens_DT
Ens_NN
Ens_LR

Instances
DDoS
900
900
900

Benign
100
100
100

Predicted Results
DDoS
Benign
TP FP TN FN
861 1
99 39
863 2
98 37
892 1
99 8

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

0.977
0.978
0.995

0.96
0.961
0.991

0.999
0.998
0.999

0.957
0.959
0.991

0.01
0.02
0.01

To verify the detection ability of the IDS containing the best performing
supervised models, we experimented with the DDoS detection mechanism using
verification datasets. Table 4.3 shows the results of the experiment with the
verification dataset. The detection performance is determined with a comparison of
the ground truths associated with the verification dataset. A comparison of the
performance metrics values of Table 4.3 with the corresponding values in Table 4.2
demonstrates that the metrics associated with the verification sets are similar to
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those of the test datasets, which indicates that the IDS with these models using our
ensemble approach will correctly detect at most 99.1% (96% for NSL-KDD dataset) of
the DDoS attacks and incorrectly detect minimum 0.01

4 .5

summary
Machine learning, a subset of artificial intelligence takes the intrusion detection

study to a new dimension. Ensemble of machine learning classifiers including
reduced feature set often produce a better detection accuracy rate compared to single
classifier. In detecting DDoS attack, machine learning based IDS has promising
outcomes. In this chapter, we developed an ML-based DDoS detection mechanism
that combines the pre-trained best performing supervised model. Five individual
and six ensemble models were trained using supervised ensemble framework for
each dataset, and the best performing models were selected based on standard
evaluation metric values. We evaluated our approach using three different
benchmark datasets: NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017. Experimental
results demonstrated that in all three cases the ensemble models outperformed the
individual models in terms of providing higher detection rates of 99.1% and lower
false positive rates of 0.01%. In addition, our approach was verified using a
verification dataset with ground truths. Based on these experiments, it can be
concluded that our ensemble framework, would be a better performing solution in
detecting DDoS attacks albeit at a higher computational cost.
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c h a p t er 5

Unsupervised Ensemble Framework

The goal of this research is to increase the DDoS attack detection accuracy while
decreasing the false positive rate. To design and develop an intrusion detection
system that can correctly detect 95.4% of the DDoS attacks with a false positive rate
of 0.05%, an ensemble unsupervised framework is implemented by combining five
novelty and outlier type unsupervised classifiers. The NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and
CICIDS2017 datasets and twelve feature sets from existing research for NSL-KDD
dataset are used for experimentation to compare our ensemble results with those of
our individual and other existing models.

5 .1

introduction
In Machine learning, supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised are three

basic ways to classify anomalous packets from normal packets. Supervised methods
have the privilege of differentiating anomalous and normal data from a tagged
dataset. Unsupervised methods, on the other hand, cluster dataset into different
clusters where the strength of the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among
those, novelty and outlier detection strategies are the unsupervised methods that
have significant outcomes in detecting the unseen anomaly. One class SVM (Support
Vector Machine), Local Outlier Factor, Elliptic Envelope, Isolation Forest, etc. are the
most well-known novelty and outlier detection classifiers.
Both supervised and unsupervised classifiers are being used in developing IDS.
However, the majority of these approaches have focused on learning a single model

76

for intrusions. Moreover, due to the varied nature of intrusions, it may be hard to
learn a single model that generalizes to all types. For example, some types of
intrusions can be modeled using a simple linear model (e.g. logistic regression)
while others may require more complex non-linear models (e.g. support vector
machines with kernels). Therefore, the main idea of this research is to train several
models that can identify DDoS intrusions and then combine these into a unified
system based on different mechanisms.
The benefits of ensemble learning, i.e., combining multiple classifiers to form a
more powerful classifier have been well-studied in the ML community. Dietterich et
al. [6] mentioned that ensembles can perform better than a single classifier and many
classification problems have benefited from the idea of combining multiple classifiers.
In general, there are two ways to ensemble the classifiers: homogeneous and
heterogeneous. When similar types of classifiers are used to build a training model,
it is called a homogeneous ensemble (e.g. bagging and boosting), whereas
combining different types of classifiers is called a heterogeneous ensemble (e.g.
stacking). Both homogeneous and heterogeneous ensembles are being used to build
IDS. Aburomman et al. [7] mentioned a wide range of ensemble ML techniques and
methods used to detect network intrusion. However, there are several drawbacks
with existing ML approaches. First, existing techniques do not use relevant domain
knowledge in constructing the classifier. This means that they end up using a lot of
irrelevant features which results in the so-called “curse-of-dimensionality”, i.e., the
accuracy and generalization reduce as the number of features increase. Next, most
existing methods focus on supervised ML models which is problematic since it
requires a large amount of labeled data. Finally, even in existing methods that use
unsupervised methods to detect network intrusions, there is no systematic approach
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that has been developed that can combine different unsupervised models, which is
particularly important since learning an ensemble model is more robust as compared
to learning a single model. In this work, our goal is to address all these three issues.
Here, twelve feature sets listed in Table 3.4 that produce higher accuracy for
NSL-KDD dataset are considered for experimentation. The novelty of this research is
to ensemble ‘novelty and outlier detection’ type unsupervised classifiers for better
detection accuracy and lower false positive alarm. We show that this ensemble
approach outperforms existing research methods as well and empirically show that
generalization over new attacks is significantly improved when we combine different
approaches as compared to using any one single approach.

5 .2

methodology : unsupervised ensemble framework
As DDoS has the devastating damaging effects on organizations’ assets, a

comprehensive defense mechanism is required to protect assets. Anomaly-based IDS
over signature-based has a better detection accuracy privileging in detecting unseen
attacks but at the expense of a lot of false identification of unusual activities as
anomalous. Traditional IDSs are defending and upgrading their strategies to cope up
with new attack types and patterns. However, with the change of attackers’ motive
and intention, an adaptive IDS is most demanding in the cyber world. Here, in this
research, an ML based IDS is proposed that has the novelty to ensemble
unsupervised classifiers based on outlier detection approach, and which gives a
better detection accuracy with a lower false positive rate in detecting DDoS.
To detect a DDoS attack using outlier detection and novelty detection techniques,
it is required to be able to decide whether a new observation data belongs to the
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same distribution as existing observations (can be called an inlier) or should be
considered as different (can be called an outlier). In any training dataset, data could
be concentrated into different regions or separated from each other. The observations
that are not concentrated and far from any concentrated regions, are defined as
outliers. Outlier detection estimators try to fit in those regions and ignore the deviant
observations. On the other hand, the training data is not polluted by outliers and a
new observation on outlier is known as a novelty. Both outlier and novelty detection
techniques are used for anomaly detection where they are interested in detecting
abnormal or unusual observations. Outlier detection and novelty detection are also
known as unsupervised and semi-supervised anomaly detection respectively.
Five ‘Novelty and Outlier Detection’ unsupervised models are used to ensemble
by using six different techniques in our unsupervised ensemble framework. The
selection of these classifiers is based on a grid search comparing the performance of
different ML algorithms in intrusion detection system domain. The selected
classifiers are, One-Class SVM (OCS) with two different hyperparameters, Local
Outlier Factor (LOF), Isolation Forest (ISOF), and Elliptic Envelope (ELE) which are
described in Section 2.3.2. Figure 5.1 shows the process flow of the proposed
framework from data preprocessing to DDoS detection. In this framework, five
classifiers work in parallel and each classifier builds a different model of the data.
Initially, the outputs of the five predictors are combined by majority voting method
to obtain the final output of the majority voting-based ensemble model (Ens_MV).
Then, another set of classification (we call it meta classifier) is performed using these
five predictors which is known as ensemble classification.
The proposed model which has four main parts: data collection, data
preprocessing, model classification and DDoS detection process. Data collections and
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F i g u re 5 .1: Overview of the Ensemble Unsupervised ML Classifier Framework
data preprocessing phases have been described in Section 3.2 in details for three
datasets that we have used in this experiment.
Data classification is the core component of our approach. This section
comprises several components. Two major components are individual and ensemble
classification. Initially, preprocessed data are classified by individual classifiers and
then on top of these classification results, another layer of classification is performed
which is called ensemble classification. Each of the ensemble frameworks consist of
several classifiers, models generated from individual classification, and ensemble
models generated by combining these individual models using various ensemble
classifiers.
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Figure 2.3 depicts the unsupervised ensemble mechanism using two layers of
classification. We first perform the individual classification and then the outcomes
from these individual models are fed into ensemble classifiers to combine them. To
combine these outcomes, we create a prediction matrix. A prediction matrix is a
binary matrix and contains the outputs from individual models with each row
corresponding to one record in the input dataset. The value of an element is ‘1’ if the
corresponding model identifies the record as “DDoS” and is ‘0’ if “Benign”. Since,
five individual models are used to generate prediction matrix, each column of the
matrix is treated as a feature for ensemble classification. Finally, the whole prediction
matrix is fed as input to the ensemble classifiers. The ensemble classifiers used in
this framework are: majority voting (Ens_MV), logistic regression (Ens_LR), naïve
Bayes (Ens_NB), neural network (Ens_NN), decision tree (Ens_DT), and support
vector machine (Ens_SVM). These classifiers are briefly described in Section 2.3.1.
At the end of the ensemble framework, the performance of all the individual
and ensemble models are measured and compared using standard model evaluation
metrics described in Section 3.3. After the comparison, the best performing
unsupervised model is identified from our proposed unsupervised ensemble
framework.
In real world scenario, a system can be defended by an IDS that is deployed on
the perimeter of the secured network. The core component (i.e., detection
mechanism) of this IDS contains the best performing unsupervised pre-trained
model. The mechanism collects the network traffic as it comes into the secured
network. The traffic data goes through data preprocessing steps where it is sanitized,
and feature reduced. Then it goes through the best performing unsupervised model.
If the model identifies the presence of a potential DDoS intrusion, then the
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Fi g u r e 5 . 2: IDS containing best performing model from unsupervised ensemble as
detection mechanism
mechanism raises an alert for the network administrator to take necessary action.
Here, we have used verification dataset to mimic the real-time data that can go
through the best performing unsupervised pre-trained model and the model
distinguishes the DDoS and Benign traffic. Figure 5.2 shows an IDS containing the
best performing model from the supervised ensemble framework as the detection
mechanism.
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5 .3

experiments
The proposed framework has been implemented in Python and ML tool

scikit-learn [89], a Python library to model the training data and to evaluate that
model using testing data.
In experimentation, three raw datasets, namely NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15 and
CICIDS2017 were extracted from the corresponding repository website and then
converted into a classifier readable format. The details of the datasets are described
in Section 3.1. Data collection, preprocessing and feature selection steps are
performed to create a standard data formats that are acceptable for a machine
learning classifier. The details of these steps are shown in Section 3.2.
Since unsupervised outlier detection models were used in our experiment, the
training data should contain the majority of ‘normal’ or ‘non-anomalous’ type data
instances for better predictions. From the whole training dataset, normal and
anomalous data were separated, and a new training dataset was created which
contained 99% of normal data and 1% of anomalous data. The reason behind using
1% anomalous data in the training dataset was to make the model run efficiently and
accurately in detecting anomaly by learning from normal behavior. The additional
percentage of noise (anomalous data) was added later to measure the framework’s
efficiency. After separating normal and anomalous data from the training data, 1% of
these normal data, was added with anomalous data to create a new or modified
training dataset. Table 3.3 shows the amount of data considered for unsupervised
classifications with corresponding datasets. On the other hand, testing dataset
wasn’t modified i.e., we have used original amount of test data. For both cases, the
‘class’ column from the dataset was removed as we used unsupervised methods in
this framework. However, the ‘class’ column from the test dataset was preserved to
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use it later in determining the accuracy of all five ensemble classifiers, and training
as well as testing purposes for Ensemble models.
Among various ML classification family, we have chosen five unsupervised
classifiers based on their ability in binary classification, and anomaly detection. As
the goal of this research is to detect existing and new DDoS attacks pattern, Outlier
and Novelty Detection type classifiers were the highest priority on selecting
classifiers. Here, four different types of the Outlier and Novelty Detection classifiers
were chosen, namely One-Class SVM, Local Outlier Factor, Isolation Forest, and
Elliptic Envelope. As four is the even number and there might be a chance of a tie
while choosing an outcome using the Majority Voting ensemble, the next odd
number five was chosen as the classifier count in this experiment. We experimented
with nine classifiers using a grid-search algorithm and retained the best values of the
hyper-parameters given by the grid-search for these classifiers in the framework. The
hyper-parameters used for different classifiers are given in Table 5.1. In order to
obtain robust models and to avoid over-fitting, we used 10-fold cross-validation over
randomly divided training data during training of the models. In a k-fold
cross-validation, the entire training set is divided into k parts with one part used as
test data and remaining k-1 parts used as training data. The selection of the test data
segment starts from the first part and slides towards k for each iteration. After k
iteration, k-fold cross-validation produces an average of the metrics values.
In the data classification phase, the experiments were conducted into two layers.
Initially, individual classifications with five unsupervised classifiers (one by one)
were performed using the prepossessed training data to build the models. Then the
outcomes (i.e., predictions) of each model was fed as input (i.e., training set) to each
of the six ensemble classifiers. The snippet of ensemble framework is shown in
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Ta b l e 5 .1 : Hyper-parameters for unsupervised individual and ensemble classifiers
Classification
Type

Classifier
Name

Abbreviated
Name

Hyper-parameters

Unsupervised

One Class SVMPolynomial Kernel
One Class SVMLinear Kernel
Local Outlier Factor

OCSVM_P

nu=0.2, kernel=‘poly’, gamma=0.1

OCSVM_L

nu=0.2, kernel=‘linear’, gamma=0.1

LOF

Isolation Forest

ISOF

Elliptic Envelope

EE

n_neighbors=20,
contamination=0.22, novelty=True
behaviour=‘new’, max_samples=100,
random_state= rng, contamination=0.2
support_fraction=1, contamination=0.2,
random_state = rng

Majority Voting
Decision Tree
Naïve Bayes

Ens-MV
Ens-DT
Ens-NB

Logistic Regresion

Ens-LR

Neural Network

Ens-NN

Support Vector
Machine

Ens-SVM

Ensemble

none
default parameters
alpha=1.0, binarize=0.0,
fit_prior=True, class_prior=None
random_state=0, solver=‘lbfgs’,
multi_class=‘multinomial’
solver=‘lbfgs’, alpha=1e-5,
hidden_layer_sizes=(5, 2), random_state=1
contamination=0.22, novelty=True
C=1.0, kernel=‘rbf’, degree=3, gamma=‘scale’,
coef0=0.0, shrinking=True, probability=True

Figure 2.5 to illustrate how the individual classifications are combined using
different ensemble classifiers. For NSL-KDD dataset, we have performed the same
experimentation for twelve times with different feature sets where eleven of them are
reduced feature-sets and another one is the full list of features. Details of these
feature sets are shown in Table 3.4.

5 .4

results and discussion
In this section, we analyze and discuss the results of the experiments running

the ensemble framework with three different datasets. We performed individual and
ensemble classifications with three datasets. However, for NSL-KDD dataset, we
experimented twelve times on each set with twelve different feature sets listed in
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Table 3.4. Out of these experiments with the NSL-KDD dataset, the dataset with FS-9
feature set provided the best performance for unsupervised models.
We show the detailed results for the three datasets in Section 3.1. Here we
discuss only the best models and some extra experiments with NSL-KDD dataset.
In Majority Voting, the nominal class label which was predicted the most from
the unsupervised outputs then be selected as the final output. On the other hand,
Ens_LR, Ens_DT, Ens_NB, Ens_NN and Ens_SVM are supervised models that
require a class label to learn. Here, we used these models to combine the outputs of
five unsupervised models. To train these models, a tagged dataset was required to
create using the unsupervised models’ outputs as features as well as the class label
that was removed in the data preprocessing phase. Maximum-likelihood estimation
is the key mechanism for both Logistic Regression and Naïve Bayes to predict the
ensemble outputs.
Ta b le 5 .2: Best performing results using unsupervised ensemble framework
Dataset

Category

Classifier

Individual EE
NSL-KDD
Ensemble Ens_NB
Individual OCSVM_L
UNSW-NB15
Ensemble Ens_DT
Individual EE
CICIDS2017
Ensemble Ens_DT

F1-Score Accuracy Precision Recall

FPR

0.897
0.951
0.855
0.896
0.648
0.703

0.075 0.908
0.063 0.957
0.173 0.913
0.085 0.93
0.163 0.748
0.083 0.781

0.91
0.955
0.885
0.925
0.783
0.834

0.904
0.926
0.747
0.851
0.637
0.773

0.891
0.978
1
0.945
0.659
0.645

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time
49.591
1122.498
3.89
0.316
179.692
44039.256

Table 5.2 and the corresponding bar-graph in Figure 5.3 show the best
performing unsupervised individual and ensemble models for the three datasets. In
general, all the ensemble models perform better than the individual models for all
the categories. The degree of improvement by ensemble models are significant for
unsupervised models. For example, for the NSL-KDD dataset best unsupervised
ensemble model improves the F1-score by 5.4%, accuracy by 4.5%, precision by 2.2%
and recall by 8.7% over the corresponding best individual unsupervised model.
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Fi g u r e 5 .3: Performance comparison of indivisual (LHS) vs ensemble (RHS) models
for all datasets using Unsupervised Ensemble Framework
Similarly, for the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the improvements are by 4.1% for F1-score,
4.0% for accuracy, and 10.4% for precision. For the CICIDS dataset the improvements
are by 5.0% for F1-score, 5.1% for accuracy, and 13.6% for precision. However, we
find that the recall values for the cases of both the UNSW-NB15 and CICIDS datasets
have decreased. Out of six best ensemble models for six different categories, the
ensemble with DT comes out best for two occasions. Among the best individual
models, EE comes up best for two categories.
Referring to the Tables b.1, b.2 and b.3 Appendix b, we can see that for almost
all the cases the ensemble models perform better than the corresponding individual
models. We also notice that the supervised models return better performance
numbers (From Chapter 4 and Appendix a) compared to their corresponding
unsupervised models. This is not unexpected, given that the supervised models are
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trained with labeled data. However, in practice, raw data are unlabeled, and
additional data engineering is required to label these. Also, since supervised models
are trained with labeled data, they learn the patterns associated with “DDoS” very
well and can detect such patterns with consistent accuracy. In other words, if the
attack pattern is not one of the learned patterns or the attack is a new one, then
supervised models do not perform that well. In these cases, unsupervised models
flag any out-of-the-ordinary pattern consistently.
The last columns in Tables 5.2, b.1, b.2 and b.3 show the time taken to train
and test the models. They show that the ensemble models take more time. This is
because in an ensemble mechanism, all the constituent individual models run first,
then the ensemble classifier runs. Therefore, ensemble models include the times
taken by the individual models in addition to its own time. In these days of
high-performance computing, time is a critical and important factor. A real-time
deployment of these models may not seem feasible. However, in practice, the
training is seldom done in real-time. Instead, the training is used off-line to obtain a
robust model and then this “trained” model is deployed online to detect similar
attacks. Typically, high-performance computing platforms with graphical processing
units (GPU) are used to speed up the training process into many folds.
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the data instances were normal data and
very few amounts (1%) of noise (abnormal data) mixture was added to build a
modified training dataset using NSL-KDD dataset. To verify our framework’s
stability and efficiency with the increase of noise (adding more anomalous data into
dataset) added with the training dataset, we varied the noise amounts from 1% to 5%
and measured the performance metrics. Figure 5.4 shows the deviation of
performance after adding noise with the training data.
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F igure 5 .4: Performance measurement with respect to adding noise
To verify the detection ability of the IDS containing the best performing
unsupervised models we experimented with the DDoS detection mechanism using
verification datasets. Table 5.3 shows the results of the experiment with the
verification dataset. In addition, a comparison of existing research is included in this
table. The detection performance is determined with a comparison of the ground
truths associated with the verification dataset.
A comparison of the performance metrics values of Table 5.3 with the
corresponding values in Table 5.2 and existing research, demonstrates that the
metrics associated with the verification sets are similar to those of the test datasets,
which indicates that the IDS with these models using our ensemble approach will
correctly detect at most 95.4% (81.4% for CICIDS2017 dataset) of the DDoS attacks
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Ta b l e 5. 3: Verifying unsupervised ensemble with the verification dataset and
comparison with existing models
Dataset
NSL-KDD
UNSW-NB15
CICIDS2017
NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD

Best Model
Ens_NB
Ens_DT
Ens_NN
GAR [90]
IG-GAR [90]
SU-GAR [90]
LDA-NB-kNNCF [91]
LOO-OAR-SVM [66]
GAR [90]

Instances
DDoS
900
900
900
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Benign
100
100
100
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Predicted Results
DDoS
Benign
TP
FP
TN
FN
859
5
95
41
739
7
93
161
723
9
91
177
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

0.977
0.978
0.995
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.974
0.898
0.886
0.773
0.789
0.776
0.82
0.827
0.773

0.954
0.832
0.814
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.994
0.991
0.988
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.954
0.821
0.803
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

and incorrectly detect minimum 0.05% benigns (0.09% for CICIDS2017 dataset) as
DDoS.

5 .5

summary
In this research, the goal was to detect DDoS attacks using an unsupervised ML

ensemble. Classifiers from various classifier families of outlier and novelty detection
type have been chosen to build the proposed framework. Initially, single classifiers
were used to measure the performance metrics in detecting DDoS attacks. On top of
these five individual classifiers (One class SVM: two different hyperparameters,
Local outlier factor, Elliptic envelope, and Isolation forest), an ensemble with
majority voting was applied as a baseline. NB, LR, DT, NN and SVM were then used
to ensemble these five classifiers again to get a better detection accuracy. In our
experiment, all most all ensemble models outperform the single classifiers used for
model classification. In addition, it was also observed from the experimental results
and compared to existing research that our proposed approach correctly detects at
most 95.4% of the DDoS attacks and incorrectly detect minimum 0.05% benigns as
DDoS. The proposed model is not only capable of detecting existing DDoS attacks,
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but also using outlier detection classifiers, it has the capability to detect unseen or
new DDoS attack.
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c h a p t er 6

Combined Ensemble Framework

In this study, a comprehensive solution is presented to detect DDoS attacks
using an ensemble-based machine learning approach. This approach combines a
supervised and an unsupervised machine learning ensemble frameworks. We
experimented using three benchmark datasets, namely NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and
CICIDS2017, and the results showed that ensemble classifiers significantly
out-performed single classifier-based approaches. An IDS utilizing the combination
of best performing supervised and unsupervised ensemble models correctly detects
at most 99.1% unseen DDoS attacks with a negligible false alarm rate.

6 .1

introduction
Imposing security in cyber arena has been a very serious problem not only for

national security but also for organizations and the general public who depend upon
server-based networking technology and the Internet. With every passing year the
usage of these technologies has been increasing steeply along with the economic
ramifications. But with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, an enormous number
of businesses and individuals have been forced to go online. National institutions,
governments, commercial organizations, educational institutions, nonprofits and
other offices and sectors across the board are now relying on networking facilities to
maintain their bottom-line. As a related consequence, at the same time these changes
have caused an exponential increase in the attack surface which is available to the
criminal elements within our society. Attackers are leveraging the vulnerabilities to
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exploit the new and unprecedented opportunities that are available to them to profit
from and/or disrupt e-commerce. For example, Cybersecurity Ventures estimates
that the economic loss due to cybercrime, will soon reach the level of $6 trillion
annually by 2021 [1]. Developing new countermeasures to stem the tide of such
attacks will certainly aid in stemming the tide of cybercrime.
In anomaly detection problem, ML uses three basic ways, namely supervised,
semi-supervised, and unsupervised to classify network packets with anomalous
content from normal content. Supervised methods have the advantage of
differentiating anomalous from normal data using a tagged or labeled dataset.
Unsupervised methods, on the other hand, sort data into different clusters where the
strength of the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among those, novelty and
outlier detection strategies are the unsupervised methods that have significant
outcomes in detecting otherwise hidden anomalies.
There are several drawbacks with existing ML approaches. First, existing
techniques often do not use relevant domain knowledge in constructing the model.
Consequently, they end up using a lot of irrelevant features which cause the
“curse-of-dimensionality", meaning that the accuracy and generalization power are
reduced as the number of features increase. Next, most existing methods are built on
either supervised or unsupervised classifiers. The supervised classifiers require large
amounts of data be curated as labeled data (i.e., the ground truth). Whereas it is not
difficult to collect data during normal operation, “attack" data is very sparsely
available. On the other hand, the unsupervised classifiers do not require “label" to
construct models and these models are therefore better equipped to detect zero-day
attacks. However, unsupervised models are known to produce spurious results in
practice. For example, using clustering methods, while we can cluster the data
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according to some metric, not all clusters may be meaningful. To alleviate the
shortcomings of these two types of classifiers, in this research, we propose a scheme
that utilizes machine learning ensembles consisting both supervised and
unsupervised classifiers. That is, we use individual classifiers that are supervised or
unsupervised and then combine these classifiers using a meta-classifier that tries to
correct the errors from one classifier based on the results from other classifiers. All
three datasets, NSL-KDD [8], UNSW-NB15 [9], and CICIDS2017 [10], we use in this
research are labeled so the ground truths are known a priori.
In the past few years, severe disruptions occurred in several tech giants
including GitHub and Amazon, making the security experts struggle to detect DDoS
attacks and find countermeasures. This motivates us to work on this research [3].
Due to the drawbacks inherent in traditional IDS approaches in detecting unseen
attacks, it is necessary to incorporate intelligence with detection mechanisms.
Several standalone machine learning classifiers have been used in detecting
intrusions [7]. However, not all the classifiers perform similarly on the same data. It
has been shown that ML ensemble provides better accuracy and decisive results
compared to individual data classifications.
Supervised methods take the advantage of using a tagged or labeled dataset in
learning to differentiate the different classes in the data. Unsupervised methods,
working on unlabeled data, group the different classes into clusters where the
strength of the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among unsupervised
methods, novelty and outlier detection strategies have shown significant promise in
detecting otherwise hidden anomalies. The supervised methods require large
amounts of curated data. Unsupervised methods do not require labeled data.
Unsupervised methods are better equipped to discover zero-day attacks never before
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encountered. A scheme that utilizes both supervised and unsupervised classifiers
can address and counterbalance the drawbacks inherent to each other. Therefore,
here we develop a DDoS intrusion detection mechanism that employs machine
learning ensembles of both supervised and unsupervised classifiers that are
complementary in reaching a corroborated classification decision, and higher
performance with respect to lower processing time.
Our contribution here is three-fold. First, we used five stand-alone supervised
and five unsupervised classifications to detect DDoS attacks and obtained
outstanding accuracy with negligible false alarms. Second, we ensemble those
individual supervised and unsupervised models’ outcomes with various
mechanisms like majority voting, logistic regression, naive Bayes, neural network,
decision tree, and support vector machine. Third, we used three different datasets to
experiment with our scheme and compared the performances among those. In
addition, our scheme was verified using a verification set consisting of ground truths.

6 .2

methodology : combined ensemble framework
This section provides an overview of the proposed ensemble-based DDoS attack

detection scheme. The detailed architectural diagram depicting the process flow is
given in Figure 6.1. It shows the individual processing phases, namely data
collection, data preprocessing, data classification, and DDoS detection.
Data Collection: As the primary goal of our research is to detect DDoS attack
precisely using ensemble-based ML approach, we have collected various benchmark
datasets containing DDoS attacks. In this phase, we have collected three benchmark
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Fi g u r e 6.1: Process flow of the combined ensemble framework to detect DDoS
attacks
datasets: NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017. Details of these datasets are
described in Section 3.1. Each of the dataset has three types of instances, such as
training, testing and verification data.
Data preprocessing: Data preprocessing is the first and foremost task before
starting with any data classification. There are various subtasks in a data
preprocessing phase like removing unwanted data, data conversion, scaling,
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removing invalid data, etc. The details of data preprocessing are described in
Section 3.2.
Feature Selection: Selecting the right feature and right number of features could
lead the classification model to its cherished goal. Feature selection is another crucial
preprocessing phase in data classification which can be done by various inbuilt
selection mechanisms or by using domain knowledge. In Section 3.2.2, feature
selection for different datasets are discussed in detail.
Data Classification: Data classification is the heart of our approach. This section
comprises several components. Two major components are supervised and
unsupervised ensemble frameworks. Each of the ensemble frameworks consist of
several classifiers, models generated from individual classification, and ensemble
models generated by combining these individual models using various ensemble
classifiers. Finally, all individual and ensemble models are analyzed in terms of
standard performance metrics to produce the best performing model.
From the Figure 6.1, two ensemble frameworks are shown in data classification
phase. The construction mechanism of these two ensemble frameworks are almost
same but the only difference is, they are built with two different types of classifiers
(supervised and unsupervised).
The supervised classifiers included in our framework are decision tree (DT),
logistic regression (LR), naïve Bayes (NB), support vector machine (SVM), and neural
network (NN). One-class support vector machine with polynomial kernel
(OCSVM_P), one-class support vector machine with linear kernel (OCSVM_L),
isolation forest (ISOF), elliptic envelope (EE), and local outlier factor (LOF) are the
unsupervised classifiers used in our framework. A brief description of these
classifiers is shown in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.1.
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In individual data classification, we perform both supervised and unsupervised
types of classification. The reason behind performing stand-alone data classification
is to find the performance metrics and to compare them with ensemble
classifications.
As mentioned earlier, we first perform the individual classification and then the
outcomes from these individual models are fed into ensemble classifiers to combine
them. To combine these outcomes, we create a prediction matrix.
A prediction matrix is a binary matrix and contains the outputs from individual
models with each row corresponding to one record in the input dataset. The value of
an element is ‘1’ if the corresponding model identifies the record as “DDoS” and is
‘0’ if “Benign”. Since, five individual models (both supervised and unsupervised) are
used to generate prediction matrix, each column of the matrix is treated as a feature
for ensemble classification. Finally, the whole prediction matrix is fed as input to the
ensemble classifiers. The ensemble classifiers used in both frameworks are: majority
voting (Ens_MV), logistic regression (Ens_LR), naïve Bayes (Ens_NB), neural network
(Ens_NN), decision tree (Ens_DT), and support vector machine (Ens_SVM). These
classifiers are briefly described in Section 2.4.
In the end of each ensemble framework, the performance of all the individual
and ensemble models are measured and compared using standard model evaluation
metrics described in Section 3.3. After the comparison, the best performing
supervised and unsupervised models are identified from two different ensemble
frameworks.
DDoS Detection: In real world scenario, a system can be defended by an IDS that
is deployed on the perimeter of the secured network. The core component (i.e.,
detection mechanism) of this IDS contains the combination of best performing
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Fi g u r e 6 . 2: DDoS detection using the combined best performing supervised and
unsupervised models
supervised and unsupervised pre-trained models. Figure 6.2 depicts the flowchart of
the DDoS detection mechanism within the IDS. The mechanism collects the network
traffic as it comes into the secured network. The traffic data goes through data
preprocessing steps where it is sanitized, and feature reduced. Then it goes through
the best performing supervised and unsupervised models. If any one of the models
identify the presence of a potential DDoS intrusion, then the mechanism raises an
alert for the network administrator to take necessary action.

99

6 .3

experiments
This section presents a set of experiments with the framework proposed in this

paper. Supervised methods work better with balanced dataset, i.e., when the amount
of data pertaining to ‘non-attack’ and ‘attack’ are close to equal. On the other hand,
unsupervised methods require that the ‘attack’ data is a small fraction of ‘non-attack’
data.
In the supervised classification, we separated normal and anomalous data
instances from the training dataset provided by the corresponding repository. As the
anomalous data not only contains DDoS data but also other types of attacks in
several datasets, we extracted data instances containing the DDoS. We combined this
DDoS data with normal data preparing the training dataset for supervised
classification. For preparing the datasets for the unsupervised classifiers, normal and
anomalous data were separated from the entire training dataset and a new training
dataset was created that contained 99% of normal data and 1 % of anomalous data.
The numbers of benign (normal) and DDoS (anomalous) data in the three training
datasets for both supervised and unsupervised methods are shown in Table 3.3. Data
preprocessing and feature reductions steps are mentioned detailed in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.2.2, respectively.
Among various ML classification family, we have chosen five supervised and
four unsupervised classifiers based on their ability in binary classification, and
outlier, novelty, and anomaly detection. We experimented with these nine classifiers
using a grid-search algorithm and retained the best values of the hyper-parameters
given by the grid-search for these classifiers in the framework. The hyper-parameters
used for different classifiers are given in Table 4.1 and 5.1. In order to obtain robust
models and to avoid over-fitting, we used 10-fold cross-validation over randomly
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divided training data during training of the models. In a k-fold cross-validation, the
entire training set is divided into k parts with one part used as test data and
remaining k-1 parts used as training data. The selection of the test data segment
starts from the first part and slides towards k for each iteration. After k iteration,
k-fold cross-validation produces an average of the metrics values.
In the data classification phase, the experiments were conducted into two layers.
Initially, individual classifications with five supervised and five unsupervised
classifiers (one by one) were performed using the prepossessed training data to build
the models. Then the outcomes (i.e., predictions) of each model was fed as input (i.e.,
training set) to each of the six ensemble classifiers. As there are two sets (supervised
and unsupervised) of individual classifications, the outcomes of the models on each
set were used to train the corresponding set of ensemble classifiers i.e., six ensemble
classifiers are used to ensemble supervised and unsupervised classifiers separately.
The snippet of ensemble frameworks are shown in Figure 2.3 to illustrate how the
individual classifications are combined using different ensemble classifiers.
For NSL-KDD dataset, we have performed the same experimentation for twelve
times with different feature sets where eleven of them are reduced feature-sets and
another one is the full list of features. Details of these feature sets are shown in
Table 3.4.

6 .4

results and discussion
In this section we analyze and discuss the results of the experiments running the

ensemble framework with three different datasets.
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We performed two sets of individual classifications (supervised and
unsupervised) with three datasets. However, for NSL-KDD dataset, we
experimented twelve time on each set with twelve different feature sets listed in
Table 3.4. Out of these experiments with the NSL-KDD dataset, the dataset with FS-7
feature set provided the best performance for supervised models, and for the
unsupervised models, FS-9 provided the best performance. Since the supervised and
unsupervised classification techniques are different in nature but black box to users,
they produce different types of outcomes. Depending on the nature of classification
process, FS-7 performed better in supervised classification, whereas FS-9 in
unsupervised classification. We show the detailed results for the three datasets in
Appendix a and Appendix b. Here we discuss only the best models.
Table 6 .1: Best performing results using combined ensemble
Dataset

Learning
Type

NSL-KDD

Supervised

UNSW-NB15

CICIDS2017

Classifier
Category

Individual
Ensemble
Unsupervised Individual
Ensemble
Supervised
Individual
Ensemble
Unsupervised Individual
Ensemble
Supervised
Individual
Ensemble
Unsupervised Individual
Ensemble

Models

F1-Score

SVM
Ens_DT
EE
Ens_NB
DT
Ens_LR
EE
Ens_LR
DT
Ens_LR
EE
Ens_DT

0.967
0.971
0.897
0.951
0.978
0.979
0.855
0.896
0.999
0.999
0.648
0.703

Accuracy Precision
0.972
0.975
0.910
0.955
0.985
0.986
0.885
0.925
0.999
0.999
0.783
0.834

0.984
0.991
0.904
0.926
0.977
0.982
0.747
0.851
0.999
0.999
0.637
0.773

Recall

FPR

ROC
AUC

Elapsed
Time (s)

0.949
0.952
0.891
0.978
0.979
0.976
1.000
0.945
0.999
0.999
0.659
0.645

0.012
0.006
0.075
0.063
0.012
0.009
0.173
0.085
0.001
0.001
0.163
0.083

0.959
0.977
0.908
0.957
0.984
0.983
0.913
0.930
0.999
1.000
0.748
0.781

468.64
468.68
49.59
1122.49
0.282
26.29
3.890
313.56
60.46
112599.96
203.87
54780.97

Table 6.1 and the corresponding bar-graph in Figure 6.3 show the best
performing supervised and unsupervised, individual and ensemble models for the
three datasets. In general, all the ensemble models perform better than the
individual models for all the categories. For supervised models, the improvements
are not that substantial. However, the degree of improvement by ensemble models
are significant for unsupervised models. For example, for the NSL-KDD dataset best
unsupervised ensemble model improves the F1-score by 5.4%, accuracy by 4.5%,
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Fi g u r e 6.3: Back-to-back performance comparison of the individual (LHS) vs
ensemble (RHS) models for all three datasets
precision by 2.2% and recall by 8.7% over the corresponding best individual
unsupervised model. Similarly, for the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the improvements are
by 4.1% for F1-score, 4.0% for accuracy, and 10.4% for precision. For the CICIDS
dataset the improvements are by 5.0% for F1-score, 5.1% for accuracy, and 13.6% for
precision. However, we find that the recall values for the cases of both the
UNSW-NB15 and CICIDS datasets have decreased. Out of six best ensemble models
for six different categories, the ensemble with LR comes out best for three occasions.
Among the best individual models, DT comes up best for two categories.
Referring to Tables a.1, a.2 and a.3 in Appendix a and Tables b.1, b.2 and
b.3 in Appendix b, we can see that for almost all the cases the ensemble models
perform better than the corresponding individual models. We also notice that the
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supervised models return better performance numbers compared to their
corresponding unsupervised models. This is not unexpected, given that the
supervised models are trained with labeled data. However, in practice, raw data are
unlabeled, and additional data engineering is required to label these. Also, since
supervised models are trained with labeled data, they learn the patterns associated
with “DDoS” very well and can detect such patterns with consistent accuracy. In
other words, if the attack pattern is not one of the learned patterns or the attack is a
new one, then supervised models do not perform that well. In these cases,
unsupervised models flag any out-of-the-ordinary pattern consistently. That is why
we included both supervised and unsupervised models in our framework.
The last columns in these tables show the time taken to train and test the
models. They show that the ensemble models take more time. This is because in an
ensemble mechanism, all the constituent individual models run first, then the
ensemble classifier runs. Therefore, ensemble models include the times taken by the
individual models in addition to its own time. In these days of high-performance
computing, time is a critical and important factor. A real-time deployment of these
models may not seem feasible. However, in practice, the training is seldom done in
real-time. Instead, the training is used off-line to obtain a robust model and then this
“trained” model is deployed online to detect similar attacks. Typically,
high-performance computing platforms with graphical processing units (GPU) are
used to speed up the training process into many folds.
To verify the detection ability of the IDS containing the best performing
supervised and unsupervised models (as described in Section 6.2), we experimented
with the DDoS detection mechanism using verification datasets. Table 6.2 shows the
results of the experiment with the verification dataset. The detection performance is
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Table 6 .2: Test results with the verification datasets
Dataset

NSL-KDD

UNSW-NB15

CICIDS2017

Method
Sup En
Unsup En
OR’ed
Sup En
Unsup En
OR’ed
Sup En
Unsup En
OR’ed

Best
Model
Ens_DT
Ens_NB
N/A
Ens_LR
Ens_LR
N/A
Ens_LR
Ens_DT
N/A

Instances
DDoS

Benign

900

100

900

100

900

100

Predicted Results
DDoS
Benign
TP FP TN FN
861 1
99
39
859 5
95
41
861 2
98
39
863 2
98
37
739 7
93 161
863 4
96
37
892 1
99
8
723 9
91 177
892 5
95
8

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

0.977
0.974
0.977
0.978
0.898
0.977
0.995
0.886
0.993

0.960
0.954
0.959
0.961
0.832
0.959
0.991
0.814
0.987

0.999
0.994
0.998
0.998
0.991
0.995
0.999
0.988
0.994

0.957
0.954
0.957
0.959
0.821
0.959
0.991
0.803
0.991

0.010
0.050
0.020
0.020
0.070
0.040
0.010
0.090
0.050

determined with a comparison of the ground truths associated with the verification
dataset. A comparison of the performance metrics values of Table 6.2 with the
corresponding values in Table 6.1 demonstrates that the metrics associated with the
verification sets are similar to those of the test datasets, which indicates that the IDS
with these models using our ensemble approach will correctly detect at most 99.1%
of the DDoS attacks and incorrectly detect at most 0.01% benigns as DDoS.

6 .5

summary
Despite being around for a long time, the threats of distributed denial of service

(DDoS) attacks have only increased. Early detection of intrusions causing DDoS
attacks is an active field of research. Among other approaches, machine learning
(ML) based detection has shown promise. In this research, we developed an
ML-based DDoS detection mechanism that combines the pre-trained best performing
supervised and unsupervised models. These models were trained using supervised
and unsupervised ensemble frameworks, and the best performing models were
selected based on standard evaluation metric values. We evaluated our approach
using three different benchmark datasets: NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017.
Experimental results demonstrated that in all three cases the ensemble models
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outperformed the individual models in terms of higher detection rates and lower
false positive rates. In addition, our approach was verified using a verification
dataset with ground truths. Based on these experiments, it can be concluded that our
ensemble framework, a combination of both the supervised and unsupervised ML
models, would be a better performing solution in detecting DDoS attacks albeit at a
higher computational cost.
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c h a p t er 7

Ensemble Feature Selection Methods (EnFS)

In an ML classification problem, the feature selection process, aka feature
engineering, is treated as a mandatory pre-processing phase that potentially reduces
the computational complexity by identifying important or relevant features from the
original dataset and results in the overall improvement of classification accuracy. In
this chapter, we describe an ensemble framework for feature selection methods
(EnFS) that combines the outputs of seven well-known feature selection methods
using the majority voting (MV) technique and produces an optimal set of features. In
the evaluation of the framework, an extensive experiment was performed using the
intrusion detection benchmark dataset NSL-KDD. Furthermore, using the optimal
feature set, we have experimented with ensemble supervised ML framework [92] for
the same dataset that demonstrated the efficacy of our approach by producing
greater accuracy and negligible false alarms compared to existing approaches.

7 .1

introduction
In response, to mitigate the severity of cyber-attacks, Intrusion Detection

Systems (IDSs) are being used in ways to scrutinize attempted attacks anticipating
that there will be follow on attempts. Machine Learning (ML) based techniques are
being employed thereby to incorporate active intelligence and make detection more
effective in countering such attacks. Combining ML into IDS can improve the
accuracy, reliability, and resiliency of networked public facing information
infrastructures compared with standard signature based IDSs. Feature Selection (FS)
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methods used in the pre-processing phase have the greatest potential to improve the
performance of ML classifications when combined with IDSs. FS uses various
techniques to extract a subset of features within the data to better discriminate
between classes resulting in needing fewer features and less processing time. Thus,
features that do not help to discriminate the class are eliminated because they do not
contribute to the models’ prediction. FS methods can be classified into three
categories, namely (a) filter-based, (b) wrapper-based, and (c) embedded methods.
Here, we subsume all three types of methods within our framework by combining
them in a way that eliminates the inherent bias and drawbacks when used
individually.
The contribution of this study includes the stepwise process as well as an
empirical validation using the NSL-KDD dataset to evaluate our approach in the
case of DDoS attack detection. Recent studies show that ensemble technique for
feature selection improves the performance of models in several ways by i) removing
non-discriminating features, ii) identifying important features which have a high
correspondence with the target class [35], iii) finding some features that produce
weak performance individually, and strong performance when used in a group [93],
etc. In this chapter, we describe an ensemble framework EnFS that combines seven
FS methods using the majority voting (MV) technique. The EnFS framework codifies
a systematic and repeatable method that provides better results (prediction accuracy)
in less computational time (more efficient), and maintains such benefits as reducing
overfitting, reducing classification and training time, etc. Furthermore, an extensive
set of experiments have been conducted with fifteen different FS methods. Using a
grid-search algorithm, we chose the best seven methods from the various selection
method categories. Then, by using the reduced feature set obtained from the EnFS
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framework, we performed data classification with our previous supervised ensemble
ML framework to identify the best performances. Consequently, using the
well-known NSL-KDD dataset, we could clearly demonstrate that the subset of
features produced by our ensemble approach (i.e., EnFS) yields better accurate
results. This was true for several different classification methods as compared to
using a single FS criterion or without using any FS method.

7 .2

methodology : ensemble feature selection
framework
This section provides an overview of our ensemble framework EnFS. The

detailed architectural diagram depicting the process flow is given in Figure 7.1. It
shows the processing phases, namely a) data preprocessing, b) feature selection, c)
ensemble selection methods and d) model classification with performance analysis of
the detection.
Data Preprocessing: There are various subtasks that must be done in a data
preprocessing phase, like removing unwanted data, data conversion, scaling,
removing invalid data, etc. The detail of data preprocessing is described in
Section 3.2.
Feature Selection using Individual Methods: Selecting the right feature and right
number of features could lead the classification model to its cherished goal. Feature
selection (FS) phase is one of the crucial phases of model classification which can be
done by various inbuilt mechanisms or by using domain knowledge. In this
framework, we have used seven FS methods (described in Section 2.5) individually
to experiment with NSL-KDD dataset and to extract a minimal number of features
from each of the methods.
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Fi g u r e 7. 1: Process flow of the Ensemble Feature Selection Method Framework
(EnFS)
Ensemble Feature Selection (EnFS) Ensemble feature selection is a process of
identifying the best feature subset based on the majority voting technique. The
process is illustrated in Figure 7.2, where we use nine individual FS methods,
namely Analysis of variance (Anova), Logistic regression with L1 penalty (LRL1),
Lasso, Mutual information (Mut Info), Chi squared (Chi-2), Random forests (RF),
Recursive feature elimination (RFE), and Select p value using false positive rate
(SFPR), to select the reduced feature set. Afterwards, we rank the features according
to majority voting where more than half of the FS methods select the features.
First, we consider five features in a dataset and nine FS methods as shown in
Figure 7.2 are used to reduce the features. The selected features from each FS
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Fi g u r e 7.2: Ensemble feature selection approach (EnFS) using majority voting,
where the frequency for each feature is shown in brackets, e.g. 7 is the frequency
for Feature-3
method are then combined (ensemble) and EnFS selects the most frequent features
using majority voting. We apply this EnFS technique for NSL-KDD datasets.
Model Classification: In this phase, several ML models are considered and
analyzed to evaluate the accuracy of the feature set that are obtained from the
previous section. In addition, we experimented with full features (i.e., no FS methods
were applied) to compare the results and to validate that the FS process is necessary.

7.2.1 DDoS Detection
In the real world, an IDS as shown in Figure 7.3 can be placed at the gateway in
a secured network. The IDS consists of sensors and an audit data preprocessor, to
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convert the incoming traffic into activity data. We use ‘Verification data’ to mimic the
real time data stream. The best performing model obtained from the ensemble
supervised framework is used as the detection model of the IDS. The detection
model within the detection engine analyzes the verification data and identifies the
data as anomaly or benign. Afterwards, based on the rules from the decision table,
the decision engine takes necessary actions and reports the network admin about the
potential threat.

Fi g u r e 7 .3 : Ensemble machine learning framework as the detection technique of an
IDS

7 .3

experiments
This section presents a set of experiments and their details using our EnFS

framework. Dataset details and data preprocessing are already described in
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Section 3.2. Here, in this section we will discuss feature selection and model
classification process.
Feature Selection: In this section, we have performed two layers of experiments.
Initially, seven selection methods are chosen from among fifteen selection methods
based on accuracy, performance, and other metrics using a manual grid search
algorithm. The search algorithm selected all three types (filter-based, wrapper-based
and embedded methods) of selection methods. We have selected the top seven FS
methods from among fifteen that produced the best results. After completing
method selection, seven FS methods were used individually to extract the features,
where each of the methods selected a different subset of features. Subsequently, the
majority voting (MV) technique is used to ensemble all seven methods. Finally, a
combined subset of features is extracted that was further used in data classification.
Model Classification: We utilized our ensemble supervised classification
framework (described in Chapter 4) to evaluate the models’ performances using the
feature set obtained from the previous section. For the supervised ensemble
framework, Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT),
Neural Network (NN), and Logistic Regression (LR) were used for individual data
classification, and on top of those classifications another layer of classification was
performed to ensemble them. We have used various ensemble techniques, like
Majority Voting (Ens_MV), Logistic Regression (Ens_LR), Naive Bayes (Ens_NB),
Neural Network (Ens_NN), Decision Tree (Ens_DT), and Support Vector Machine
(Ens_SVM). All these methods and the framework were used here to analyze the
efficacy of the DDoS classification problem using the feature set obtained from this
research.
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7 .4

results and discussion
In this section, the results obtained from several experiments are illustrated in

detail. Experimental results performed by the EnFS along with seven FS methods are
analyzed here. The goal of this experiment is to extract important features using
several selection methods as well as find the exact number of features after
combining all these methods using ensemble technique (i.e., MV). Table 7.1 shows
the features that were extracted from seven FS methods.
The majority voting (MV) technique (i.e., a feature can be selected if more than
half of the methods select it) is used here to ensemble all seven selection methods’
output. Since seven selection methods are used in this research, ensemble framework
selects those features who have been selected by any four of the seven methods.
Table 7.2 enumerates that EnFS selects 11 features, and each of the features is
demonstrated in a form of right or cross mark that shows the selection by individual
methods. In addition, a score card counter is added to support the MV technique
(i.e., Total Count)
To evaluate those selections (both EnFS and the individual seven methods), we
performed three types of experiments using the ensemble supervised model.
Initially, we used the full feature set (i.e., no FS method was applied), then seven
feature sets obtained from seven selection methods, and finally we used feature set
obtained from EnFS for model classification. Table 7.4 shows the best performed
experiments, whereas the full experimental results are available in Appendix c.
From Table 7.3, it is obvious that the features obtained from EnFS perform better
than all other FS methods. In addition, full feature set (i.e., without applying any
selection method) was used in another experimentation to compare and evaluate the
necessity of FS methods or framework like EnFS.
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Table 7 . 1: Extracted features from seven FS methods
F#

Method

F#1

Pearson Correla- [’dst_host_rerror_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate’,
tion
’srv_diff_host_rate’,
’service’,
’dst_host_count’,
’flag’,
’logged_in’,
’count’,
’dst_host_srv_count’,
’dst_host_same_srv_rate’, ’serror_rate’, ’srv_serror_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’,
’same_srv_rate’]
Chi-Square
[’service’, ’flag’, ’logged_in’, ’count’, ’serror_rate’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’srv_rerror_rate’,
’same_srv_rate’,
’srv_diff_host_rate’, ’dst_host_count’, ’dst_host_srv_count’,
’dst_host_same_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’, ’dst_host_rerror_rate’]
Mutual Informa- [’service’, ’flag’, ’src_bytes’, ’dst_bytes’, ’same_srv_rate’,
tion
’diff_srv_rate’]
LASSO
[’duration’,
’protocol_type’,
’wrong_fragment’,
’logged_in’,
’srv_count’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’srv_rerror_rate’,
’same_srv_rate’,
’diff_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate’]
Logistic
[’duration’, ’protocol_type’, ’flag’, ’wrong_fragment’,
Regression
’hot’, ’root_shell’, ’num_file_creations’, ’is_guest_login’,
with L1 Penalty ’count’, ’srv_count’, ’srv_serror_rate’, ’srv_rerror_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_count’,
’dst_host_same_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate’]
Random Forests [’service’,
’flag’,
’dst_bytes’,
’count’,
’serror_rate’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’same_srv_rate’,
’diff_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_count’,
’dst_host_diff_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’, ’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’]
Recursive
[’duration’, ’protocol_type’, ’flag’, ’wrong_fragment’,
Feature
’hot’, ’logged_in’, ’is_guest_login’, ’count’, ’srv_count’,
Elimination
’srv_serror_rate’, ’srv_rerror_rate’, ’dst_host_srv_count’,
’dst_host_same_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’]

F#2

F#3
F#4

F#5

F#6

F#7

Extracted Features

The ROC curve performance analysis for EnFS framework is shown in Figure 7.5.
Rest of the ROC curves for seven selection methods are available in Appendix c.
Using Table 7.3, a bar chart can be plotted as shown in Figure 7.4. It shows the
comparison of performances using features from seven methods, from EnFS, and
applying no FS method. From all the figures and comparisons, it is obvious that our
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Ta b l e 7 . 2: Score Card: Extracted features using Ensemble Feature Selection
Framework (EnFS)
Feature Name

Pearson

Ch-Square

Mutual Info

LASSO

LR-L1 RF

FRE

Total Count

srv_serror_rate
flag
same_srv_rate
count
dst_host_srv_count
dst_host_serror_rate
logged_in
service
dst_host_same_srv_rate
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
srv_rerror_rate

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1

0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0

Ta b l e 7.3 : Best performed classification results using full features, seven features,
and the features obtained from EnFS
Method

Model Name

F-1 Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

No FS
PEARSON
CHI2
MUTINFO
LASSO
LRL1
RF
RFE
EnFS

Ens_DT
Ens_DT
Ens_DT
Ens_DT
Ens_NN
Ens_NB
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM
Ens_DT

0.884
0.882
0.925
0.869
0.921
0.888
0.898
0.893
0.971

0.9
0.904
0.936
0.895
0.936
0.912
0.918
0.916
0.975

0.878
0.941
0.941
0.95
0.989
0.982
0.977
0.99
0.991

0.89
0.83
0.909
0.801
0.862
0.811
0.831
0.814
0.952

0.011
0.04
0.043
0.032
0.007
0.011
0.015
0.006
0.006

ensemble framework for FS methods (EnFS) outperforms any other single selection
methods.

7 .5

summary
Feature selection is a vital part of any classification problem. In this chapter, we

discussed an ensemble framework for feature selection (EnFS) which combined
seven well-known selection methods. The goal of combining these methods is to
extract the most accurate set of features that produces better outcomes in detecting
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Fi g u r e 7.4: Performance comparison of EnFS with other seven selection methods
and using no selection method.

Figure 7 . 5: ROC curve using EnFS framework
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DDoS attacks. We performed three experiments using the i) full feature set initially,
then ii) seven feature sets obtained from the seven selection methods, and iii) finally
the resultant feature set obtained from our EnFS that used the majority voting
technique. The NSL-KDD dataset provided the basis for validating EnFS that
reduced the number of features from 41 to 11. Subsequently, we performed an
extensive set of experiments using our ensemble supervised ML framework to
evaluate the performance of the resulting feature set. As a result of this extensive
experimentation, we were able to demonstrate, in this case, that a better performance
measurement is achieved in terms of the f-1 score, accuracy, precision, recall, and the
false positive rate which is minimized.
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c h a p t er 8

Taxonomy of Interpretable Machine Learning
Model

Since traditional machine learning (ML) techniques use black-box models, the
internal operation of the model is unknown to human. Due to this black-box nature
of the ML model, the trustworthiness of their predictions is sometimes questionable.
Interpretable Machine Learning (IML) is a way of dissecting the ML models to
overcome this shortcoming and provide a more reasoned explanation of model
predictions. In this Chapter, we explore several IML methods and their applications
in various domains. Moreover, a detailed survey of IML methods along with
identifying the essential building blocks of a black-box model is presented here.
Herein, we have identified and described the requirements of IML models and for
completeness, a taxonomy of IML methods which classifies each into distinct
groupings or sub-categories, is shown here. The goal, therefore, is to describe the
state-of-the-art for IML methods and explain those in more concrete and
understandable ways by providing better basis of knowledge for those building
blocks and our associated requirements analysis.

8 .1

introduction
Machine learning (ML) techniques are being used extensively in various

decision-making problems in healthcare, finance, agriculture, criminal justice [94],
etc., while there are questions about their reliability due to their lack of transparency.
In other words, experts working with classification problems have been using ML

119

classifiers lavishly and blindly without knowing how a classifier functions internally,
how a machine-learned response function works, how a model predicts, etc. As a
result, the usages of these ML models become untrustworthy to the users/ experts
due to the classifiers’ black-box characteristics across multifarious domains. For
example, relying on ML models blindly has had a significant number of issues in
recent days, including some catastrophic failures, such as deadly accidents using
self-driving car [95, 96], crime-fighting robot colliding with a child [97], Alexa
playing uncensored audio instead of a kid’s song [98], Amazon’s face recognition
that falsely matched 28 members of Congress with mugshots [99], complex artificial
intelligence (AI) based stock trading software causing a trillion dollar flash
crash [100], and so on.
Human can understand ML-based autonomous decisions and regulatory
compliance, if the technique ensures transparency. Explainable Machine Learning or
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) pertains post hoc analyses to understand a
pretrained model and/ or its predictions. The analysis behind these techniques
enhances understanding in various ways, by providing transparency, insights into
the functional aspects of these algorithms, information on how they predict and how
these functions operate, etc. In addition, trustworthiness is the primary concern of
developing these techniques. Generally, trust in machine learning techniques grows
from the tangible accuracy, transparency of the mechanism, and from its security.
Explainable ML techniques enhance trust by ensuring fairness with transparency,
stability, and dependability of ML algorithms to its users.
Interpretable Machine Learning (IML) explains an ML model in an
understandable way and thus achieves trust. Interpretability is the degree of
measurement on how much a human can understand the reason behind decisions
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(i.e., predictions) made by ML models. The higher the interpretability of a machine
learning model, the more understandable it is for human in terms of reasoning of a
certain prediction. In other words, interpretability increases the trustworthiness of a
model’s functionality, whereas a single-metric evaluation, such as model’s ‘accuracy’
is an incomplete description of understandability in most real-world tasks. The
primary task of making an interpretable model is to create the model using
white-box techniques. Generally, the complex model is often hard to interpret and
explain. So, it is necessary to ensure the highest degree of human understanding for
the high-stakes decision-making model. In these high-stakes cases, maximum
transparency safeguards against fairness and security issues. In addition,
interpretability comes at a negligible accuracy penalty for some newer white-box
modeling methods, such as explainable neural network (XNN), scalable Bayesian
rule lists, monotonic gradient boost machine (GBM), etc. Furthermore,
interpretability helps debug an ML model and perform fairness auditing tasks
easier [101].
The outline of this chapter contribution is as follows:
• We discuss IML in detail with its importance in multiple research domains,
• As building white-box model is the primary concern of making an ML model
interpretable, we identify and discuss the requirements in building IML
models,
• We classify IML models into several categories by outlining building blocks
and then provide a taxonomy of IML models,
• We discuss recently used IML models and provide a comparison of these
models using the building blocks.
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The objective of this chapter is to identify the necessary requirements, building
blocks of IML models and to provide the state-of-the-art of interpretable machine
learning models. This survey not only helps understand IML technique but also
unveils the future research scope on it.

8 .2

interpretable machine learning (iml )
The interpretation of the ML model is a process in which individuals try to

understand its predictions. Interpretability is the ability of understanding the
decision-making policies of the machine-learned response function in order to
explain the relationship between independent (input) and dependent (target)
variables, ideally in a humanly interpretable manner. In many areas, interpretability
cannot be sacrificed either because of legal requirements or because it leads to unfair
decisions or because it is important for users. Interpretability has multiple benefits,
such as:
• helps users to extract interpretable patterns from trained ML models,
• users can identify the reasons behind poor predictions,
• helps users to increase trust in model predictions,
• users become able to detect bias in ML models,
• creates additional safety catch that can protect against over-fitted models, etc.
Generally, ML algorithms (models) act as black boxes in which the algorithms’
internal functionality is not known, and users have no idea of how the models make
predictions. As the traditional models prevent users from having deep insight into
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the algorithms, people became doubtful and started raising most obvious questions
about the predictions of the models, such as:
• Why did the model make this decision and not the other one?
• Why should I trust the model?
• How do I correct an error?
• When does the model succeed?
• When does the model fail? and so on...
Interpretable machine learning has numerous applications across various
domains. Currently, interpretability is the prime focus in commercialized ML
solutions and products. As such, some recent commercialized IML solutions like
H2O Driverless AI [102], DataRobot [103], etc. provide interpretability as base
service. FICO, an analytics software company, which is famous for using AI in credit
scoring, published a white paper “XAI Toolkit: Practical, Explainable Machine
Learning” [104], and used IML methods in their applications. Several XAI platforms
for government, financial services, healthcare, etc. are provided by Kyndi [105].

8 .3

iml requirements
The requirements for building interpretable machine learning models are

summarized here [101, 106]. Degree of White-Box Modeling: Since IML techniques
enhance the capability of transparency of traditional ML models, the best practice
would be to increase the degree of white-box modeling (i.e., maximize transparency).
Maintaining a certain degree of white-box modeling helps human understand the
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model and using it for high-stakes decision-making problems where the maximum
transparency safeguards against the fairness and security issues.
Data Visualization: Machine Learning models, and therefore Interpretable
Machine Learning models represent data. So, understanding data as well as its
content is very important as it helps explain reasonable expectations for model
behavior and the prediction. In practice, sometimes it is difficult to visualize and
understand the datasets due to their complex design, enormous number of variables
and instances. A graphical view or plot of higher dimension datasets are often
helpful for human comprehensibility.
Model Visualization: Model visualization is required in IML techniques which
provides graphical insights into the prediction behavior of ML models and helps
debug the prediction mistakes (if any). In addition, model visualization helps
envision the process flow of a complex model’s decision-making process, model’s
local view and global view, the change of a model’s predictions based on input
variables, prediction errors while highlighting anomalies and outliers, potential
interactions in ML models when multiple models are used combinedly, etc.
Variable Importance: Variable importance is the key aspect of explaining machine
learning models. To calculate the variable importance, several methods exist where
the methods determine the contribution of an input variable that helps a model to
predict, either globally or locally. In terms of measuring global variable importance,
averaging local measures into global measures are recently more established than the
aggregation of local measures.
Fairness: Fairness is another required element in ML techniques when the
model’s outcome affects humans. It often refers to disparate impact analysis that
includes assessing model predictions and errors across sensitive demographic
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segments of ethnicity, gender, etc. In ML arena, fairness helps remove biasness from
the training data and from model predictions.
Sensitivity: Sensitivity analysis is the most important validation and debugging
technique for ML models that maintains the acceptable model behavior and for its
predictions when the data is intentionally perturbed or simulated by other means. In
practice, numerical instability of regression parameters is being counted seriously on
various linear model validation methods due to the correlation, which is measured
between two input variables or between input and target variables. Moreover, while
transforming linear modeling approach to ML approach, instability of model
predictions is counted more seriously than that of parameters.
Residuality: Residuals for each data instances in a dataset can be measured by
difference between stored dependent value and the predicted dependent value.
Unless any random error, these residuals distribute randomly over a well-fitted
model. Residuality is necessary in building IML models to make them well-fitted
and adopted during any certain abnormal condition apart from errors.

8 .4

building blocks of iml
IML methods come in varieties of forms in nature and are widely spread. As a

result, sometimes it becomes difficult to classify those methods within a very short
range. In this section, we show various IML methods with different classification
families. In order to build the taxonomy of the IML methods shown in Figure 8.1,
several building blocks are described in the subsequent sections.
Consistency: In the interpretable machine learning, consistency is the degree of
measurement that determines the similarity of explanations that are provided by
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similar data instances for a certain type of model prediction. For an example, flu and
COVID-19 have some similar symptoms like fever, cough, runny nose, headache, etc.
Assuming we have two COVID-19 patients with similar symptoms, and they are
detected as COVID-19 patients through ML models. An explanation is often needed
after detecting a COVID-19 patient. In the above case, consistency measurement
determines the similarities of two patients’ symptoms and dissimilarities with flu
patients. Therefore, consistency refers to the stability of a model which denotes
during the change of a model’s internal functionality, if simplified input’s
contribution increases or stays the same regardless of the other inputs; but the
input’s attribution should not decrease. Based on the consistency measurement, IML
models are divided into two classes:
• Consistent: An IML model is treated as a consistent model if it generates
consistent explanations for similar data instances. In other words, the
explanation for a certain type of data instance is said consistent when the
explanation is similar with same type of data and dissimilar with different type
of data.
• Inconsistent: On the other hand, when the explanations for similar type of data
instances are varied, the IML model that is used for these explanations is
inconsistent no matter what happens with different types of data.
Visualization: As mentioned earlier, data visualization is the key requirement of
IML models. Based on visualization, IML methods can be classified into two
categories:
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F igure 8 .1: Taxonomy of IML models
• Global: Global view is the measurement of understanding the relationship
between the input variables and the overall model based on the target variable.
However, this type of interpretation is often highly presumptive.
• Local: On the other hand, local visualization provides us with the interpretation
of model itself or the prediction made by that model for single data instance or
a group of similar instances. Local visualization is more accurate than global
visualization, as the machine-learned response functions for a small group are
seemed to be linear and monotonic.
Both local and global visualization techniques help interpret a model precisely
and accurately with its marginal boundaries. The best interpretability analysis for an
IML model can be performed by combining them.
Model Interpretability Techniques: Model interpretability technique is an important
way to classify IML models. There are two types of model interpretability techniques.
• Model Agnostic: This technique applies when the IML models are used in
various types of ML algorithms i.e., these IML models can be used
irrespectively in any ML model.
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• Model Specific: On the other hand, the IML models that are designed to apply
only for a single type or class of algorithm, are called model specific.
Scale of Interpretability: Scale of interpretability is the measurement of the degree
of interpretability of certain model. Based on this, IML models can be classified into
four interpretable levels, such as high, medium, low, and any. The order high to low
represents the deviation of interpretability i.e., high interpretability means through
these models, human can understand prediction more accurately while from low
interpretability, it has less understandability for human. Interpretable level ‘any’
applies when models are interpretable with any of three levels (high, medium, and
low) based on the requirement.
Domain Dependency: Domain dependency of IML refers to the models’
interactivity with multiple research areas. IML models can be applied on a single
domain or multiple domains. Based on the count of interactions, IML models can be
classified into two:
• Domain Dependent: Several IML models are only applicable for a single domain
i.e., the functionality of some IML models are solely related with certain
domain, and their functionalities are not applicable to other domains.
• Domain Independent: When the functionalities of IML models are not domain
dependent and can be applied over multiple domains, the models are treated
as domain independent models.
Time Computation: Computational time is the major parameter for any
algorithms including IML models. In an IML model, computational time can be
measured by the time taken to train the model and/or time taken for explaining a
prediction. Based on the computational time, IML models can be classified into three
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classes: high computational time, medium computational time, and low
computational time models. High, medium, and low quantifiers are determined by
the comparative measurement of time taken to train the model. For example, a
regression model takes longer time to train than a linear model; on the other hand, a
decision tree model requires lesser training time than linear and regression model.

8 .5

comparison of iml models
This section first describes several IML models with their applications or usages,

and then compares them based on the taxonomy provided in Section 8.4.
LIME: Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanation (LIME) method can
generate sparse or simple explanations based on the local important variables. To
explain the behavior of a complex machine-learned response function, LIME uses
local linear parameters. It is helpful only for local interpretation with a medium
complexity for explanation and is often used in pattern-recognition
applications [107].
Anchors: Another well-known method proposed by the same researchers who
introduced LIME method. By finding high-precision sets of rules in terms of input
variables, this approach explains individual predictions using reinforcement learning
techniques in combination with a graph search algorithm. It has the impact on data
mining and pattern recognition domains. Anchor is a model agnostic method that
creates local interpretation with medium complexity for explanation [108].
PDP: Partial Dependence Plot (PDP) shows the marginal effect of one or two
features that contributes to the ML methods’ prediction. PDP shows the relationship
between the target and a feature which can be linear, monotonic or complex. PDP is
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a global model agnostic interpreter that explain any type of ML problem with lower
computational time [109].
ICE: Individual Conditional Expectation (ICE) plots are newer and less adaptive
than PDP where the plots show how a model behaves for single instance. ICE is a
local model agnostic interpreter that can be used to verify monotonicity constraints
with various complexity of explanations [110].
ALE: Accumulated Local Effect (ALE) is a plot that describes the influence of
features in machine learning predictions. This plot is faster to compute (i.e., O(n))
and an unbiased alternative to PDP. ALE is a model agnostic local interpretable
technique that can be used to explain any type of ML problems [111].
SLIMs: Supersparse Linear Integer Models (SLIMs) are used to create predictive
models using simple arithmetic operations like addition, subtraction, multiplication,
etc. These models are used in high-stakes decision-making problems to explain the
predictions. SLIM is a simple global interpretable model that is used for specific ML
methods. It is often used to optimize medical scores [112].
GAMs: Generalized Additive Models are the alternative regression white-box
modeling approaches that use contemporary methods to augment linear models.
This type of explanation is easier to build for simple ML problems and can be used
globally for specific methods with medium complexity in explanation [106].
GBM: Monotonic Gradient Bosting Machine can be used for white box modeling.
Due to the monotonic constrains, sometimes it is difficult to interpret nonlinear
nonmonotonic models and can be solved by enforcing a uniform splitting approach.
GBM is a model specific technique with its global interpretability and has medium
complexity in explaining predictions [106].
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Treeinterpreter: Treeinterpreter decomposes tree type ML models, like decision
tree, random forest, etc. into bias for each input variable. Treeinterpreter works
locally, sometimes works globally, and has lower time complexity with specific type
of model like tree-based model [113].
LOFO: LOFO stands for Leave One Feature Out. LOFO first creates local
interpretations for each data instance and then for each features in the unlabeled
dataset. During scoring, it leaves one variable out of the prediction by setting value
to ‘zero’ or ‘missing’. It is model agnostic and often used to build reason coding.
LOFO is faster than Shepley in model training and data scoring. It can be used both
locally and globally with various types of complexity for explanation [114].
CEM: Contrastive Explanations Method (CEM) is an explanation based on
missing values, also known as pertinent negatives. To justify an explanation, CEM
not only considers the positive or present elements but also finds contrastive
perturbations that should be necessarily absent. It is a local model agnostic
interpreter that worked with various domains and has a low implementation cost
[115].
Table 8 .1: IML models and their building blocks
IML Models

Consistency

Visualization

Interpretability Technique

Scale of Interpretability

Domain Dependency

Time Computation

LIME
Anchors
PDP
ICE
ALE
SLIMs
GAMs
GBMs
Treeinterpreter
LOFO
CEM
Residual Plot
Shapely Value
SHAP
Tree SHAP
Kernel SHAP
LRP
XNN
DeepLIFT

Consistent
Consistent
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Consistent
?
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
?
?
?

Local
Local
Global
Local
Local
Global
Global
Global
Both
Both
Local
Both
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Global

Model Agnostic
Model Agnostic
Model Agnostic
Both
Model Agnostic
Model Specific
Model Specific
Model Specific
Model Specific
Model Agnostic
Model Agnostic
Model Agnostic
Both
Both
Model Specific
Both
Model Agnostic
Model Specific
Model Specific

Medium
Medium
Any
Medium
Any
Low
Medium
Medium
Any
Any
Medium
Any
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium

Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Dependent
Dependent
Independent
Independent
?
Dependent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent

Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
High
Low
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
High
High
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Residual Plot: Residuals for each data instances in a dataset can be measured by
difference between stored dependent value with the predicted dependent value.
Unless any random error, these residuals distribute randomly over a well-fitted
model. Residual Plots are model agnostic interpreter that use both local and global
views and explain different ML methods. These plots are mostly used for debugging
purposes [106].
Shapely Value: Shapley value interpretable model is constructed based on
coalitional game theory where each of features for a certain data instances is
considered as a player and the prediction is considered as playout. Explanation of a
prediction formulated based on game theory. This interpretable method is used for
any agnostic ML model with local visualization but high computation
overhead [101].
SHAP: Shapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) are different from shapely values
in that the former ones are built with the credible support of both economics and
game theory. These explanations unify approaches like LIME, LOFO, treeinterpreter,
etc., and creates consistent and accurate global views with global variable
importance measurement. SHAP explanations are time consuming to calculate and
can be used for both model specific and model agnostic techniques [101, 116].
KernelSHAP: Kernel SHAP is the combination of Linear LIME and Shapley
Values. The KernelExplainer builds a weighted linear regression by using the input
variables, target variable, and machine-learned response function that generates the
predicted values. The major limitation of the Kernel SHAP explanation is, it has
longer running time for explanation. However, it has local visualization and can be
used in both model agnostic and model specific technique [101].
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TreeSHAP: TreeSHAP explainer is a variant of SHAP that uses tree-based
machine learning models, like decision trees, random forests, and gradient boosted
trees. TreeSHAP is a model-specific alternative to KernelSHAP which can produce
unintuitive feature attributions. It has lower computation time than KernelSHAP
and uses local visualization [101, 117].
LRP: Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) is a Deep Neural Network
interpretation technique to explain the predictions using layered network. LRP
computes contribution scores and back propagates the scores across the layers from
output variables to input variables. LRP has been used in various datatypes like
images, text, EKG signals, audio, etc. and with various neural architectures
(ConvNets, LSTMs) [118].
XNN: eXplanable Neural Network (XNN) is the model-specific explainer for
artificial neural network (ANN) to interpret and explain ANN accurately. XNN
extracts features from the fully connected neural networks and provides a
cost-effective explanation of the relationship between the input variables and the
target variable. It is often used for pattern recognition, fraud detection, credit
scoring, etc., and can be interpretable with both global and local views [106, 119].
DeepLIFT: DeepLIFT (Deep Learning Important FeaTures) explanation method
decomposes the prediction of an ANN on a specific input by backpropagating the
contributions of all neurons in the ANN to every input variable (feature) [120].
Table 8.1 shows a comparison of all IML methods associated with their building
blocks. In the table, ’?’ sign indicates that it was unknown. The goal of all the above
methods is to interpret ML predictions so that human can understand the process
flow, insights of the response function, and the details on how a decision is made
based on feature importance and variances. Depending on the problems, like
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monotonic, nonmonotonic, linear, regression, neural network, etc., IML methods
work with certain problem domain from various angles, like visualization, degree of
interpretability, time to explain, consistency, interpretable techniques, etc.

8 .6

summary
Humans cannot trust the Machine Learning (ML) based decisions completely in

high-stakes applications such as COVID-19 testing, fraud detection, loan sanctions,
credit scoring, etc., as the traditional ML models lack in transparency due to their
black-box nature. Interpretable machine learning (IML) technique is the way of
explaining ML predictions which helps human to understand the internal
functionalities of the functioning ML model. To ensure the transparency of these
traditional ML models, it is necessary to know the requirements of building a
white-box ML model. In this chapter, we have identified the key requirements in
building IML models. The importance of interpretability on various domains is also
mentioned here. Moreover, we conducted a detailed survey on IML models across
multiple domains to produce the state-of-the-art of interpretable machine learning.
Apart from these, a taxonomy of IML models to classify them into several
subsections is also proposed. The taxonomy that we have introduced will help the
future researchers to dive deeper into IML methods.
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c h a p t er 9

Feature Selection Process based on
Interpretable Machine Learning Model (IMLFS)

In a machine learning based classification problem, feature selection is an
important pre-processing step that is used to identify the important and relevant
features from the original dataset. This phase potentially reduces the computational
complexity and helps to improve the overall classification performances. Feature
reduction mechanisms, such as Information Gain, Gain Ratio, Chi-squared, ReliefF,
Deep Learning, etc. along with domain knowledge are used to find the appropriate
features from a dataset. In this chapter, we describe a novel feature selection process
based on interpretable machine learning technique (IMLFS) to find the optimal
relevant features in DDoS detection problems. Based on effectiveness of the critical
features, this technique is also used to explain an identified DDoS attack. These
relevant features are then used in the feature selection phase to retrain the model
effectively for better accuracy. NSL-KDD, a benchmark dataset, is used our
experiment to evaluate the proposed approach. Moreover, using the extracted
features and the same dataset, we experimented with our existing ensemble
supervised framework to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach by
producing higher detection accuracy and lower false positive alarms compared to
existing feature selection methods.
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9 .1

introduction
In the recent years, machine learning (ML) has evolved in addressing several

real-life problems including cybersecurity. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
installed on a server, network, security devices, etc. can be used to detect abnormal
activity in the system. They have evolved intelligently using machine learning
technique as their detection mechanism, and have already been explored to find
recent-day anomalies, such as trojan, ransomware, identity theft, DDoS, etc.
However, IDSs rely on the outcomes of the black-box ML models in detecting and
defending against these attacks. Therefore, several satisfactory outcomes do not
guarantee the universally accepted answer to the most obvious question of how to
trust the ML classifiers’ outcome without knowing exactly what is happening inside
the classifier. Our approach tunes these black-box classifiers with reduced or selected
minimal features in order to get better accuracy with minimum ML training time.
Interpretable machine learning (IML) is the area of machine learning that provides
the explanation of predicted outcomes with the interpretation of a pre-trained model.
Therefore, the uninitiated reliance on these black-box models is reduced. On the
other hand, the explanation provided by the IML is based on the effectiveness of the
corresponding critical features, where the effectiveness is measured by the weight of
contribution for such predictions.
In this chapter, we describe a novel feature selection approach, IMLFS, based on
interpretable machine learning technique. This approach produces a set of most
relevant features from the dataset using backpropagation algorithm. Local
Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [107], an IML model, is used to
explain the predictions from a pretrained model, where the explanation of a
prediction is formulated based on the effectiveness of the relevant features. These
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relevant features are used further for feature selection purposes to retrain the model.
In addition, a number of well-known feature selection (FS) methods are used to
compare the effectiveness of IMLFS approach. To demonstrate and compare the
efficiency of all feature sets (from all well-known FS methods and from IMLFS
approach), our ensemble supervised framework [92] is used in model classification.
The outcome of this research not only improves the model performances by
providing minimal features in feature selection phase, but also presents the DDoS
detection mechanism in a more understandable way to the humans. Therefore, the
goal of this research is to select reduced number of features by using IML technique
so that these features can explain the predictions more accurately.

9 .2

methodology : iml based feature selection
approach
This section provides an overview of our novel interpretable machine learning

based feature selection approach (IMLFS). The detailed architectural diagram
illustrating the process flow is shown in Figure 9.1. It shows the processing phases,
namely a) data collections, b) data preprocessing, c) DDoS explainer, d) explanation
of predictions, e) feature elimination, and f) recursive feature elimination to extract
the final feature set.
Data Collections: We collect data from the NSL-KDD [8] data repository that
contains several data files and labelled data instances. As the training model for the
FS process is supervised, these labelled datasets help us in training and testing
purposes. To prepare the training dataset, benign and DDoS data instances are
discriminated from the train data i.e., other different types of attack data are filtered
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out. Similarly, DDoS data instances are only picked up from the test dataset for
testing purposes.

Fi g u r e 9. 1: Feature Selection Process Flow using Interpretable Machine Learning
(IMLFS)
Data Preprocessing: There are various subtasks that must be done in a data
preprocessing phase, like removing unwanted data, data conversion, scaling,
removing invalid data, etc. The detail of data preprocessing is described in
Section 3.2.
DDoS Explainer: In this phase, interpretable machine learning technique is used
to build an explainer model. To do so, logistic regression (LR) is used to train the
model and then the explainer model is built on top of that pre-trained model using
LIME. This explainer model is capable of explaining DDoS predictions.
Explanation of Predictions: As the feature selection is the key concern of our
methodology, explanations based on relevant features can trigger the process flow in
the forward direction. In this phase, test data instances are passed through the
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pre-trained explainer model to generate the predictions first and to produce an
explanation for each of these predictions. Generally, the explanation is formulated
based on the relevant features and their corresponding weights. The weight for each
of the features denotes the measure of contribution for the prediction. LIME has the
capability to generate the explanation of a prediction in either tabular or graphical
form. From the LIME explanation object, we have collected the features and their
corresponding weighted contribution for a prediction.
Feature Elimination: In this phase, we need to find a way on how the relevant
features can be selected from the explanations that are obtained from the previous
phase. Since all of the test instances are not similar in their feature values, the
explanations are not consistent. In other words, the extracted features for all
explanations are not on the same order when they are sorted by their weighted
contribution values. To generalize the features for all explanations, the weighted
values of a single feature for all test instances are aggregated, and then based on
aggregated weighted values, the features are sorted. The feature of the lowest
aggregated weighted value is eliminated in this phase from the feature set to
reiterate the whole process.
Recursive Feature Elimination: Recursive feature elimination is not a single or
standalone phase; it is either a combination of phases or a process that continues
until certain stop condition is satisfied. Since the explanations that are generated by
LIME for this dataset are not consistent, eliminating features recursively can
generalize the feature selection process. The process starts with all features (41) from
data collections phase to feature elimination phase; later, the feature of lowest
aggregated weighted value is eliminated at the end of feature elimination phase. So,
the remaining features (40) are used for FS purposes in phase B for the next round of
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model training to build another explainer model. This process continues repeatedly
with eliminating one feature at a time until it reaches the stopping condition. Right
after eliminating a feature at feature elimination phase, the FS process checks
whether the remaining feature count reaches to ‘five’, as the IMLFS selects five
important and relevant features. Finally, our proposed IMLFS method extracts five
crucial features recursively for detecting DDoS attacks using IML model.

9 .3

experiments
This section presents a set of experiments and their details using our proposed

IMLFS approach. We have used NSL-KDD dataset for this experiment. The details of
dataset and data preprocessing are described in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Feature Selection using IML: As mentioned earlier, IML is used in this research to
select relevant features from the NSL-KDD dataset for DDoS attack detection. A
detailed overview of IML based feature section process is provided in Section 9.2. In
this process, an explainer model is built using the training dataset with LIME and LR
to explain all test instances. The explanations show the feature- relevancy and their
corresponding weight of contribution for predictions. Due to inconsistent
explanations, and to generalize the features, weighted values of a single feature for
all explanations are aggregated. After sorting the aggregated values, the feature of
the lowest aggregated weighted value is eliminated to retrain the explainer model
with remaining features. This feature elimination process continues recursively until
it reaches a minimum feature count. Here, we have chosen number five as minimal
feature count because if we keep decreasing the feature count below to five, model’s
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performances will degrade, and the DDoS detection problem will produce a generic
solution.
Feature Selection using FS methods: In this section, eight FS methods are chosen
from among fifteen selection methods based on accuracy, performance, and other
metrics using a manual grid search algorithm. The search algorithm selected all
three types (filter-based, wrapper-based and embedded methods) of selection
methods. We have selected the top eight FS methods from among fifteen that
produced the best results. After completing method selection, eight FS methods were
used individually to extract the features, where each of the methods selected a
different subset of features. Along with these FS methods, a matrix decomposition
method, PCA, is used to reduce the dataset’s dimensionality. Since we have extracted
five features from our proposed IMLFS method, dataset matrix is decomposed from
41 to 5 using PCA. Finally, these subsets of features and decomposed matrix were
used in data classification
Model Classification: We utilized our ensemble supervised classification
framework [68] to evaluate the models’ performances using the feature set obtained
from the previous sub-sections, and decomposed matrix (from 41 to 5) from PCA.
For the supervised ensemble framework, support vector machine (SVM), naive Bayes
(NB), decision tree (DT), neural network (NN), and logistic regression (LR) were
used for individual data classification, and on top of those classifications another
layer of classification was performed to ensemble them. We have used various
ensemble techniques, like majority voting (Ens_MV), logistic regression (Ens_LR),
naive Bayes (Ens_NB), neural network (Ens_NN), decision tree (Ens_DT), and
support vector machine (Ens_SVM). All these methods and the framework were
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used here to analyze the efficacy of the DDoS classification problem using the feature
set obtained from this research.

9 .4

results and discussion
In this section, we describe the results obtained from several experiments are

illustrated in detail. Experimental results performed by our proposed IMLFS method
along with eight FS methods are analyzed here. Though feature selection using IML
is the goal of this research, a performance comparison using this feature set with the
feature sets obtained from other well-known eight FS methods is also shown that
validates our proposed methodology. Table 9.1 shows the features that were
extracted from eight FS methods and from IMLFS method.
Table 9 . 1: Extracted features from nine FS methods
F#

Method

F#1

ANNOVA

F#2
F#3
F#4
F#5
F#6
F#7
F#8

F#9

Extracted Features

[’serror_rate’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’same_srv_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’, ’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’]
Chi-Square
[’logged_in’,
’serror_rate’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’, ’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’]
LASSO
[’duration’, ’protocol_type’, ’wrong_fragment’, ’logged_in’,
’srv_count’]
LR
with
L1 [’duration’, ’wrong_fragment’, ’hot’, ’num_file_creations’,
Penalty
’is_guest_login’]
Mutual Informa- [’src_bytes’, ’diff_srv_rate’]
tion
Pearson Correla- [’serror_rate’,
’srv_serror_rate’,
’dst_host_serror_rate’,
tion
’dst_host_srv_serror_rate’, ’same_srv_rate’]
Random Forests [’flag’, ’dst_bytes’, ’count’, ’same_srv_rate’, ’diff_srv_rate’]
Recursive
[’duration’, ’wrong_fragment’, ’count’, ’srv_serror_rate’,
Feature
’dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate’]
Elimination
IMLFS
[’src_bytes’,
’dst_bytes’,
’count’,
’srv_count’,
’dst_host_count’]
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F i g ure 9 .2: Training Time vs F-1 Score with eliminating features one by one
In the IMLFS method, we used recursive feature elimination process to remove
features one at a time and selected minimal set of features. The minimal features not
only produced a better accuracy but also took less training time. Figure 9.2 shows
the comparison of F-1 score and training time with respect to feature count. From
the Figure 9.2, we can see that with the decrease of feature count, F-1 score increases
while at the same time model training-time reduces, which is a positive indication of
a best feature set.
To evaluate these selections (both IMLFS method and the individual eight
methods), we performed four types of experiments using the ensemble supervised
model. Initially, we used the full feature set (i.e., no FS method was applied), then
eight feature sets obtained from eight selection methods, then decomposed matrix
from PCA method and finally we used feature set obtained from IMLFS for model
classification. Table 9.2 shows the best performing experiments, whereas the full
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Ta b l e 9.2: Best performed classification results using full features, nine features,
and the features obtained from IMLFS
Method

Classifier

F-1 Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Time

ANOVA
CHI2
LASSO
LRL1
MUTINFO
PCA
PEARSON
RF
RFE
W/o FS
IMLFS

Ens_NB
Ens_NB
Ens_DT
NB
Ens_DT
Ens_DT
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_DT

0.833
0.501
0.88
0.553
0.84
0.866
0.833
0.863
0.803
0.884
0.94

0.872
0.708
0.901
0.39
0.875
0.894
0.872
0.884
0.838
0.9
0.946

0.959
0.963
0.923
0.406
0.937
0.957
0.959
0.887
0.849
0.878
0.925

0.736
0.339
0.841
0.869
0.762
0.791
0.736
0.84
0.761
0.89
0.955

0.024
0.01
0.053
0.978
0.039
0.027
0.024
0.082
0.103
0.011
0.006

0.184
0.19
0.201
0.193
0.195
0.202
0.187
1.272
0.317
6.79
0.173

experimental results are available in Appendix d. From Table 9.2, it is obvious that
the features obtained from IMLFS method perform better than all other FS methods.
In addition, full feature set (i.e., without applying any selection method) was used in
another experiment to compare and evaluate the necessity of FS methods or feature
selection process like IMLFS.
The ROC curve performance analysis for IMLFS is shown in Figure 9.3. Rest of
the ROC curves for eight selection methods are available in Appendix d. Using
Table 9.2, a bar chart can be plotted as shown in Figure 9.4. It shows the comparison
of performances using features from eight FS and IMLFS methods, decomposed
matrix and no FS method.
From all the figures and comparisons above, it is obvious that our interpretable
ML based feature selection (IMLFS) process outperforms any other single selection
methods. We validate our proposed approach using the verification set comparing
with the ground truth. This set consists of 1000 labelled data instances where 900
instances are DDoS and the rest of them are benign. We assume that an intrusion
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Figure 9 . 3: ROC AUC using IMLFS method

Figure 9 . 4: Performance metrics for best performing classifications
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detection system (IDS) is placed in the perimeter of a secure network to defend the
system. The IDS consists of the best performed pre-trained ML model (Ens_DT)
obtained from our IMLFS based feature selection process and ensemble supervised
machine learning approach. The IDS captures network traffic, converts it into
Table 9 . 3: IMLFS approach with verification dataset
Best Performing Model
Ens_DT

Verification Set
DDoS
900

Benign
100

Predicted Results
DDoS
Benign
TP FP TN FN
861 1
99 39

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

0.977

0.96

0.998

0.957

0.01

features and based on our detection technique, it identifies whether the traffic is
DDoS or benign. Table 9.3 indicates that our proposed approach successfully detects
95.70% DDoS attacks accurately and 0.1% of benign traffic as DDoS.

9 .5

summary
Feature selection is a mandatory pre-processing phase in classification problems

that not only reduces the computational complexity but also improves the model
performance. We implemented a novel interpretable machine learning based
approach for feature selection (IMLFS) in DDoS detection problem that improves the
detection accuracy, reduces computation time and false positive alarms, and
provides the explanation for the detected DDoS attacks. Here, we performed four
experiments by using initially the full feature set, using feature sets obtained from
the well-known FS methods, decomposed matrix using PCA, and finally, using the
extracted feature set obtained from IMLFS method. The NSL-KDD dataset provided
the basis for validating the proposed method that reduced the number of features
from 41 to 5. Subsequently, we performed an extensive set of experiments using our
ensemble supervised ML framework [92] to evaluate the performance of the
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resulting feature set. As a result of this extensive experimentation, we were able to
demonstrate in this case that, a better performance measurement can be achieved in
terms of the F-1 score, accuracy, precision, recall, and the false positive rate, and
computation time can be minimized.
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c h a p t er 10

DDoS Explainer using Interpretable Machine
Learning

Machine learning (ML) experts use black-box classifiers for modeling purposes
in several high stakes decision making systems. However, the users of these systems
are raising questions about the transparency of these models. This lack of
transparency often misclassifies the data resulting in incorrect predictions. In the
security domain, it would be a great loss in economy, customer trust and reputation
when security solutions provide incorrect predictions and are made of with
black-box ML classifiers for prediction purposes such as DDoS detection. Due to this
incorrectness, security experts often rely on the DDoS detection mechanism that uses
black-box machine learning technique. In this research, we propose a DDoS
explainer model that provides an appropriate explanation for certain detection,
based on the effectiveness of the features. We used interpretable machine learning
(IML) models to build the explainer model which not only provides the explanation
for the DDoS detection but also justifies the explanation by adding confidence scores
with it. Confidence scores are referred as consistency score which can be computed
by the percentage of consistent explanations of similar type of data instance. Our
proposed framework incorporates the best performing explainer model chosen from
the comparison of the explainer models developed by two IML models LIME and
SHAP. We experimented with NSL-KDD dataset and ensemble supervised ML
framework for DDoS detection and validation.
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10 .1

introduction

Machine Learning (ML) techniques are being used extensively in various
decision-making problems in healthcare, finance, agriculture, criminal justice [94]
etc., while there are questions about their reliability due to their lack of transparency.
In other words, experts working with classification problems have been using ML
models lavishly and blindly without knowing how a model functions internally, how
a machine-learned response function works, how a model predicts, etc. As a result,
the usages of these ML models become untrustworthy to the users/ experts due to
the models’ black-box characteristics across multifarious domains. For example,
relying on ML models blindly has had a significant number of issues in recent days,
including some catastrophic failures, such as deadly accidents using self-driving
car [95, 96], crime-fighting robot colliding with a child [97], Alexa playing
uncensored audio instead of a kid’s song [98], Amazon’s face recognition that falsely
matched 28 members of Congress with mugshots [99], complex artificial intelligence
(AI) based stock trading software causing a trillion dollar flash crash [100], and so on.
Using machine learning techniques blindly in security aspects like intrusion
detection could lead a devastating failure while ensuring security to the systems.
Biasness in anomaly detection such as DDoS intrusion detection incorrectly could
cause a tremendous reputation and financial loss.
Human can understand ML-based autonomous decisions and regulatory
compliance, if the technique ensures transparency. Explainable Machine Learning or
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) pertains post hoc analyses to understand a
pretrained model and/ or its predictions. The analysis behind these techniques
enhances understanding in various ways, by providing transparency, insights into
the functional aspects of these algorithms, information on how they predict and how
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these functions operate, etc. In addition, trustworthiness is the primary concern of
developing these techniques. Generally, trust in machine learning techniques grows
from the tangible accuracy, transparency of the mechanism, and from its security.
Explainable ML techniques enhance trust by ensuring fairness with transparency,
stability, and dependability of ML algorithms to its users.
Interpretable Machine Learning (IML) explains an ML model in an
understandable way and thus achieves trust. Interpretability is the degree of
measurement on how much a human can understand the reason behind decisions
(i.e., predictions) made by ML models. The higher the interpretability of a machine
learning model, the more understandable it is for human in terms of reasoning of a
certain prediction. In other words, interpretability increases the trustworthiness of a
model’s functionality, whereas a single-metric evaluation, such as model’s ‘accuracy’
is an incomplete description of understandability in most real-world tasks. The
primary task of making an interpretable model is to create the model using
white-box techniques. Generally, the complex model is often hard to interpret and
explain. So, it is necessary to ensure the highest degree of human understanding for
the high-stakes decision-making model.
In this research we provide explanation for detected DDoS attacks by using
interpretable machine learning techniques. Initially, we used our existing ensemble
supervised model to detect DDoS attacks precisely and further we provide the
convincing explanation that supports the prediction. Here, we used two
interpretable methods, namely LIME and SHAP to get the best performing explainer
model through comparing using likelihood and consistency measures. In addition,
we add a confidence using consistency score which also supports the explanation.
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The consistency score is measured by the degree of similarity of the explanations
generated by the similar data instances.

10 .2

related work

In recent years, significant research has been carried out to mitigate and counter
DDoS attacks. Various techniques have been employed, such as ML and statistical
methods to detect and defend against DDoS threats [121]. The explanation for these
detections adds extra trustworthiness to the users. Marino et al. [122] provided an
explanation approach for incorrect classification of data-driven Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs). Smith et al. [123] presented the Detection of Anomalous Activity in
Real-Time (DAART) system for detecting anomalous activity without training data
and proposed interactive explanation methods for improved operator trust and
enhanced operator feedback through system transparency. Wang et al. [124]
provided an explanation-based ML framework for IDS. Android malware is one of
the major threats to mobile security. Melis et al. [125] generalized the current
explainable android malware detection approach to any black-box ML model by
leveraging a gradient-based approach to identify the most influential local features.
Similarly, Drebin [126] with an android malware detector, detects smartphone’s
malicious application using the lightweight method. In addition, various feature
selection processes are benefited using the interpretability on their models.
From the related work stated above, researchers didn’t use multiple IML
techniques for explanation purposes while detecting DDoS attack. In our research,
we build IML models using two different IML techniques and compare their
performances to find out the best performing explainer that generates more
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appropriate explanation. Though the existing research provided explanations, did
not mention any convincing argument in establishing those explanations. Here we
provide a confidence score that adds the percentage of confidence along with the
explanation.

10 .3

background

The interpretability of a model can be measured as the degree to which humans
can comprehend the decisions made by that ML model [101]. Model interpretability
is divided into two categories: global and local interpretability. Through global
interpretability, users can understand the functionality of the model directly from its
overall structure, whereas local interpretability examines an input and tries to find
out why the model makes a decision. In this research, LIME and SHAP tools are
used to explain the local interpretability of the DDoS attack detection process.
Figure 10.1 presents an overview of how an interpretable machine learning (IML)
method can be used to interpret the prediction of an ML model.

F igure 10 .1: Basic structure of a prediction and explanation mechanism
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Table 10.1 shows the similarities and dissimilarities between LIME and SHAP
tools.
Table 10 .1: Similarities and dissimilarities of LIME and SHAP methods
Similarities

Dissimilarities

LIME and SHAP are both model agnostic LIME lacks stability and consistency
methods.
whereas SHAP satisfies both properties.
Both of them have python libraries for SHAP computation is very expensive
when compared to LIME as it checks for
implementation and additive in nature.
all the possible combinations.
LIME and SHAP are surrogate models.
LIME assumes that the local model is
linear but SHAP does not make any
assumptions.
Both methods are domain independent Choosing and considering neighbor needs
and can be applied to text, tabular or to be defined in LIME, however, the same
trained model can be used multiple times
image data.
in SHAP.

Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) method generates
sparse or simple explanations based on the local important variables. To explain the
behavior of a complex machine-learned response function, LIME uses local linear
parameters. It is helpful only for local interpretation with a medium complexity for
explanation and is often used in pattern-recognition applications [113]. The local
surrogate model is calculated in the following way:

ξ ( x ) = argmin { L ( f , g, w x ) + Ω ( g)}

(10.1)

geG

where,
• g represents the explanation model for the instance x, (e.g. linear regression).
• G is the family of possible explanations. For example, all possible linear
regression models.
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• L is the loss function (e.g. mean squared error), which is used to measure how
close the predictions from the explanation model is to the original model.
• f represents the original model.
• w x defines the weight between the sampled data and the original data. If the
sampled data is like the original data, the weight is greater, and vice versa.
• Ωg represents the complexity of model g.
Shapley Additive Explanations (SHAP) are different from shapely values in that
the SHAP are built with the credible support of both economics and game theory.
These explanations unify approaches like LIME, LOFO, treeinterpreter, etc., and
creates consistent and accurate global views with global variable importance
measurement. SHAP explanations are time consuming to calculate and can be used
for both model specific and model agnostic techniques [101]. SHAP specifies the
explanation for an instance x as:
M

g(z0 ) = ∅0 + ∑ ∅ j z0j

(10.2)

j =1

where,
• g is the explanation model.
• z0 is the coalition vector (also called simplified features), and z0 ∈ {0, 1} M . The
1 in z0 refers the features in the new data are the same as those of the original
data (the instance x), whereas the 0 means they are different.
• M is the maximum coalition size.
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• ∅ j ∈ R is the feature attribution for the feature j of instance x. It is the Shapley
value. Large positive number of ∅ j means feature j has a large positive impact
on the prediction made by the model.

10 .4

method: ddos explainer model

The goal of this research is to provide a complete security solution that not only
develops a detection mechanism for DDoS attacks but also generates the
corresponding explanation supporting the detection. The detection mechanism is
borrowed from our existing research, i.e., ensemble supervised ML framework [92],
which has the outstanding performance in terms of detecting DDoS attacks more
accurately and maintaining a lower false alarm. When human operators use IDSs to
make decisions like attack detection, interpretability is almost as important as
accuracy. That’s why, we use two interpretable machine learning techniques to build
the explainer models and after comparing these two explainer models, the best
performing model generates the appropriate explanation of the detected DDoS
attacks which improves the trustworthiness of the decision-making process to the
security experts. Figure 10.2 shows the process flow of our proposed framework
which has the capability of both detecting DDoS attacks and generating
corresponding explanation. The framework consists of four major parts, namely data
preprocessing, model classification, DDoS detection and explanation of that
prediction
The process flow starts with the data extraction from the raw dataset and then
feed the dataset to the data preprocessing phase to produce ML model acceptable
preprocessed data. From the preprocessed data, the ensemble supervised ML
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F i gure 10 .2: Processflow of DDoS detection and explanation mechanism
framework classifies them and generates various models using different modeling
algorithm. For single model classification, we have used logistic regression (LR),
decision tree (DT), naïve bayes (NB), Neural network (NN), and support vector
machine (SVM) to build the models. Then the outcomes of these five supervised
models are combined with six ensemble mechanisms. Figure 2.3 shows the details
ensemble supervised mechanism that is used in our ensemble supervised ML
framework.
The best performing detection model obtained from the model classification
phase detects DDoS attacks using the testing and verification data.
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The core part of our proposed framework is to generate explanation for the
predicted DDoS attacks which is performed in the explanation of prediction phase.
As mentioned earlier, we have used two IML models, namely LIME and SHAP to
develop the explainer models from the training dataset. Each explainer model
generates the explanations for training, testing and verification data separately
where the prediction for these data instances are obtained from DDoS detection
phase. It should be mentioned that the data instances in all datasets are leveled with
a cluster number in the data preprocessing phase.
To validate the explanation that is provided by our explainer model, we use a
confidence score along with explanation. The confidence score is calculated by the
consistency and likelihood score. Consistency means the similarity of the
explanation provided by the similar data. Likelihood is a measure of variance that
helps to analyze the properties of the distribution within each cluster, where
explanation weights are used to define a distribution over the data. It can be
calculated using the Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis method (PPCA). If
the likelihood score is high, then users will have more confidence in the explanation.
The likelihood and the consistency of the explanations for a single cluster data are
calculated from the following equations:

Consistency Score(CS) = Explanation similarity( ES) ∗ Cosine similarity(COSS)
(10.3)
where,

Explanation similarity( ES) =

number o f common f eatures between two instances
total number o f f eatures
(10.4)
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Or,
ES =

∑ ( f A ∩ fB)
∑f

(10.5)

Where f A and f B are the features of A and B instances, respectively.

Cosine similarity(COSS) = cos(Θ) =

~ · ~B
A
∑in=1 Ai Bi
q
=q
n
2
~ ~B
A
∑i=1 Ai ∑in=1 Bi2

(10.6)

So, the consistency scores are calculated by

Consistency Score(CS) =

∑ ( f A ∩ fB)
∑f

!

∗

∑in=1 Ai Bi
q
q
∑in=1 A2i ∑in=1 Bi2

!
(10.7)

Likelihood and consistency scores are calculated for each cluster and stored in a
separate location that provides the confidence of the explanation for a single
explanation on demand.
In real world scenario, a system can be defended by an IDS that is deployed on
the perimeter of the secured network. The core component (i.e., detection
mechanism) of this IDS contains the best performing supervised pre-trained model.
The mechanism collects the network traffic as it comes into the secured network. The
traffic data goes through data preprocessing steps where it is sanitized, clustered
and feature reduced. Then it goes through the best performing supervised model. If
the model identifies the presence of a potential DDoS intrusion, then the mechanism
raises an alert and generates an explanation for the detected DDoS attack to the
network administrator for further actions. The explainer section has the best
explainer model from the two explainers developed by LIME and SHAP methods. A
pre-stored consistency score is calculated for each cluster of the dataset while
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comparing these two explainers. When the system provides an explanation for a
certain traffic, it adds a confidence score that justifies how accurate the explanation
with a percentage value from 0-100. The traffic is tagged with a cluster number
during the data preprocessing phase and used to determine the confidence score
from the pre-computed consistency score assigned with the same cluster number.
Here, we have used verification dataset to mimic the real-time data that can go
through the best performing supervised pre-trained model and the model
distinguishes the DDoS and Benign traffic. Then the best pre-trained explainer gets
this prediction and generates the explanation along with confidence score for the
network administrator.

10 .5

experiments

In this section, the experiments for the proposed framework are described and
the results are presented along with the performance evaluation of the model.
NSL-KDD [8] dataset is used for the experimentation in this research. The detail of
the dataset is described in Section 3.1.
Basic data preprocessing steps like transformation, normalization and feature
reduction are described in Section 3.2. Other than these preprocessing steps, we have
performed clustering mechanism beforehand to divide the dataset into several
clusters. K-means clustering technique is used here to split the whole dataset into
five clusters. We have used scikit-learn [89], a python library for K -means data
clustering. Before performing clustering process, we have downsized our dataset
with a fewer feature to expediate the clustering process. Autoencoders technique
was used for dimensionality reduction. Autoencoder is an unsupervised artificial

159

neural network that compresses the data to lower dimension and then reconstructs
the input back. We used it to reduce the dimension of the NSL-KDD dataset from 41
to 5. Tensorlow [127], a python library for autoencoder provided by google is used to
reduce the dimensionality of our dataset. After clustering the whole dataset, we
assigned corresponding cluster number for each data instances. Finally, from the
data preprocessing phase, we have our preprocessed data with an associate cluster
number.
Model classifications are performed using the ensemble supervised ML model
described in [92]. From the ensemble framework, best performing supervised model
is chosen to detect DDoS attacks in DDoS detection phase.
In the explanation section, we performed three steps experimentation such as
determining best explainer model, measuring the confidence for each cluster and
finally generating the explanation as well as consistency score for verification dataset.

10 .6

results and discussion

To perform our experiments, we have accumulated all training and testing data
from NSL-KDD dataset. Then divided the total data into three parts: training (70%),
testing (29.5%) and verification (0.5%). To build the interpretable models like LIME
and SHAP, they require an inbuilt ML model for training purposes. Decision tree
(DT), random forest (RF) and logistic regression (LR) classifiers are used to train
these explainer models separately i.e., six explainer models are built using these
combinations. These combinations are used to tune these models in order to find the
best performing explainer model. In addition, we have performed 10-fold
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cross-validation to avoid the model overfitting. These six explainer models are tested
with the same training dataset and the corresponding explanations for each instance
are recorded to calculate the likelihood scores. Using those explanations likelihood
scores for each model concerning each tool was calculated using Probabilistic
Principal Component Analysis (PPCA) method. These likelihood scores are
calculated for each cluster, and then the average score was computed. Table 10.2
shows the average likelihood scores for six combinations of explainer models. From
the table, we can see LIME with DT and SHAP with LR are the best performing
explainer models.
Ta b le 10 . 2: Average likelihood scores of LIME and SHAP for the training data
Training Models/ IML models

LIME

SHAP

RF
LR
DT

110.0567254 63.03735792
58.8884445
172.1107093
219.0543364 114.0537158

In the next phase of the experiment, the best performing pretrained explainer
model are verified with the test dataset. Here we again divided the test dataset into
two categories: DDoS and Benign. Table 10.3 shows the average likelihood scores for
each cluster with respect to DDoS and Benign data while using the two best
performing explainer models from Table 10.2.
Ta b l e 10 . 3: Average likelihood score of LIME and SHAP for the testing dataset

Clusters
Cluster 0
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Average of 5 clusters

SHAP with LR
DDoS
Benign
130.2164387 239.6212871
130.4525149 240.7186669
130.4789805 240.3790723
130.3922202 239.775669
130.2829869 239.5538814
130.3646283 240.0097154
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LIME with DT
DDoS
Benign
150.4715315 201.9722392
150.665541
202.4073015
151.1570196 200.9535858
149.8448111 203.2547771
151.928286
200.0191476
150.8134378 201.7214102

Table 10.3 clearly shows LIME with DT explainer model has the higher
likelihood scores than SHAP with LR while detecting DDoS attacks. Since the
likelihood scores are the measurement of likeliness of the explanations on each
cluster, this value could be treated as the confidence score while explaining a single
data instance residing the same cluster. In other words, when the explainer model
provides an explanation for certain data instance, it would add the corresponding
likelihood scores as confidence value. Finally, we experiment with a verification data
mimicking the real time data to verify the efficacy of these explainer models. Though
LIME with DT provides the better outcomes in Table 10.3, we run our experiment
with both explainer models once again to verify the comparison result. Table 10.4
shows the average likelihood scores for verification data.
Ta b l e 10. 4: Average likelihood scores of LIME and SHAP for the verification dataset

Clusters
Cluster 0
Cluster 1
Cluster2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Average of 5 clusters

SHAP with LR
DDoS
Benign
40.44405365 52.82059163
40.87385173 52.68666134
40.82595881 53.27728957
40.64080684 52.74984162
41.18808239 52.52036178
40.79455068 52.81094919

LIME with DT
DDoS
Benign
61.13502625 82.84599248
60.15906643 84.16350736
60.68715878 84.68575556
68.28617695 84.53174138
59.80388547 84.04316597
62.01426278 84.05403255

The major goal of our proposed method is to identify DDoS attacks and then
provide understandable explanations. To fulfill the goal, we experimented with
several data instances to verify the DDoS detection comparing with ground truth
and illustrated valid explanations based on the corresponding features. Figure 10.3
and 10.4 show the explanation of a single DDoS data instance with their
corresponding features using LIME and SHAP explainer model. From Figure 10.3,
three features: service, src_bytes, and dst_host_rerror_rate are colored as orange as
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they have the positive impact in predicting this particular instance as DDoS. LIME
explainer model also provided a confidence score of 60.69 which means 60.69% of
data instances similar to this instance provide the same feature set.

F igure 10 .3: Explanation of a DDoS attack using LIME explainer model

Fi gure 10 .4 : Explanation of a DDoS attack using SHAP explainer model
On the other hand, Figure 10.3 shows the SHAP explanation with important
features and a confidence score of 40.83. Comparing these two explanations, we can
conclude the LIME with DT provides better explanation. From the security point of
view and based on the domain knowledge, we can verify that those features are
crucial while identifying a Smurf ( a type of DDoS) attack.
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10 .7

summary

In this research, we implemented a DDoS detection and explanation mechanism
to restore the untrustworthiness of traditional ML classification for humans. In
addition, a confidence score was added along with the explanation to show the
correctness of explanation. Here, two explainer models using LIME and SHAP were
built to explain the predictions of detected DDoS attacks and to conduct a
comparison analysis of their likelihood scores. We performed three sets of
experiments to find the optimal explainer model and further we verified with
verification data using NSL-KDD dataset. Finally, graphical views of a single DDoS
instance’s explanation are illustrated using LIME and SHAP explainer model
separately.
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c h a p t er 11

Network Intrusion Detection using Natural
Language Processing and Ensemble Machine
Learning (Application 1)

In this chapter, we implement a network intrusion detection system (NLPIDS)
that utilizes natural language processing and ensemble-based machine learning.
NLPIDS converts natural language HTTP requests into vectors which are then used
to train several supervised and ensemble-based machine learning models. The
trained models are then used to detect anomalous traffic. We validated our method
using HTTP DATASET CSIC 2010. The results show the efficacy of the NLPIDS by
producing better F1 score of 99.9% and negligible false alarms of 0.07% compared to
existing methods. The NLPIDS does not depend on attack methods and feature
vectors.

11 .1

introduction

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software or hardware implementation
that monitors a system (software, hardware, OS, network, etc.) for malicious
activities and policy violations. Deviating from the normal activity or any policy
violation is treated as a potential threat and typically reported to an administrator or
centralized collection for further investigation and mitigation. Traditional intrusion
detection techniques use either pattern matching or blacklisting. A pattern matching
IDS stores a long list of known attack patterns and checks if the incoming traffic
matches with certain string (exact match) or a pattern (by using regular expression).
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In a blacklisting IDS a firewall or a proxy server maintains a list of malicious servers
and denies access for any server in the list. In both cases they fail to identify
unknown or zero-day attacks or new malicious server. On the other hand,
behavior-based detection technique analyzes the attack behavior, and detects attacks
with a higher detection rate than the previous two types. However, all three types of
IDSs are unable to detect some well-known attacks, like Drive-by Download attack
(DbD) [128], C&C traffic [129], and unseen malicious traffic. Machine learning (ML)
based IDS can better detect new patterns or behaviors. Addition of natural language
processing (NLP) can enhance the detection accuracy of these IDSs as NLP-based
detection mechanisms do not rely on the attack techniques. The NLP and ML based
system can be used as an additional module to a traditional IDS. Whenever, this
module identifies a so far unseen attack, the pattern or origin of this malicious
activity can be added to the database of known attacks.
In this chapter, we discuss our implemented NLP and ML based network
intrusion detection system (NLPIDS). The NLPIDS converts HTTP requests from
natural language text to feature vectors using NLP techniques. These feature vectors
are used to train machine learning models. The machine learning module consists of
a number of supervised methods and ensembles of those supervised methods. The
main contribution of this chapter is the development of an intrusion detection
mechanism that analyzes natural language-based network traffic using NLP
techniques and detects anomalous, potentially malicious, traffic using an
ensemble-based machine learning scheme. The method was validated using a public
dataset, namely the HTTP DATASET CSIC 2010 [130], and evaluated using standard
metrics. The results of these experiments show that our method performs better than
existing methods discussed in Section 11.2.
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11 .2

related work

In detecting network intrusions, packet traces are the most popular methods on
traffic classification. However, analyzing network packets became intractable in
today’s broadband network. Traffic classification based on network logs is the
alternative solution of packet analysis. Alternatively, traffic classification based on
network logs such as NetFlow [129], DNS records [131] and proxy server logs [132]
are popular way to detect network intrusions.
Recently, in detecting network intrusions, machine learning (ML) techniques are
being used to discriminate malicious traffic from benign traffic. Detecting phishing
attacks [133] using NLP and ML, log-mining using NLP [134], intrusion detection
using NLP [135], intrusion detection in cloud [136], etc. are found from the recent
research. Various types of supervised [52], unsupervised [137], and ensemble-based
[86] machine learning approaches including various feature selection
approaches [85] are also used in detecting anomalies.
Lilleberg et al. [138] proposed a text classification using support vector machine
(SVM) and word2vec. They showed that the combination of word2vec and tf-idf
outperform tf-idf. However, they haven’t mentioned SVM or any ML classification
model anywhere in their paper. Also, doc2vec is more efficient than word2vec
method. Min et al. [139] implemented an NIDS based on text-convolutional neural
network (CNN) and random forest(RF) using statistical and payload features. They
used CNN to extract the effective information from the payloads in network traffic
from the ISCX2012 dataset and random forest to classify them. However, there is no
proper justification of choosing RF model in their research, as well as comparison of
other classification results are missing. Mimura et al. [140] proposed a network
interface packet analysis method using source and destination IP in their NLP, which
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does not make any significant difference in detecting anomaly. They reported
F1-score of 98.00% as the best performing metric for their method. Generally, a lot
more information is captured in a log file instead of a network packet. In addition, a
comparative performance analysis using several ML models are missing here. Li et
al. [141] used weighted word2vec, and LightGBM and CatBoost. Their method
achieved 99.49% as accuracy. Althubiti et al. [142] used six different ML methods,
namely RF, LR, J48, ABc, SGDc and NB, to analyze HTTP DATASET CSIC 2010.
They found RF to be the best-performing model with an F1-score of 99.90%.
In contrast, our proposed method works on the HTTP requests that contain
textual details of activity history which is more suitable for NLP. Moreover, detailed
information enables the IDS to detect the anomalies better. In addition, it generates a
fixed length of vectors from any arbitrary length paragraph where the vectors are
further used in model classification. The dataset we used, namely the HTTP
DATASET CSIC 2010, is a collection of natural language HTTP requests and hence is
more suitable for NLP compared to KDD99 dataset.

11 .3

natural language processing tools

In our method, we use natural language techniques to build the vector spaces
from text corpus and use the vector spaces to train machine learning models to
detect the anomaly. Here we briefly discuss two NLP methods and an open-source
software used in our work.
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11.3.1

Word2Vec

Word embedding is a popular technique used to preprocess linguistic texts for
natural language processing using machine learning or statistical analyses. Word
embedding process maps each unique word or phrase in a text corpus to vectors of
real numbers. Word2vec [143] is a popular word embedding method. Word2vec uses
a shallow two-layer neural network to learn word and phrase associations from a
corpus of text and the trained model can predict suitable words or phases for
incomplete sentences. Word2vec is based on the distributional hypothesis and uses
two algorithms: 1) continuous-bag-of-words (CBoW) to predict correct word or
phrase from the contextual window of surrounding words, and 2) skip-gram to
predict window of surrounding words from a word or phrase. Both the algorithms
use vector representation of words and phrases.

11.3.2

Doc2Vec

While word2vec produces just word embedding, an extension of it, called
doc2vec or paragraph2vec, is used to construct embedding from entire documents by
representing documents as vectors [144]. The document or paragraph vectors are
also trained along with word vectors to predict a missing word or phrase. Similar to
word2vec, doc2vec is also based on the distributional hypothesis, and uses two
algorithms: 1) distributed-memory (DM), an extension of CBoW, to predict a word or
phrase from a contextual windows of a paragraph or document, and 2)
distributed-bag-of-words (DBoW), an extension of skip-gram, to predict a contextual
window of paragraph or document from a word or phrase.
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Doc2vec enables calculation of the semantic similarity between two paragraphs
or documents and thus infer similar paragraphs or documents semantically. This
function is important to develop a practical system to detect unseen malicious traffic
by comparing traffic data from network packets, and locating words or sentences in
traffic data that are not contextually similar.

11.3.3

Gensim

Gensim [145] is an open-source library for topic modeling, document indexing
and natural language processing, using machine learning. It includes
implementation of word2vec and doc2vec. Gensim, implemented in the Python and
Cython programming languages, is used to analyze plain-text documents for
inferring semantic similarity.

11 .4

methodology : nlp and ensemble ml based ids

This section provides an overview of the natural language processing and
machine learning based scheme to detect network intrusion. Figure 11.1 shows the
workflow of the method. The scheme has three phases: 1) data pre-processing phase,
2) natural language processing phase, and 3) ensemble-based machine learning
phase. In the first phase, natural language content of the file of HTTP requests is
converted into bag of words, and the bag of words creates sentences. Then the
collection of these sentences is converted to labeled vector space. These vector-spaces
are used to train ensemble machine learning framework, and the trained models are
used to detect network intrusion as anomalies in the data.
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F igure 11 .1: Overview of NLPIDS
Conversion of HTTP Requests to Corpus: An HTTP request command in a network
contains many different kinds of information. Relevant items from the HTTP
requests are extracted using a pre-processing tool and converted into words. These
words generate a single natural language sentence for a corresponding HTTP
request. A paragraph is constructed by collating a number of sentences and stored in
a document. Collection of all these documents constitute a corpus. Figure 11.2 shows
an HTTP request and Figure 11.3 shows a document containing a paragraph of ten
sentences extracted from ten HTTP requests. From these figures, it can be seen that
only relevant information was extracted to construct a sentence from one HTTP
request. The pre-processing phase also parses the encoded strings in the HTTP
requests into tokens.
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Figure 11 . 2: Details of a Single HTTP request

Fi g u r e 11. 3: A single document file shows a paragraph consisting ten extracted
sentences
Construction of Vector Space Model: In this phase, the documents in the corpus as
created above are converted into vector space model using gensim [145]. For all three
corpora, the consisting documents are converted into feature vectors using doc2vec.
Each arbitrary length document generates a fixed length of feature vectors using the
semantic similarities among all documents. So, the M number of documents in a
single corpus generate a matrix of M × N, where N is the fixed length of feature
vectors. We combined all three corpora by combining all three tagged M × N
matrices. Then split the combined matrix into training and testing data which are
stored in CSV files.
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Ensemble Machine Learning: The third phase in the workflow uses a machine
learning framework to classify the vector data to detect network anomalies. The
machine learning framework uses ensemble-based learning, where multiple
classifiers are used together and the results given by these constituent classifiers are
further classified by another classifier [92].
Ensemble is a two-stage framework. In the first stage, supervised classifiers,
namely logistic regression (LR), support vector machines (SVM), naïve Bayes with
Gaussian function (NB), decision tree (DT), and neural networks (NN), are used to
classify the data. In the second stage, the classification results by these individual
classifiers are used as input to another classifier, called the ensemble classifier. In our
framework, majority voting (Ens_MV), logistic regression (Ens_LR), naïve Bayes
(Ens_NB), neural network (Ens_NN), decision tree (Ens_DT), and support vector
machine (Ens_SVM) are used as the ensemble classifiers.

11 .5

experiments

The dataset, experiment preparation, data pre-processing and model selection
tasks are mentioned in this section.
Dataset: The dataset used for experimental validation of our method is the HTTP
DATASET CSIC 2010 web penetration and hacking dataset consisting of normal and
anomalous HTTP requests [130]. The dataset contains the generated traffic targeted
to an e-Commerce web application. The HTTP requests are labeled anomalous when
the requests contain attacks such as SQL injection, buffer overflow, information
gathering, files disclosure, CRLF injection, XSS, server side include, parameter
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tampering, etc. The dataset is generated automatically and contains 36,000 normal
requests and more than 25,000 anomalous requests.
Experimental Setup: The scheme was implemented in the Python programming
language and using the machine learning library scikit-learn [89]. As noted before,
the scheme also uses the gensim library. The experiments were executed on a PC
with x64 Intel®Core™i5-6600K CPU @ 3.50GHz, 8GB memory and running a 64-bit
Ubuntu Linux operating system.
Data Preparation: The file containing the HTTP requests is processed to convert
different relevant entries in the requests into natural language sentences. Then
paragraphs containing 10 sentences are created and stored in documents. Collections
of such documents create three corpora corresponding to three data files, such as
normal traffic (training), normal traffic (test) and anomalous traffic (test). After that,
the gensim tool is used to convert the documents into vectors using doc2vec model.
We used the following parameters for the doc2vec model: 1) Dimensionality of the
feature vectors = 100, 2) Window = 15, 3) Number of epochs = 30, and 4) Training
Model = DBoW. The window is the maximum distance between the predicted word
and context words used for prediction within a document. The dataset is now
prepared to be used as input to any machine learning method.
Model Training: In this phase, the processed dataset was used to train our
existing ensemble supervised ML framework [92] which consists of five individual
classifiers and six ensemble classifiers. The models were trained using grid-search
and the best values of the hyper-parameters given by grid-search were retained. The
dataset was split into two subsets: 70% for training and 30% for testing. To avoid
over-fitting and to obtain robust models, 10-fold cross validation over randomly
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divided training data was used. Then the test data was used for prediction and for
measuring model performance.

11 .6

results and discussion

In this section, we present and discuss results for applying the scheme on the
dataset in terms of the evaluation metrics.
Table 11.1 shows the evaluation metrics values for different classifier models and
the corresponding graph in Figure 11.4 depicts the values for F1-score, accuracy,
precision and sensitivity. Figure 11.5 shows the false positive rate. From the
Table 11.1 we find that the accuracy values for the models vary from 96.34% for
LR-based ensemble classifier, Ens LR, to 99.95% for three ensemble models, Ens_NN,
Ens_DT, and Ens_SVM. The best precision value of 99.96% is given by four ensemble
models, Ens_NB, Ens_NN, Ens_DT, and Ens_SVM.
Ta b l e 11.1: Evaluation metrics values for individual and ensemble models using
the dataset
Models

F1-Score Accuracy

Precision

Sensitivity

Specificity

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time

LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

0.9938
0.9855
0.9996
0.9736
0.9993
0.9991
0.9735
0.999
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997

0.9979
0.9719
0.9996
0.9692
0.9996
0.9986
0.9484
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997

0.9896
0.9995
0.9996
0.978
0.999
0.9996
1
0.9983
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997

0.9958
0.9412
0.9992
0.9367
0.9992
0.997
0.8884
0.9993
0.9993
0.9993
0.9993

0.0042
0.0588
0.0008
0.0633
0.0008
0.003
0.1116
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007

0.9997
0.9918
1
0.9908
1
0
1
0.999
1
1
0.9993

1.158
0.2565
0.5903
3.8398
13.8474
2.1451
0.2112
0.1973
0.2918
0.1925
0.2764

0.9917
0.9803
0.9994
0.9644
0.999
0.9988
0.9634
0.9986
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995

However, in a classification problem where the goal is to detect the minor class
occurrences, the most important metrics are the sensitivity or recall which, in this
case, measures the proportion of actual “anomalous” paragraphs that are correctly
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identified as such; the specificity which measures the proportion of actual “normal”
paragraphs that are correctly identified as such; and the F1-score which is the
weighted average of precision and recall. Considering these, we find Ens_NN,
Ens_DT, and Ens_SVM are the best performing models with highest values of
sensitivity, specificity, and F1-score. These models will detect almost 100% of the
anomalous data, i.e., attacks, and will almost never raise false alarms. Figure 11.6
shows the ROC curves of all the models.

Fi g u r e 11.4: Comparison of the individual and ensemble models using F1-score,
accuracy, precision and sensitivitya1

11 .7

summary

Natural language processing (NLP) is one of most powerful tools used in areas
like speech recognition, sentiment analysis, question answering, anomaly detection,
etc. In this chapter, we described our implemented NLP and ensemble machine
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F i g ure 11 .5: Comparison of the individual and ensemble models using FPR

F igure 11 .6: ROC curves of all models in NLPIDS
learning-based intrusion detection system to detect anomalous traffic from the traffic
flow. We extracted relevant information from HTTP requests as natural language
sentences, converted the sentences to vector space using NLP tools, and finally used
ensemble machine learning models to classify normal and anomalous traffic. We
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experimented with HTTP DATASET CSIC 2010 to evaluate the performance of the
proposed NLPIDS. Results of this experiment show that our NLPIDS outperformed
other methods in the literature in terms of detection rate (99.96%), false alarm rate
(0.07%) and F1-score (99.96%).
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c h a p t er 12

Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks
in Smart Grid (Application-2)

Stealthy false data injection attacks target state estimation in energy
management systems in smart power grids to adversely affect operations of the
power transmission systems. This chapter presents a data-driven machine learning
based scheme to detect stealthy false data injection attacks on state estimation. The
scheme employs ensemble learning, where multiple classifiers are used and
decisions by individual classifiers are further classified. Two ensembles are used in
this scheme, one uses supervised classifiers while the other uses unsupervised
classifiers. The scheme is validated using simulated data on the standard IEEE
14-bus system. Experimental results show that the performance of both supervised
individual and ensemble models are comparable. However, for unsupervised
models, the ensembles performed better than the individual classifiers.
This research is proposed and administrated by Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman, a
research student of Dr. Frederick T. Sheldon from University of Idaho. Mohammad
conducted the research with setting up the experiments to collect smart grid data
from several sensors. I have worked in a collaboration with them and applied my
supervised and unsupervised frameworks with the smart grid dataset. This work is
an application of my implemented ensemble frameworks. Besides, Mohammad and I
published this research in a journal [146].
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12 .1

introduction

With the integration of cyberspace for communication, control and monitoring
of the physical processes of generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption
of electricity, the smart grid (SG) has evolved into the largest and most complex
cyber-physical system (CPS). Even though CPS industry has attempted to “air-gap”
the operational technology (OT) of CPSs from their information technology (IT)
networks, the OT networks are unfortunately still not fully insulated from IT
networks. OT networks are in fact vulnerable to both internal and external
cybersecurity threats [147]. A study by the Ponemon Institute reports that 90% of
organizations relying on OT have experienced at least one business-impacting
cyber-attack within the 2 years prior to the report [148]. Being that SGs are critical
national infrastructures, there is widespread concern about reducing the attack
surface of SGs. For example, in December 2015, three power distribution companies
were taken down in a coordinated cyber-attack, resulting in a power outage for
about 225,000 Ukrainians [149].
Rapid advancement in machine learning algorithms have enabled them to find
natural patterns in data that generate insight and enable better decisions and
predictions. The use of data analytics to predict, detect, and prevent security threats
is termed security analytics [150]. The incorporation of cyber capabilities into SG
functionality has led to the proliferation of new data sources. The availability of
abundant data generated by these components has enabled investigators to better
study cybersecurity threats and countermeasures in SGs using security
analytics [151].
State estimation (SE) is the principal tool used by energy management systems
(EMS) at power transmission control centers. SE computes voltage magnitudes and
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phase angles for all of the different buses after collecting measurement data
communicated to the control center from remote terminal units (RTUs) equipped
with SCADA units [152]. A cyber-attacker can subtly modify these measurement
data after compromising RTUs or substation meters, by gaining unauthorized access
to the control system or by intruding into the wireless communication networks, for
example, by successfully conducting a man-in-the-middle attack. This new type of
cyber-attack against SE in EMS is called false data injection (FDI) attacks [153]. The
falsely injected measurement data can affect the outcome of the SE and can reduce
the control center operators’ level of situational awareness. This can potentially force
operators to take erroneous corrective actions against spoofed data, which may
disrupt the real-time operation of the grid by impacting OT tools and methods such
as contingency analysis, unit commitment, optimal power flow and the
computational outcomes of locational marginal pricing for electricity markets. The
FDI attacks that impact SE predictions have been presented in several
publications [153, 154, 155, 156, 157]. FDI is an important element of a coordinated
attack on the power grid and, represents an important class of CPS attack [158].
Numerous attempts have been undertaken to devise detection methods for FDI
attacks using traditional statistical approaches and based on the physics of state
estimation [159, 157] and using data-driven machine learning-based security
analytics [151].
Machine learning approaches work by treating FDI attacks on the measurement
data as anomalous compared to the normal data. Hence the problem is reduced to a
binary classification task. Most of the related studies up to now have used
stand-alone (either supervised, unsupervised or semi-supervised) classification
methods. Different classifiers usually perform differently on the same data. In
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ensemble-based machine learning, multiple classifiers are used together and the
results given by these constituent classifiers are further classified by another (second
stage) classifier [6, 160]. Ensemble-based machine learning approaches have been
shown to perform well in solving other problems [86, 161, 162].
Supervised methods have the advantage of learning to differentiate the
anomalous from normal data using a tagged or labeled dataset. Unsupervised
methods, on the other hand, sort data into different clusters where the strength of
the clustering lies within the algorithm itself. Among unsupervised methods,
novelty and outlier detection strategies have shown significant promise in detecting
otherwise hidden anomalies. The supervised methods require large amounts of data
to be curated as labeled data (i.e., with ground truth). It is not very difficult to collect
data during normal operation. However, “attack” data is very sparsely available
making the process of creating labeled datasets onerous. Unsupervised methods do
not require labeled data. These methods, though more prone to higher rates of false
detection, are better equipped to discover zero-day attacks never before encountered.
A scheme that utilizes both supervised and unsupervised classifiers can address and
counterbalance the drawbacks inherent to each other.
In this paper, a security analytics approach that employs two sets of machine
learning ensembles is presented to identify stealthy FDI attacks on state estimation.
One set of the ensembles uses only supervised methods while the other one uses
only unsupervised methods. The supervised methods used are logistic regression
(LR), support vector machines (SVM), naïve Bayes with Gaussian function (NB),
decision tree (DT), and neural networks (NN). The unsupervised methods are
one-class SVM (OCSVM), isolation forest (ISOF), elliptic envelope (EE), and local
outlier factor (LOF). These individual classifiers when run together, simultaneously
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or one after another, form the first phase of a machine learning ensemble. The
resultant classifications, into either normal or anomalous, are used as input to
another classifier, called the ensemble classifier. Majority voting, logistic regression,
support vector machines, naïve Bayes with Gaussian function, decision tree, and
artificial neural networks are used as the ensemble classifiers. The models are
trained using historical data and the best performing supervised and unsupervised
ensemble models are chosen out of six ensemble models of each kind. Both of these
“best” models from these experiments would then be deployed online for real-time
detection of stealthy FDI attacks on SE.
The major technical contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Design of an ensemble-based machine learning (EML) scheme that consists of
ensembles of both supervised and unsupervised classification methods to
leverage the advantages of these two learning classes.
• Inclusion of the random forest classifier (RFC) in the EML scheme enabling a
reduced number of features in the data thereby assessing and minimizing the
effect of the so-called “curse of dimensionality” [163].
• Generation of power transmission system measurement data using a standard
IEEE 14-bus system simulated in MATPOWER [164] and introduction of
stealthy FDI attacks, i.e., intelligently crafted modifications, to the power flow
data.
• Development of a testing and evaluation scheme using the simulated data to
enable performance assessment of the different EMLs against stand-alone
models using standard evaluation metrics.
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12 .2

related work

A number of machine learning based approaches have been proposed to detect
false data injection attacks on the state estimation in energy management systems.
Table ?? lists the related works showing the learning class, algorithms used for
feature selections, algorithms used for training, and how the datasets were generated
or obtained for each of the works listed. A review of these works is given in ??. In
this section, the works directly related to the current work are discussed.
Ozay et al. [165] employed supervised and semi-supervised machine learning
methods to detect both observable (non-stealthy) and unobservable (stealthy) FDI
attacks. The supervised methods used were perceptron, k-nearest neighbors (k-NN),
support vector machine (SVM) with linear and Gaussian kernels, sparse logistic
regression (SLR), and AdaBoost; and the semi-supervised SVM (S3VM). They
evaluated the models using MATPOWER simulations of IEEE 9-, 57- and 118-bus
systems. While they used multiple individual classifiers and a boosting algorithm
(i.e., AdaBoost), they did not assemble the methods in an ensemble.
Wang et al. [166] applied the concept of “first difference”, borrowed from
economics and statistics to time-series measurement data to detect time-synchronous
attacks on SE. The “first-difference aware” data is then trained using five supervised
models k-NN, neural network (NN), SVM, naïve Bayes (NB) and decision tree (DT).
They tested their proposed approach on MATPOWER-simulated IEEE 14-bus system.
In this case also the authors used the methods as stand-alone methods only.
On the unsupervised learning side, Yang et al. [167] used one-class SVM
(OCSVM), robust covariance (RC), isolation forest (ISOF) & local outlier factor (LOF)
as individual classifiers. They ran these methods using data from a simulated IEEE
14-bus system.
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A few observations can be made from the review of the works above and the
works listed a Table in [146]:
1. Different learning classes had been attempted by the researchers. However, no
attempts to use adversarial learning or explanation-based learning have been
undertaken up to now.
2. None of the investigations combined both supervised and unsupervised
methods together in one approach.
3. A few studies mentioned here used multiple classifiers as individual methods,
but none used any ensemble methods.
4. Almost all the studies used simulated datasets for validating their approaches.
Alimi et al. [168] used power flow data from the Nigerian power grid, but they
seeded synthetic attacks into the dataset later.

12 .3

false data injection attacks on state estimation

This section describes state estimation (SE) in power transmission system, the
mathematical formulation for stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks on static SE,
and how stealthy FDI attacks are carried out on SE.

12.3.1

State Estimation in Power Transmission Systems

State Estimation is used to provide the best estimate of the values of the
system’s unknown state variables, i.e., voltage magnitudes and phase angles on the
system buses, based on the measurements available from the network model and
sent by the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system to the control
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center. This is known as static state estimation which captures the quasi-static
behavior of the power transmission system. SE is run every few seconds to few
minutes. The functions of the state estimator include identifying and correcting
anomalies in the data, suppressing any bad data, and refining the measurements.
Finally, SE delivers a set of state variables that are acceptable to the operator and as
inputs to other computational programs within the energy management system
(EMS) [169]. Figure 12.1 gives the data flow in a typical state estimator.

Fi g u r e 12 . 1:
(from [169]).

The state estimation process for power transmission systems

These EMS tools are directly dependent on SE outputs process [169]:
Contingency analysis is one of the most important tasks of the EMS. It
involves performing efficient calculations of system performance from a set of
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simplified system contingency conditions and is used for fast estimation of
system static stability right after outages.
Unit commitment is an operational planning method used to determine the
schedule called the unit commitment schedule which tells the system operators
beforehand when and which units to start and shut down during the operation
over a pre-specified time, such that the total operating cost for that period is
minimized.
Optimal power flow is a technique used to simulate load flow through an AC
power system by finding the combination of flows that is operationally and
economically optimal.
Locational marginal pricing tools are used to price out the cost of electricity
for the local distributors and consumers.
The SE process generates a “residual vector” which is analyzed to detect
possible abnormal measurements by checking for residuals that do not obey the
Gaussian assumption. While the standard residual analysis tests can identify the
presence of errors, it may not detect “stealthy" FDI attacks because an attacker
familiar with the target power transmission system topology can carefully craft the
amount of data to be injected in such a way that the residual of the original
measurement vector remains equal to the residual of the measurement vector that
contains the injected (or spoofed) false data.

12.3.2

Formulation of SE and FDI Attacks

The static SE is run after the SCADA units collect the power flows, power
injections and voltage magnitudes measurements from the system buses. The static
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SE estimates the state vector x ∈ Rn that contains phase angles and voltage
magnitudes at the different buses, where n = 2k − 1 and k is the number of buses in
the system. For AC static SE, the state vector x obeys the following nonlinear
equation:

z = h( x) + e

(12.1)

In the above equation, the vector of measurements z ∈ Rm contains measurement
readings from SCADA units, where m is the number of measurements. The
nonlinear vector function h(·) is computed from the grid topology and the
transmission lines, transformers and other grid device parameters. The error vector
e ∈ Rm is assumed Gaussian with a covariance matrix R. The SE is run to compute
and estimate the state vector x using an iterative algorithm based on the weighted
least squares (WLS) [152].

x̂k = x̂k−1 + Hk] (zk − h( xk−1 ))

(12.2)

where Hk] = ( Hk> R−1 Hk )−1 Hk> R−1 and Hk is the Jacobian matrix of h with respect to
x at step k. The WLS algorithm is optimal under Gaussian noise.
After the algorithm converges, i.e., once k x̂k − x̂k−1 k < δ for some chosen small
threshold δ > 0, the obtained residuals are analyzed for possible abnormal
measurements by checking for residuals that do not obey the Gaussian assumption.
These abnormal or bad data could be due to natural failures such as sensor or
communication error, or due to FDI attacks. The chi-square test (χ2 ) and the “3σ”
rejection rule are used, in most cases, to detect the bad data [152].
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A DC static SE can also be computed. In this case, only phase angles are
estimated. All voltages are assumed to be equal to 1pu. The line resistances are
neglected and the phase angles differences between buses are assumed to be small.
The DC model obeys a linear regression model.

z = Hx + e

12.3.3

(12.3)

Stealthy FDI Attacks on State Estimation

Conventional methods detect abnormal or bad data by analyzing the residual
(i.e., the difference between the measurement vector z and the calculated value from
the SE, i.e., z − H x̂). If the largest absolute value of the elements in normalized
residual is greater than a pre-defined threshold α > 0, (α is generally chosen to be 3)
the corresponding measurement is identified as bad data and reported to system
operators. The measurement is removed and the estimation is re-executed.
Therefore, if the bad data is due to FDI attacks and the injected data are large
enough, the conventional residual tests can detect them: these are called non-stealthy
FDI attacks, or simply FDI attacks. In the non-stealthy case, the attackers do not have
the knowledge of the measurement matrix H and they simply manipulate the meter
readings to generate random attacks. If the attackers have knowledge of the system
topology or know the measurement matrix H, they can carefully and intelligently
craft the false data in such a way that the residual r, the true residual of the original
measurement vector z, remains the same as the residual r a of the measurement
vector z with the injected data z a .

r a = z a − H x̂ a = z − H x̂ = r
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(12.4)

These attacks cannot be detected using the conventional methods based on residual
analysis, and are called stealthy FDI attacks [153].

Stealthy FDI Attack Process

12.3.4

False data injection attacks can be carried out on different parts of the power
grid, e.g., transmission systems, distribution systems, advanced metering
infrastructure, etc. [170]. However here, only FDI attacks on the SE in the AC power
transmission system are considered.
The following are the steps an adversary may use to commit a stealthy FDI
attack:
1. Intrusion into the System (the stepping-stone):
(a) If the adversary is an outsider, they will hack into the system using any or
more of the usual cyber-attacks, e.g., spear-phishing, password-cracking,
cracking the cryptographic protection, or using a man-in-the-middle attack
by compromising any wired or wireless communication channel, among
others.
(b) An outside adversary can also be successful in installing malware using
the means described above or by using social engineering ploys. This
malware may have the ability to steal system information, particularly bus
topology.
(c) If the adversary is a trusted insider, then they may already have the access
and authority to the needed information.
2. Carry out stealthy FDI attacks:
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(a) After the adversary has gained access into the system and obtained the
necessary system information, they can now surreptitiously change
measurement data to achieve a stealthy FDI attack.
(b) The operator and the state estimator assume that the data is correct and
estimate the state variable values based on this false assumption.
(c) Since the state variable values do not represent the actual state of the
system, calculation by any of the post-SE tools will be incorrect. This will
cause an erroneous situation resulting in adverse operation of the system
in turn causing malfunctions or major disruptions.
The goal of the attacker is to disrupt the operation of the transmission system
leading to a failure in one or more components or buses, which may even trigger a
cascade of failures, i.e., tripping of breakers because of power overload, and causing
localized to wide-scale power disruption.

12 .4

methodology : ensemble based detection

This section provides an overview of the ensemble based stealthy FDI attack
detection scheme. The framework implements pipelines of individual and ensemble
methods consisting of both supervised and unsupervised classifiers. The detailed
schematic diagram depicting the process flow is given in Figure 12.2. It shows the
individual processing phases, namely 1) data preprocessing, 2) feature selection, 3)
classification using individual classifiers, 4) classification using ensemble methods,
and 5) building the best performing detection models. The training is performed
offline with historical data, and the testing is performed online in real-time
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Fi g u r e 12.2 : High-level diagram of the training pipelines for supervised and
unsupervised learning.
deployment mode. A review of the machine learning methods used in this
framework is given in Section 2.3.
Data Preprocessing: Data preprocessing is the first and foremost task before
starting with any machine learning application. There are various sub-tasks in a data
preprocessing phase such as removing unwanted data, data conversion, scaling,
removing invalid data, etc. At this time, the framework supports standard and
min-max scaling.
Feature Selection: The dimension of a dataset increases with the size of the power
grid. For example, the number of features in the measurement data for state
estimation is 27 for the IEEE 9-bus system and is 1122 for the IEEE 300-bus system.
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With increasing feature dimensions, the complexity and elapsed time for training the
models increase very steeply, causing the so-called “curse of dimensionality” [163].
To minimize this problem, feature selection is often used to eliminate the least
discriminating features from the dataset, thereby reducing the dimensionality
without sacrificing much of the information. Selecting the best feature and best
number of features could lead the method to achieve its optimal performance while
minimizing its running time. The feature selection phase is one of the most crucial
phases of model classification, which can be done by various inbuilt mechanisms or
by using domain knowledge. The ensemble framework currently supports random
forest classifier (RFC) as a feature selection algorithm.
Individual Classifiers: The scheme employs both supervised and unsupervised
classifier methods. In supervised learning, labeled data, i.e., a training set of
examples with correct responses, is provided and based on this training the machine
learning algorithm generalizes (i.e., learns the patterns in the training data) to
classify the unlabeled input sets. In unsupervised learning, the algorithm is trained
with unlabeled data to identify similarities between the inputs that have something
in common. These similar inputs are then categorized together. In other words, the
algorithm attempts to learn the hidden patterns in the input data, and later predicts
responses to test inputs based on the learned patterns.
If trained with well-developed labeled data, supervised learning models
perform better than unsupervised models. However, the additional and often
cumbersome data engineering needed to label raw data is painstaking and
challenging. Moreover, attack data is very sparse. Consequently, the availability of
labeled data is not always guaranteed in a timely manner. That is why most datasets
are synthetic. Because supervised models are trained with labeled data, they learn
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the patterns associated with “attacks” very well and can detect such patterns more
consistently. However, if the attack pattern is not one of the learned patterns or if the
attack is a new one, then the performance of supervised models is highly degraded.
In these cases, unsupervised models which flag any out-of-the-ordinary pattern
more consistently must be considered. For these reasons, both supervised and
unsupervised models are included in the framework.
• Supervised Classifiers: The supervised classifiers included in the framework are
decision tree (DT), logistic regression (LR), naïve Bayes (NB), support vector
machine (SVM), and artificial neural network (NN). Section 2.3.1 provides a
brief description of these methods.
• Unsupervised Classifiers: The unsupervised classifier models included in the
framework are: one-class support vector machine with polynomial kernel
(OCSVM_P), one-class support vector machine with linear kernel (OCSVM_L),
isolation forest (ISOF), elliptic envelope (EE), and local outlier factor (LOF).
Section 2.3.2 provides a brief description of these methods.
Ensemble Classifiers: Ensemble is a learning method where different classifiers
are combined into a meta-classifier that has better generalization performance than
each individual classifier alone [6]. Ensemble is a two-stage process. The first stage
consists of different classification methods, for example, DT, SVM, LR, and so on, or
one base classification algorithm can be used repeatedly with different subsets of the
training data. These individual classifiers are run together, simultaneously or one
after another. In the second stage, the decisions given by individual classifiers are
fed as input to another classifier, called the ensemble classifier, for the final decision.
Majority voting is the most popular ensemble method, which selects the class label
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that has been predicted by the majority of the constituent classifiers. Instead of
majority voting any binary classification method can be used as the ensemble
classifier.
This framework contains two ensembles: one is an ensemble of all the
individual supervised classifiers used in the framework, and the other is an
ensemble of all the individual unsupervised classifiers. The framework uses six
classifiers as the ensemble classifier: majority voting (Ens_MV), logistic regression
(Ens_LR), naïve Bayes (Ens_NB), neural network (Ens_NN), decision tree (Ens_DT),
and support vector machine (Ens_SVM). Best Performing Models: The datasets in the

Fi g u r e 12.3: High-level diagram of the deployment pipeline using the bestperforming models
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pipeline go through all the individual and ensemble classifiers. The performance of
all the supervised classifiers and the unsupervised classifiers are then compared
using standard evaluation metrics. This comparison identifies the best performing
supervised ensemble model and the best performing unsupervised ensemble model.
These models will be deployed in the state estimation process for real-time detection
of stealthy false data injection attack in power transmission systems. Figure 12.3
depicts a possible real-time detection pipeline. Any unknown FDI attack detected by
the best unsupervised model, can be used to train the supervised ensemble, so that
next time around those attacks are detected more quickly and more reliably.

12 .5

experiments

This section presents a set of experiments that were performed using the
framework presented above and associated results.
Attack Model: The attack model considered in this research constitute FDI attacks
targeting the static AC (alternating current) state estimation of the transmission
system. The considered attack model assumes that the attacker is capable of
changing the communicated data such as voltages, currents and power magnitudes.
The adversary has only selected partial knowledge of the network topology and
therefore can generate a stealthy attack on a single bus only. The attack model
assumes one fixed bus is targeted throughout the entire duration of the attack,
meaning that it is a targeted attack, not a random attack.
Simulation and Data Generation: Simulation of the standard IEEE 14-bus system is
used for the purpose of generating power flow data. The IEEE 14-bus system has 5
generators and 11 loads [171], as shown in Figure ??. The measurements are
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obtained from solving power flows using the MATPOWER toolbox [164] and adding
Gaussian measurement noise. The loads are considered to vary randomly around
their average values. The measurements are 40 active power-flows, 14 active
power-injections, 40 reactive power flows, 14 reactive power-injections and 14 voltage
magnitudes giving a total of 122 measurement features. The dataset consists of
100,000 sets of measurements.

Fi g u r e 12.4: Diagram of IEEE 14-bus system (adapted from [168]) showing the
stealthy FDI attack on bus number 4

Experimental Setup: The framework has been implemented in the Python
programming language and using the machine learning library scikit-learn [89]. The
experiments were executed on a PC with x64 Intel®CORE™i5-6600K CPU @
3.50GHz, 8GB memory and running a 64-bit Ubuntu Linux operating system.
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Data Preprocessing: The dataset generated contains 90% “normal” data and 10%
“attack” data implying that the dataset is imbalanced. Classifiers perform poorly
when trained with imbalanced datasets, especially for the minority class. In this case,
the “attacks” are in the minority class, and the goal is to detect these precisely. To
overcome this problem, two popular techniques to balance datasets, namely the
synthetic minority over-sampling technique (SMOTE) and the edited nearest
neighbor (ENN), were applied to over-sample the “attack” sets of data and
under-sample the “normal” sets of data respectively [172]. After this balancing act
the ratio of major and minor class samples in the dataset was 3:2. Since the
unsupervised models function as outlier or anomaly detectors in this paper, the
dataset was not balanced for the unsupervised models.
The dataset did not have any missing data or invalid data; consequently, no data
cleaning was performed. The data types of all the features in the dataset are numeric,
except for the class label which is either “normal” or “attack”. All the “normal”s
were changed to 0s and “attack”s to 1s. Standard scaling was applied to the dataset.
In standard scaling, the features are normalized by removing the mean and scaling
to unit variance. Standard scaling replaces the data values in a feature by their z
score. For a value x, the z score is calculated as: z = ( x − µ)/σ, where µ is the mean
and σ is the standard deviation of the data values for a given feature.
Feature Selection: The random forest algorithm was used on the dataset to obtain
an ordering of the features according to their importance. A plot showing the feature
importance is given in Figure 12.5. The figure shows that the first 21 features have
the largest variances, and therefore only these features were retained in the dataset
as the predictor variables, plus the target variable.
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F i g ure 12 .5: Plot showing the features in the dataset in order of importance.
Model Training: In the model training phase, the experiments were conducted
with individual classification first and then ensemble classification. The experiments
ran the data through five supervised and five unsupervised learning models. Six
ensemble models were run with the outcomes of the supervised models, and six
ensemble models with the outcomes of the unsupervised models. The models were
run using grid-search and the best values of the hyper-parameters given by
grid-search were retained. The optimal hyper-parameters used for different models
are given in Table 12.1. The dataset was split into two subsets: 70% for training and
30% for testing. To avoid over-fitting and to obtain robust models, 10-fold cross
validation over randomly divided training data was used. Then the test data was
used for prediction and for measuring model performance.
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Ta b l e 12.1: Hyper-parameter values used for different individual and ensemble
classifiers

Supervised
Models

Unsupervised
Models

Ensemble
Models

12 .6

Classifier

Short
Names

Hyper-parameter Values

Logistic Regression

LR

Decision Tree
Naïve Bayes

DT
NB

Neural Network

NN

Support Vector
Machine

SVM

random_state=0, solver=‘lbfgs’,
multi_class=‘multinomial’
default parameters
alpha=1.0, binarize=0.0,
fit_prior=True, class_prior=None
solver=‘lbfgs’, alpha=1e-5,
hidden_layer_sizes=(5, 2), random_state=1
C=1.0, kernel=‘rbf’, degree=3, gamma=‘scale’,
coef0=0.0, shrinking=True, probability=True

One Class SVMPolynomial Kernel
One Class SVMLinear Kernel
Local Outlier Factor

OCSVM_P

nu=0.2, kernel=‘poly’, gamma=0.1

OCSVM_L

nu=0.2, kernel=‘linear’, gamma=0.1

LOF

Isolation Forest

ISOF

Elliptic Envelope

EE

n_neighbors=20,
contamination=0.1, novelty=True
behaviour=‘new’, max_samples=100,
random_state= rng, contamination=0.1
support_fraction=1, contamination=0.1,
random_state = rng

Majority Voting
Decision Tree
Naïve Bayes

Ens_MV
Ens_DT
Ens-NB

Logistic Regresion

Ens_LR

Neural Network

Ens_NN

Support Vector
Machine

Ens_SVM

none
default parameters
alpha=1.0, binarize=0.0,
fit_prior=True, class_prior=None
random_state=0, solver=‘lbfgs’,
multi_class=‘multinomial’
solver=‘lbfgs’, alpha=1e-5, novelty=True
hidden_layer_sizes=(5, 2), random_state=1
C=1.0, kernel=‘rbf’, degree=3, gamma=‘scale’,
coef0=0.0, shrinking=True, probability=True

results and discussion

Table 12.2 and the corresponding bar-graph in Figure 12.6 show the results, i.e.,
the values for the evaluation metrics, from running all the five supervised classifiers
and six ensemble classifiers on a feature-reduced dataset with 21 features.
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Ta b l e 12 . 2: Evaluation metrics values for supervised individual and ensemble
models using the test dataset
Models

F1

Accuracy

Precision

Sensitivity

FPR

Specificity

ROC

LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

0.8439
0.8439
0.8439
0.8438
0.8439
0.8439
0.8472
0.8472
0.8472
0.8472
0.8472

0.8931
0.8931
0.8931
0.893
0.8931
0.8931
0.8961
0.8961
0.8961
0.8961
0.8961

0. 9991
0. 9991
0. 9991
0. 9991
0. 9991
0. 9991
0.9993
0.9993
0.9993
0.9993
0.9993

0.7304
0.7304
0.7304
0.7302
0.7304
0.7304
0.7353
0.7353
0.7353
0.7353
0.7353

0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003

0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997
0.9997

0.8639
0.8081
0.865
0.8797
0.8642
N/A
0.8675
0.8675
0.8675
0.8675
0.8675

The experiment results show that the values for individual classifiers and those
for the ensemble classifiers are effectively the same for all the metrics. The table
shows that precision values for the models are very close to 100%, whereas accuracy
values are about 90%. However, in a classification problem where the goal is to
detect the minor class occurrences, the most important metrics are the sensitivity
which, in this case, measures the proportion of actual “attacks” that are correctly
identified as such; and the specificity which measures the proportion of actual
“non-attacks” that are correctly identified as such. For supervised models, the
sensitivity values for all the models are very similar, with the ensemble models
having a little better number at 73.53%. This indicates that even the best model
would be able to detect about 73% of the attacks and the rest 27% will go undetected.
The specificity values for the models are 99.97% meaning that the models are able to
identify a “non-attack” as such almost always and will seldom raise a false alert.
Table 12.3 shows the elapsed time for training the different models. It is notable
that not only the ensemble models do not perform any better, but they also take
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Fi g u r e 12 .6: Bar-graph of the evaluation metrics values for supervised individual
and ensemble models.
more time to run than the individual models. This is because the ensembles first run
all the five individual models and then run the ensemble classifier, and the
accumulated elapsed time is therefore higher.
The dataset with all the 122 features was also used to train the models and it
was found that the performance numbers for the models do not change at all for this
case. Comparison of the values in column two in Table 12.3 with those in column
three, shows that the training times from 122 features are up to 400% more than
those with 21 features.
SVM is a popular model among the researchers working on the problem of
detecting stealthy FDI attacks on SE. However, the experiment shows that SVM
performs the same as the other models. Moreover, SVM takes much more time to
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Ta ble 12 .3: Training times for supervised individual and ensemble models
Models
LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

Elapsed Time in second
21 features 122 features Without SVM
0.56
1.02
0.27
1.03
0.57
0.83
1.59
114.52
2713.82
8897.83
2718.96
9017.94
6.07
2717.06
9015.59
4.15
2717.01
9015.32
4.12
2717.11
9015.91
4.33
2717.02
9015.59
4.08
2733.31
9031.7
8.55

train. Whereas the other individual models take less than 2 seconds to train, SVM
takes more than 2700 seconds or 45 minutes on the feature-reduced dataset. On the
original dataset with 122 features, SVM takes an astounding 8900 seconds or 2.47
hours. This also exemplifies the “curse of dimensionality” and how it can be
handled by reducing the feature set. It was also observed that if SVM is taken out as
a constituent individual model, then the times taken by the ensemble models were
reduced drastically without any reduction in performance. The last column in
Table 12.3 shows times taken by the ensemble models when SVM is not included in
the set of the individual models.
Table 12.4 and the corresponding bar-graph in Figure 12.7 show the evaluation
metrics for the unsupervised models and the ensemble models for the 21-feature
dataset. For the unsupervised models, it was observed that four out of six ensemble
models have better accuracy values than any of the individual classifiers. Among the
individual classifiers, the elliptic envelope performs with 63.18% F1-score and 92.14%
accuracy. Two of the ensemble models, namely ensemble with DT and ensemble
with SVM, perform with 66.15% F1-score and 94.07% accuracy. However,
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Ta b l e 12.4: Evaluation metrics values for unsupervised individual and ensemble
models using the test dataset
Models

F1

OCSVM_P
LOF
ISOF
EE
OCSVM_L
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

0.0834
0.1388
0.3781
0.6318
0.1731
0.4375
0.6409
0.5502
0.6218
0.6615
0.6615

Accuracy

Precision

Sensitivity

0.4549
0.8586
0.7939
0.9214
0.5
0.8892
0.9394
0.9034
0.9216
0.9407
0.9407

0.0494
0.1604
0.263
0.5606
0.1023
0.415
0.6739
0.4679
0.5428
0.6689
0.6689

0.2661
0.1223
0.6722
0.7237
0.5617
0.4626
0.6111
0.6676
0.7278
0.6544
0.6544

FPR
0.5257
0.0657
0.1935
0.0582
0.5062
0.0669
0.0287
0.0736
0.0595
0.0314
0.0314

Specificity

ROC

0.4743
0.9343
0.8065
0.9418
0.4938
0.9331
0.9713
0.9264
0.9505
0.9686
0.9686

0.3702
0.5283
0.7393
0.8327
0.5277
N/A
0.7912
0.7969
0.8341
0.8114
0.8114

Elapsed Time in sec
21 features 122 features
284.16
7962.94
841.25
3047.8
7.87
19.16
12.39
84.2
35.14
199.62
1212.97
11316.29
1211.11
11313.98
1211.03
11313.96
1211.35
11315.06
1211.04
11315.05
1224.92
11316.29

considering the sensitivity, the best performing model is the ensemble with NN
giving a value of 72.78%, closely followed by the elliptic envelop with 72.37%. This
indicates that the best diagnostic or detection ability of either supervised,
unsupervised or ensemble models is about 73%. The ensemble using the LR model
has the best specificity value of all the unsupervised models at 97.13%. Among the
individual models, elliptic envelope has the best specificity value at 94.18%.
For the unsupervised models, training the dataset with all 122 features takes up
to 900% more time compared to the times for the 21-feature dataset. In this case also
it was observed that the performance numbers do not improve when the models are
trained with 122 features.
The ROC curve plots FPR on the X-axis and TPR on the Y-axis. This means that
the top left corner of the plot is the “ideal” point, where the FPR = 0, and TPR = 1.
The larger the area under the curve (AUC) the better. The red dotted line indicates
the random classification and has an AUC of 0.5.
The ROC curves for the supervised and unsupervised models are shown in
Figure 12.8 and Figure 12.9, respectively. Among the supervised individual and
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Fi g u r e 12.7: Bar-graph of the evaluation metrics values for unsupervised
individual and ensemble models

Figure 12 .8 : ROC Curves for supervised models in SFDIA detection
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F igure 12 .9: ROC Curves for unsupervised models in SFDIA detection
ensemble models, the DT model has the largest AUC, and among the unsupervised
individual and ensemble models, the ensemble with NN model has the largest AUC.

12 .7

summary

An attacker can execute stealthy false data injection attacks on the state
estimation of a power grid to steal electricity, cause minor disruption in the grid,
induce cascading failures and/or cause large-scale outages. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance that stealthy FDI attacks are detected quickly and accurately. In this
chapter, a machine learning-based scheme having two ensemble pipelines, one of
supervised classifiers and another of unsupervised, was described for detection of
stealthy FDI attacks. The scheme also includes RFC for dimension reduction. The
scheme was implemented using the Python machine-learning libraries and tested
using a standard IEEE 14-bus system simulated by MATPOWER. The performance
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of the ensemble scheme was compared with the performance of individual classifiers.
The performance of individual supervised models is the same as those of the
ensemble models. However, for the unsupervised models, the ensemble models
performed better than the individual models. The best models have a sensitivity
metric value of 73%, meaning that the models would be able to detect 73% of the
attacks. For both the supervised and unsupervised models, reducing the feature set
increases the training speed many-fold without suffering any degradation in
detection rates.
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c h a p t er 13

Conclusion

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack has become the crucial cyber threat
over the last decade. Attackers wisely choose DDoS to malfunction a victim server in
order to disrupt its normal service. Even the renowned service providers like
Amazon, Facebook, Instagram, GitHub faced disruption on their normal service at
least once as of yet due to the DDoS attack. Therefore, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) should seamlessly be configured in such a way so as to the detection
mechanism uses artificial intelligence (AI) to fight against this attack. In recent days,
AI applies machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and other intelligent
techniques to solve complicated problems. Indeed, machine learning has a
lightweight processing time with an outstanding performance compared to other AI
tools. In cybersecurity, ML provides us with adequate intelligence when applied on
IDSs. Moreover, from the state-of-the-art ML-based IDSs, the Ensemble classifier
(combination of classifiers) outperforms any individual classifier. To obtain better
outcomes and less processing time from the ML classification, feature selection
process often plays a major role. However, in spite of its noteworthy performance,
people cannot rely on ML predictions in high stakes decision making systems, such
as life threatening items like COVID-19 detection, driver-less car, facial detection, etc.
due to lack of transparency. As such, model interpretability techniques provide an
appropriate explanation for a certain ML prediction which can restore the faith in ML
predictions. Interpretable machine learning (IML) technique explains a prediction
using the effectiveness of the critical features associated with each prediction.

208

13 .1

main findings

Here the key findings of my dissertation are shown. In this research,
• We have implemented several machine learning techniques for IDSs in order to
detect DDoS attacks precisely while lowering the false alarms with minimal
human intervention
• We developed a supervised and an unsupervised ensemble framework to build
IDSs, which has shown outstanding performance in detecting DDoS attacks
with satisfactory detection accuracy and lower false alarms compared to the
existing ones.
• As the feature selection process benefits the model’s accuracy, we designed two
feature selection approaches: ensemble feature selection using majority voting
and novel feature selection based on interpretable machine learning.
• Both selection approaches improved the efficiency of our prior ensemble ML
frameworks.
• Popular and benchmark datasets: NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017
were used for our experimentation and our framework can accurately detect at
most 99.1% of DDoS attacks with maintaining the lowest false positive rate of
0.01%.
• To verify the efficacy of our frameworks, we applied them in NLP based IDS to
detect network intrusions and in smart grid to detect stealthy false data
injection attacks.
The goal of our research is twofold: to detect DDoS attacks accurately and to
provide trustworthy explanations for these detections.
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• We have built explainer model using interpretable machine learning (IML)
technique to provide valid explanations for detected DDoS attacks with the
help of the effectiveness of the corresponding features.
• To build explainer models for comparative analysis based on likelihood and
consistency scores, we used LIME and SHAP methods.
• The best performing explainer model provided proper explanation as well as a
confidence score to justify the explanation.
As the explainer model implementation is used in our research for the
explanation purposes, rest of the other implementations described above combinedly
contribute to detect DDoS attacks more efficiently. In other words, the complete
framework has the ability to detect both traditional and zero-day DDoS attacks as
well as to explain the detected DDoS attacks.

13 .2

challenges

Initially, there were difficulties choosing right ML classifier that fits best. After
extensive experimentation with hyperparameters tuning, choosing right classifier
with its best hyperparameter values that generate best performances was possible.
Recursive feature selection using interpretable machine learning model took longer
simulation time for a single iteration. That taxed several months to finish this
experiment. Finally, for the explainer model experiment, it took another six months
to get the result. Indeed, to calculate the consistency scores for more than 200K data
as it generates 200K x 200K dimensional matrix which usually take two weeks or so
to finish one classification.
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13 .3

future work

Using the results obtained from our novel feature selection method (IMLFS) as a
base, we plan to expand our research in various dimensions, such as
• to have a deeper understanding about why certain features are more relevant
than others
• improve the confidence level in early detection and prevention of DDoS attacks
• adopt this approach in other types of intrusion analyses and detection
Thus, we can prove that the IMLFS approach has the potential to play a
significant role in providing a front-line defense for these types of attacks.
In our experiments, we used offline data to train and test our models. In
addition, as we were unable to connect these implementations with a physical IDS in
real-time, we used verification data that imitate the real-time traffic. Therefore, we
plan to
• apply our models within the IDSs in real-time traffic monitoring system
• work on explainer model to get more consistent explanations
• expand this dissertation in detecting other crucial cyber-attacks
Though we initially faced challenges in computing the results for our
experiments, this dissertation represents the upward learning curve of my machine
learning knowledge. The frameworks that we have developed outperform any single
model and are applicable to any domain. Feature selection approaches that we
designed can be applied in any dataset to get reduced number of features and thus
get improvement in the performances. We plan to implement a generic detector and
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explainer which will solve real-world problems so that human can rely more on this
framework.
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a p pendix a

Supervised Ensemble Detailed Results

This appendix section presents the detail results, i.e., evaluation metrics values,
graphs, and ROC curves, for all the three datasets used in Chapter 4. Tables a.1,
a.2 and a.3 show the detailed results for the supervised (both individual and
ensemble) models for the NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15 and CICIDS2017 dataset respectively. Figures a.1, a.3 and a.5 show the corresponding bar-graphs and the
ROC curves are shown in Figures a.2, a.4 and a.6 for three datasets.
Ta ble a .1: Performance metrics for NSL-KDD dataset using supervised
ensemble framework
Models
LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

0.885
0.836
0.830
0.920
0.967
0.888
0.970
0.946
0.970
0.971
0.970

0.905
0.861
0.866
0.935
0.972
0.907
0.974
0.952
0.974
0.975
0.974

0.933
0.857
0.923
0.986
0.984
0.938
0.988
0.942
0.992
0.991
0.989

0.842
0.815
0.754
0.863
0.949
0.843
0.953
0.950
0.949
0.952
0.952

0.046
0.104
0.048
0.009
0.012
0.043
0.009
0.046
0.006
0.006
0.009

0.950
0.935
0.909
0.927
0.959
N/A
0.975
0.969
0.972
0.977
0.974

4.489
0.566
7.317
1.032
468.648
470.748
468.800
468.683
468.880
468.684
470.438
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F i g ure a.1: Performance metrics bar-charts of supervised ensemble models
using NSL-KDD dataset

229

F i g ure a .2 : ROC curves of supervised ensemble models using NSL-KDD
dataset
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Ta ble a.2: Performance metrics for UNSW-NB15 dataset using supervised
ensemble framework
Models
LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

0.946
0.800
0.831
0.978
0.969
0.972
0.979
0.971
0.978
0.978
0.978

0.964
0.837
0.900
0.985
0.979
0.981
0.986
0.980
0.985
0.985
0.985

0.963
0.684
0.974
0.977
0.958
0.964
0.982
0.961
0.964
0.961
0.961

0.930
0.964
0.724
0.979
0.981
0.981
0.976
0.982
0.993
0.996
0.996

0.019
0.227
0.010
0.012
0.022
0.019
0.009
0.021
0.019
0.021
0.021

0.956
0.868
0.87
0.984
0.980
N/A
0.983
0.981
0.987
0.987
0.988

1.24
0.19
1.29
0.28
23.04
28.25
26.29
26.25
26.66
26.26
26.70
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F i g ure a.3: Performance metrics bar-charts of supervised ensemble models
using UNSW-NB15 dataset
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F i g ure a .4: ROC curves of supervised ensemble models using UNSW-NB15
dataset
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Ta ble a .3: Performance metrics for CICIDS2017 dataset using supervised
ensemble framework
Models
LR
NB
NN
DT
SVM
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

0.929
0.753
0.964
0.999
0.966
0.970
0.999
0.970
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.956
0.872
0.977
0.999
0.979
0.981
0.999
0.981
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.903
0.903
0.936
0.999
0.947
0.951
0.999
0.952
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.957
0.646
0.993
0.999
0.987
0.989
0.999
0.988
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.045
0.030
0.030
0.001
0.024
0.022
0.001
0.022
0.001
0.001
0.001

0.990
0.963
0.997
0.999
0.997
N/A
1.000
0.999
1.000
1.000
0.999

64.146
15.689
126.845
60.469
112330.711
112600.650
112599.961
112598.241
112601.044
112598.194
112610.225
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F i g ure a.5: Performance metrics bar-charts of supervised ensemble models
using CICIDS2017 dataset
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F i g ure a . 6: ROC curves of supervised ensemble models using CICIDS2017
dataset
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a p pendix b

Unsupervised Ensemble Detailed Results

This appendix section presents the detail results, i.e., evaluation metrics values,
graphs, and ROC curves, for all the three datasets used in Chapter 5. Tables b.1,
b.2 and b.3 show the detailed results for the supervised (both individual and
ensemble) models for the NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15 and CICIDS2017 dataset respectively. Figures b.1, b.3 and b.5 show the corresponding bar-graphs and the
ROC curves are shown in Figures b.2, b.4 and b.6 for three datasets.
Ta ble b.1: Performance metrics for NSL-KDD dataset using unsupervised
ensemble framework
Models
OCSVM_P
OCSVM_L
LOF
ISOF
EE
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NN
Ens_NB
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

0.814
0.831
0.502
0.885
0.897
0.87
0.896
0.902
0.902
0.949
0.949

0.841
0.861
0.589
0.894
0.91
0.882
0.91
0.907
0.955
0.953
0.953

0.843
0.9
0.540
0.853
0.904
0.846
0.923
0.859
0.926
0.921
0.921

0.787
0.771
0.468
0.919
0.891
0.896
0.871
0.95
0.978
0.978
0.978

0.116
0.068
0.315
0.125
0.075
0.129
0.059
0.127
0.063
0.068
0.068

0.835
0.852
0.576
0.897
0.908
N/A
0.906
0.912
0.957
0.955
0.955

148.683
171.334
728.318
24.529
49.590
1124.507
1122.519
1122.669
1122.498
1122.536
1122.518

237

F i g ure b .1 : Performance metrics bar-charts of unsupervised ensemble models
using NSL-KDD dataset
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F i g ure b.2: ROC curves of unsupervised ensemble models using NSL-KDD
dataset
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Ta ble b. 2: Performance metrics for UNSW-NB15 dataset using unsupervised
ensemble framework
Models
OCSVM_P
OCSVM_L
LOF
ISOF
EE
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

0.561
0.565
0.499
0.596
0.855
0.624
0.896
0.855
0.841
0.896
0.896

0.608
0.741
0.514
0.541
0.885
0.676
0.925
0.884
0.875
0.925
0.925

0.451
0.654
0.383
0.424
0.747
0.514
0.851
0.746
0.744
0.851
0.851

0.742
0.498
0.716
1.000
1.000
0.795
0.945
1.000
0.967
0.945
0.945

0.461
0.135
0.590
0.693
0.173
0.385
0.085
0.176
0.172
0.085
0.085

0.641
0.682
0.563
0.653
0.913
N/A
0.930
0.912
0.897
0.930
0.930

35.58
15.69
11.83
246.25
3.890
315.4
313.6
313.6
313.5
313.6
315.6
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F i g ure b .3 : Performance metrics bar-charts of unsupervised ensemble models
using UNSW-NB15 dataset
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F i g ure b.4: ROC curves of unsupervised ensemble models using UNSW-NB15
dataset
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Ta ble b . 3: Performance metrics for CICIDS2017 dataset using unsupervised
ensemble framework
Models

F1-Score

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

ROC AUC

Elapsed Time (s)

OCSVM_P
OCSVM_L
LOF
ISOF
EE
Ens_MV
Ens_LR
Ens_NB
Ens_NN
Ens_DT
Ens_SVM

0.145989
0.242523
0.355704
0.640336
0.647782
0.466815
0.701033
0.659011
0.703398
0.703398
0.703398

0.393467
0.618004
0.477056
0.779639
0.782862
0.688627
0.831363
0.793603
0.83355
0.83355
0.83355

0.127333
0.303909
0.283843
0.633589
0.637112
0.485242
0.765918
0.666235
0.773203
0.773203
0.773203

0.17105
0.201769
0.476289
0.647229
0.658815
0.449736
0.646284
0.651942
0.645153
0.645153
0.645153

0.509807
0.200981
0.52261
0.162778
0.163191
0.207482
0.087061
0.143957
0.08341
0.08341
0.08341

0.330621
0.500394
0.476839
0.742225
0.747812
N/A
0.779612
0.753992
0.780871
0.780871
0.780871

27085.11
15592.11
1056.684
114.8583
179.6919
44033.58
44029.45
44028.93
44039.26
44028.88
46415.09
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F i g ure b .5 : Performance metrics bar-charts of unsupervised ensemble models
using CICIDS2017 dataset
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F i g ure b.6: ROC curves of unsupervised ensemble models using CICIDS2017
dataset
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a p pendix c

Ensemble Feature Selection Framework (EnFS)
Detailed Results

In this section, ROC curves using seven selection methods and the overview of
all experimental results are shown in graphically and in tabular form, respectively
for the Chapter 7: Ensemble feature selection methods EnFS

c. 1

tables

Table c .1: Details results using NSL KDD dataset for EnFS framework
FS

Type

Ind

Pearson

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

LR

0.814

0.855

0.921

0.729

0.048

NB

0.822

0.859

0.911

0.75

0.056

NN

0.344

0.656

0.998

0.208

0

DT

0.808

0.857

0.976

0.689

0.013

SVM

0.834

0.874

0.977

0.728

0.013

Ens_MV

0.808

0.859

0.989

0.684

0.006

Ens_LR

0.874

0.895

0.903

0.848

0.07

Ens_NB

0.852

0.88

0.913

0.799

0.058

Ens
Continued
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FS

Type

Ind

Chi-2

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_NN

0.879

0.897

0.895

0.863

0.077

Ens_DT

0.882

0.904

0.941

0.83

0.04

Ens_SVM 0.882

0.904

0.94

0.83

0.041

LR

0.802

0.848

0.923

0.709

0.045

NB

0.82

0.857

0.909

0.747

0.058

NN

0.859

0.892

0.987

0.761

0.008

DT

0.826

0.869

0.975

0.717

0.014

SVM

0.887

0.91

0.98

0.81

0.013

Ens_MV

0.841

0.88

0.985

0.734

0.008

Ens_LR

0.912

0.929

0.98

0.853

0.013

Ens_NB

0.908

0.922

0.921

0.895

0.058

Ens_NN

0.916

0.926

0.9

0.932

0.079

Ens_DT

0.925

0.936

0.941

0.909

0.043

Ens_SVM 0.924

0.935

0.939

0.909

0.045

LR

0.754

0.826

0.979

0.613

0.01

NB

0.732

0.731

0.646

0.846

0.357

NN

0.78

0.842

0.986

0.646

0.007

DT

0.848

0.881

0.955

0.763

0.028

SVM

0.822

0.867

0.977

0.71

0.013

Ens

Ind

Mut Info

Continued
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FS

Type

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_MV

0.823

0.867

0.981

0.709

0.011

Ens_LR

0.864

0.891

0.937

0.802

0.041

Ens_NB

0.859

0.886

0.925

0.803

0.05

Ens_NN

0.868

0.895

0.948

0.801

0.034

Ens_DT

0.869

0.895

0.95

0.801

0.032

Ens_SVM 0.867

0.894

0.945

0.801

0.036

LR

0.869

0.894

0.936

0.811

0.043

NB

0.812

0.852

0.907

0.735

0.058

NN

0.873

0.901

0.988

0.781

0.007

DT

0.914

0.931

0.991

0.848

0.006

SVM

0.873

0.901

0.989

0.781

0.007

Ens_MV

0.87

0.899

0.989

0.777

0.007

Ens_LR

0.918

0.934

0.989

0.856

0.007

Ens_NB

0.898

0.915

0.939

0.859

0.042

Ens_NN

0.921

0.936

0.989

0.862

0.007

Ens_DT

0.921

0.936

0.989

0.862

0.007

Ens_SVM 0.919

0.935

0.988

0.859

0.008

LR

0.796

0.844

0.917

0.703

0.049

NB

0.565

0.447

0.429

0.828

0.846

Ens

Ind

LASSO

Ens

Ind

Continued

248

LRL1

FS

Type

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

NN

0.861

0.893

0.985

0.765

0.009

DT

0.82

0.866

0.986

0.702

0.008

SVM

0.826

0.87

0.988

0.709

0.007

Ens_MV

0.829

0.871

0.984

0.715

0.009

Ens_LR

0.887

0.911

0.982

0.808

0.011

Ens_NB

0.888

0.912

0.982

0.811

0.011

Ens_NN

0.921

0.936

0.989

0.862

0.007

Ens_DT

0.886

0.91

0.985

0.804

0.009

Ens_SVM 0.888

0.912

0.982

0.811

0.011

LR

0.798

0.846

0.928

0.7

0.042

NB

0.835

0.871

0.934

0.755

0.041

NN

0.325

0.65

1

0.194

0

DT

0.834

0.875

0.983

0.725

0.01

SVM

0.825

0.87

0.997

0.703

0.001

Ens_MV

0.804

0.857

0.999

0.672

0.001

Ens_LR

0.898

0.918

0.977

0.831

0.015

Ens_NB

0.862

0.889

0.927

0.806

0.048

Ens_NN

0.889

0.907

0.923

0.857

0.055

Ens_DT

0.898

0.918

0.977

0.831

0.015

Ens

Ind

RF

Ens

Continued
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FS

Type

Ind

RFE

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_SVM 0.898

0.918

0.977

0.831

0.015

LR

0.841

0.874

0.928

0.77

0.046

NB

0.786

0.824

0.833

0.743

0.114

NN

0.778

0.785

0.705

0.866

0.278

DT

0.818

0.864

0.981

0.702

0.011

SVM

0.825

0.87

0.986

0.71

0.008

Ens_MV

0.817

0.857

0.923

0.732

0.047

Ens_LR

0.891

0.913

0.979

0.817

0.013

Ens_NB

0.844

0.876

0.921

0.779

0.051

Ens_NN

0.89

0.913

0.986

0.811

0.008

Ens_DT

0.893

0.916

0.99

0.813

0.006

Ens_SVM 0.893

0.916

0.99

0.814

0.006

LR

0.885

0.905

0.933

0.842

0.046

NB

0.836

0.861

0.857

0.815

0.104

NN

0.83

0.866

0.923

0.754

0.048

DT

0.92

0.935

0.986

0.863

0.009

SVM

0.967

0.972

0.984

0.949

0.012

Ens_MV

0.888

0.907

0.938

0.843

0.043

Ens_LR

0.97

0.974

0.988

0.953

0.009

Ens

Ind

EnFS

Continued
Ens
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FS

Type

Ind

No FS

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_NB

0.946

0.952

0.942

0.95

0.046

Ens_NN

0.97

0.974

0.992

0.949

0.006

Ens_DT

0.971

0.975

0.991

0.952

0.006

Ens_SVM 0.97

0.974

0.989

0.952

0.009

LR

0.846

0.877

0.93

0.775

0.045

NB

0.807

0.856

0.971

0.69

0.016

NN

0.84

0.873

0.933

0.763

0.042

DT

0.875

0.895

0.928

0.832

0.021

SVM

0.866

0.897

0.99

0.77

0.006

Ens_MV

0.858

0.891

0.988

0.759

0.007

Ens_LR

0.804

0.857

0.938

0.722

0.01

Ens_NB

0.87

0.892

0.925

0.821

0.052

Ens_NN

0.872

0.901

0.93

0.835

0.013

Ens_DT

0.884

0.9

0.878

0.89

0.011

0.845

0.882

0.791

0.012

Ens

Ens_SVM 0.834

c. 2

roc curves

251

(a) Chi-Squared

(b) Lasso

252

(c) LR with L1 penalty

(d) Mutual Information

253

(e) Pearson

(f) Random Forest

254

(g) Recursive Feature Elimination

F i g ure c .1: ROC Curves for seven feature selection methods using NSL-KDD
dataset in EnFS framework
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a p pendix d

Interpretable Machine Learning based Feature
Selection (IMLFS) Detailed Results

In this section, ROC curves using seven selection methods and the overview
of all experimental results are shown in graphically and in tabular form, respectively for the Chapter 9: Interpretable Machine Learning based Feature Selection
method (IMLFS)

d. 1

tables

Table d . 1: Details results using NSL KDD dataset for IMLFS framework
FS

Type

Ind

No FS

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

LR

0.846

0.877

0.93

0.775

0.045

NB

0.807

0.856

0.971

0.69

0.016

NN

0.84

0.873

0.933

0.763

0.042

DT

0.875

0.895

0.928

0.832

0.021

SVM

0.866

0.897

0.99

0.77

0.006

Ens_MV

0.858

0.891

0.988

0.759

0.007

Ens_LR

0.804

0.857

0.938

0.722

0.01

Continued
Ens
256

FS

Type

Ind

Anova

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_NB

0.87

0.892

0.925

0.821

0.052

Ens_NN

0.872

0.901

0.93

0.835

0.013

Ens_DT

0.884

0.9

0.878

0.89

0.011

Ens_SVM 0.834

0.845

0.882

0.791

0.012

LR

0.782

0.842

0.971

0.655

0.015

NB

0.831

0.871

0.968

0.728

0.019

NN

0.744

0.82

0.976

0.601

0.011

DT

0.753

0.825

0.971

0.615

0.014

SVM

0.763

0.831

0.975

0.627

0.012

Ens_MV

0.77

0.835

0.975

0.636

0.012

Ens_LR

0.831

0.871

0.964

0.73

0.021

Ens_NB

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_NN

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_DT

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_SVM 0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

LR

0.488

0.705

0.993

0.324

0.002

NB

0.488

0.704

0.981

0.325

0.005

NN

0.396

0.67

0.97

0.249

0.006

DT

0.398

0.671

0.965

0.251

0.007

Ens

Ind

Continued
Chi-2
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FS

Type

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

SVM

0.385

0.668

0.989

0.239

0.002

Ens_MV

0.395

0.672

0.988

0.247

0.002

Ens_LR

0.495

0.707

0.98

0.331

0.005

Ens_NB

0.501

0.708

0.963

0.339

0.01

Ens_NN

0.501

0.708

0.963

0.339

0.01

Ens_DT

0.498

0.709

0.981

0.334

0.005

Ens_SVM 0.501

0.709

0.973

0.337

0.007

LR

0.75

0.799

0.815

0.694

0.121

NB

0.786

0.815

0.789

0.783

0.161

NN

0.855

0.877

0.876

0.836

0.091

DT

0.797

0.848

0.951

0.686

0.027

SVM

0.842

0.873

0.916

0.778

0.055

Ens_MV

0.821

0.853

0.869

0.778

0.09

Ens_LR

0.876

0.897

0.918

0.838

0.057

Ens_NB

0.822

0.854

0.867

0.782

0.091

Ens_NN

0.878

0.899

0.918

0.841

0.057

Ens_DT

0.88

0.901

0.923

0.841

0.053

Ens_SVM 0.88

0.901

0.923

0.841

0.053

LR

0.565

0.462

0.006

0.006

Ens

Ind

LASSO

Ens

0.013
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FS

Type

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

NB

0.553

0.39

0.406

0.869

0.978

NN

0.092

0.583

0.858

0.049

0.006

DT

0.093

0.583

0.861

0.049

0.006

SVM

0.092

0.583

0.854

0.049

0.006

Ens_MV

0.092

0.583

0.858

0.049

0.006

Ens_LR

0.29

0.627

0.824

0.176

0.029

Ens_NB

0.29

0.627

0.822

0.176

0.029

Ens_NN

nan

0.567

nan

0

0

Ens_DT

0.283

0.628

0.85

0.17

0.023

Ens_SVM 0.29

0.627

0.824

0.176

0.029

LR

0.032

0.56

0.354

0.017

0.024

NB

0.55

0.399

0.408

0.844

0.942

NN

0.752

0.821

0.947

0.623

0.027

DT

0.755

0.826

0.966

0.62

0.017

SVM

0.758

0.83

0.991

0.613

0.004

Ens_MV

0.756

0.828

0.981

0.615

0.009

Ens_LR

0.836

0.87

0.926

0.762

0.046

Ens_NB

0.749

0.816

0.919

0.632

0.043

Ens_NN

nan

0.567

nan

0

0

Ens

Ind

Mut Info

Ens
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FS

Type

Ind

PCA

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_DT

0.84

0.875

0.937

0.762

0.039

Ens_SVM 0.84

0.875

0.937

0.762

0.039

LR

0.818

0.862

0.962

0.711

0.022

NB

0.79

0.848

0.983

0.661

0.009

NN

0.802

0.853

0.961

0.689

0.021

DT

0.641

0.748

0.839

0.519

0.077

SVM

0.792

0.838

0.897

0.709

0.063

Ens_MV

0.793

0.848

0.97

0.671

0.016

Ens_LR

0.866

0.894

0.957

0.79

0.027

Ens_NB

0.86

0.888

0.941

0.791

0.038

Ens_NN

0.866

0.894

0.956

0.791

0.028

Ens_DT

0.866

0.894

0.957

0.791

0.027

Ens_SVM 0.866

0.894

0.957

0.79

0.027

LR

0.782

0.842

0.971

0.655

0.015

NB

0.831

0.871

0.968

0.728

0.019

NN

0.744

0.82

0.976

0.601

0.011

DT

0.756

0.827

0.971

0.619

0.014

SVM

0.763

0.831

0.975

0.627

0.012

Ens_MV

0.77

0.835

0.975

0.636

0.012

Ens

Ind

Pearson

Continued
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FS

Type

Ind

RF

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

Ens_LR

0.831

0.871

0.964

0.73

0.021

Ens_NB

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_NN

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_DT

0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

Ens_SVM 0.833

0.872

0.959

0.736

0.024

LR

0.782

0.833

0.906

0.688

0.055

NB

0.832

0.861

0.875

0.793

0.087

NN

0.762

0.822

0.909

0.656

0.05

DT

0.819

0.866

0.987

0.7

0.007

SVM

0.763

0.825

0.927

0.649

0.039

Ens_MV

0.764

0.823

0.912

0.657

0.049

Ens_LR

0.861

0.883

0.883

0.84

0.085

Ens_NB

0.844

0.875

0.916

0.783

0.055

Ens_NN

0.863

0.884

0.887

0.84

0.082

Ens_DT

0.863

0.884

0.886

0.84

0.082

Ens_SVM 0.862

0.884

0.885

0.84

0.083

LR

0.701

0.784

0.878

0.583

0.062

NB

0.701

0.783

0.874

0.585

0.065

NN

0.772

0.819

0.852

0.707

0.095

Ens

Ind

Continued
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FS

Type

Classifier

F-1

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

FPR

DT

0.76

0.813

0.86

0.681

0.085

SVM

0.717

0.789

0.858

0.616

0.078

Ens_MV

0.714

0.79

0.872

0.605

0.068

Ens_LR

0.801

0.839

0.862

0.748

0.091

Ens_NB

0.775

0.822

0.854

0.709

0.093

Ens_NN

0.803

0.838

0.849

0.761

0.103

Ens_DT

0.8

0.839

0.862

0.747

0.091

Ens_SVM 0.801

0.839

0.862

0.748

0.091

LR

0.823

0.853

0.864

0.785

0.095

NB

0.824

0.853

0.862

0.788

0.097

NN

0.106

0.57

0.553

0.058

0.036

DT

0.879

0.897

0.895

0.863

0.078

SVM

0.913

0.925

0.926

0.9

0.055

Ens_MV

0.827

0.856

0.867

0.79

0.093

Ens_LR

0.938

0.945

0.921

0.955

0.064

Ens_NB

0.888

0.901

0.877

0.9

0.099

Ens_NN

0.938

0.944

0.921

0.955

0.064

Ens_DT

0.94

0.946

0.925

0.955

0.06

Ens_SVM 0.94

0.946

0.925

0.955

0.06

Ens

Ind

IMLFS

Ens
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d. 2

roc curves

(a) Anova

(b) Chi-Squared

263

(c) Lasso

(d) LR with L1 penalty

264

(e) Mutual Information

(f) PCA

265

(g) Pearson

(h) Random Forest

266

(i) Recursive Feature Elimination

(j) IML based Feature Selection

F i g ure d .1: ROC Curves for nine feature selection methods using NSL-KDD
dataset in IMLFS framework
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a p pendix e

Implementation Details

This section provides the details of the implementation of several machine
learning approaches shown in this dissertation.

e .1

background

The first step of performing this research is to get to know the basics of some
machine learning (ML) concepts like how do several supervised and unsupervised ML models work, their fundamentals, and inner functionality. Basically,
here we illustrated ensemble ML concept using our customized way. Details of
supervised and unsupervised ensemble are listed in chapters 4, and 5, respectively. Afterward, we have incorporated two feature selection approaches, such
as ensemble feature selection (in chapter 7) and interpretable machine learning
based feature selection (in chapter 9) to get better performances in detecting DDoS
attack. Furthermore, we have exclusively added explanation with each DDoS
detection to make the prediction trustworthy to the users using DDoS explainer
model (in chapter 10). For further literature review and background study, we
have added a detailed background section in chapter 2 in this dissertation.
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e .2

dataset

As mentioned earlier, we have used three benchmark datasets in this dissertation, such as NSL-KDD [8], UNSW-NB15 [9], and CICIDS2017 [10]. The reason
behind using these datasets are, they are well-known, several research has already
been performed using this data, and consists of recent day attack data. As our
goal was to detect DDoS attacks, we have chosen these three dataset and extracted
the DDoS data from there wisely.

e .3

software requirements

Data analysis with various domain datasets can be accomplished by several
tools like Weka. However, we haven’t used any tool to simulate or implement
our framework. Since, we have customized our ensemble mechanism, we wrote
code to implement these framework. Python is one of the popular and effective
language in data analysis as it has many more build-in libraries like scikit-learn,
keras, tensorflow, pandas, numpy, etc. We have used Python as the base programming language and scikit-learn to load several supervised and unsupervised
models for training and testing purposes. Also, output generation, evaluation
metrics generation, etc. are performed by scikit-learn’s member functions. Also,
we need to write code for data clean, data sanitize and data preparation purposes.
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e .4

hardware requirements

We have used Intel Core i5 processor with 8 GM of RAM for these simulation
and exterminations. Basically, we used Linux and MacOS operating system to
run these simulations to avoid any system overheads. Besides, we used console
instead of any python IDE which saved memory and time during model training
and testing.
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